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Summary 
 
Should I try to grow an orange tree on my balcony? 
According to modern decision theory, when individuals consider taking on a course of 
action that involves expending effort and other costs in the pursuit of valuable yet uncertain 
outcomes, their decision typically follows on a specific, subjective assessment of the overall 
value of that course of action, relative to the value of alternative courses of action. It is assumed 
that the overall value of a given course of action is its expected utility, i.e., the sum of the 
subjective values of all its possible outcomes weighted by their respective probability, 
discounted by the costs that this course of action entails. Over the last forty years, many 
violations of the expected utility maximization principle have been pointed out, and almost as 
many adjusted decision models have been proposed, in an effort to better account for actual 
human behaviour. Despite these consecutive adjustments, one implicit assumption has 
remained at the core of decision theory until this day: that of a mutual independence between 
the decisional variables that are combined together in action valuation, in particular 1) the 
subjective value of possible outcomes, 2) the subjective probability of these outcomes, 3) the 
subjective cost of action. Yet, over the past decades, substantial evidence from behavioural 
psychology and neuroeconomics experiments has accumulated, showing that value, 
probability and cost judgments can influence, or interfere with, each other. 
In this PhD work, we investigated such manifestations, with the aim of elucidating the 
computational and neural mechanisms underlying these interferences. For this, we conducted 
three studies on healthy human volunteers. 
In the first study, we had participants anticipate the energetic cost of composite running 
routes whose later completion could entail more or less valuable monetary outcomes, either 
framed as obtained gains or avoided losses. We found that a given route was anticipated as 
more costly when it was paired with a larger monetary stake compared to a smaller one (either 
in the gain or loss frame). Besides, our behavioural data were most in line with a cognitive 
scenario according to which individuals’ prospective effort judgment is contaminated by the 
output of a cost-benefit computation.  
In the second study, we moved on to the investigation of interferences between value and 
probability, with a focus on a particular case of probability judgment: confidence, that is, the 
subjective probability of being correct or successful at a given task.  Our participants were 
trained to perform a motor precision task; next, they underwent testing trials in which they 
were first presented with information about the upcoming motor challenge: its difficulty 
(adjusted via the size of the target to be hit), the magnitude of their monetary gain in case of 
success, and the magnitude of monetary loss in case of failure; then, they were prompted to 
estimate their prospective chances of success (i.e. to report their confidence); finally, they 
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tried to hit the target but did not receive any feedback about their performance. Our main 
finding was that individuals tend to be more confident when faced with a larger prospective 
gain, but less confident when faced with a larger prospective loss. This pattern of distortions 
is evocative of an affect-as-information type of misattribution. 
In our third study, we drew inspiration from earlier neuroimaging findings to predict that 
value-confidence misattributions may occur bidirectionally, and between unrelated items. To 
test our predictions, we had participants answer more or less difficult general-knowledge quiz 
questions while hearing more or less pleasant musical extracts, after which we asked them to 
make a confidence rating about their answer to the quiz question, or a likeability rating about 
the musical background. Partly in line with our predictions, higher confidence led to higher 
likeability ratings, whereas the opposite effect was more elusive.  
Overall, we managed to isolate, at the behavioural level, various cases of interference 
between decisional variables in a well-controlled setting, and we gained some insight about 
their underlying cognitive mechanisms, which seem to differ from one type of interference to 
the other. 
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Résumé 
 
Devrais-je essayer de faire pousser un oranger sur mon balcon ? 
Selon la théorie moderne de la décision, lorsqu’un individu envisage de s’engager dans 
une séquence d’actions impliquant d’investir des efforts ainsi que d’autres formes de coût, en 
vue d’une issue désirable mais incertaine, sa décision repose typiquement sur une estimation 
subjective et spécifique de la valeur globale de cette séquence d’actions, mise en regard de la 
valeur des séquences d’actions alternatives. 
La théorie suppose que la valeur globale d’une séquence d’actions correspond à son 
utilité espérée, c’est-à-dire à la somme des valeurs subjectives de toutes ses issues possibles 
pondérées par leur probabilité respective, escomptée par les coûts occasionnés par cette 
séquence d’actions. Au cours des quarante dernières années, de nombreuses transgressions 
du principe de maximisation de l’utilité espérée ont été mises en évidence, et presque autant 
de modèles de décision ajustés ont été proposés afin de mieux rendre compte de la réalité du 
comportement humain. Malgré ces ajustements successifs, une hypothèse implicite est restée 
ancrée jusqu’à ce jour au cœur de la théorie de la décision : celle d’une indépendance mutuelle 
entre les différentes variables décisionnelles combinées lors de l’évaluation d’une séquence 
d’actions, en particulier 1) la valeur subjective des issues possibles, 2) la probabilité subjective 
de ces issues, 3) le coût subjectif de l’action. Pourtant, au fil de ces dernières décennies, nombre 
d’études en psychologie comportementale et en neuroéconomie ont jeté un doute sur la 
pertinence de cette hypothèse, en rapportant des cas d’interférence entre les jugements de 
valeur, de probabilité et de coût.  
Au cours de ce doctorat, nous nous sommes intéressés à ces manifestations, dans le but 
d’élucider les mécanismes computationnels et cérébraux sous-tendant de telles interférences. 
Nous avons, pour cela, conduit trois études sur des volontaires humains sains. 
Dans la première étude, nos participants étaient invités à anticiper le coût énergétique de 
divers parcours de course composés de plusieurs tronçons, dont la complétion ultérieure 
pouvait donner lieu à l’obtention d’un gain ou à l’évitement d’une perte monétaire plus ou 
moins importante. Nous avons observé qu’un parcours donné était anticipé comme plus 
coûteux (sur le plan énergétique) lorsqu’il était associé à un enjeu monétaire plus important, 
dans la condition « gain » comme dans la condition « perte ». En outre, nos données 
comportementales étaient en accord avec un scénario dans lequel les jugements d’effort 
prospectifs seraient contaminés par le résultat d’un calcul coût-bénéfice. 
Dans la deuxième étude, nous nous sommes penchés sur les interférences entre 
jugements de valeur et de probabilité, et en particulier de confiance, définie comme la 
probabilité subjective de réussite lors d’une tâche donnée. Après avoir été entraînés à 
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effectuer correctement une tâche de précision motrice consistant à atteindre une cible en 
serrant un dynamomètre à main, nos participants étaient amenés, lors des essais de test 
proprement dits, à prendre connaissance de la difficulté du challenge moteur à venir (ajustée 
via la taille de la cible à atteindre) ainsi que de la taille du gain (ou de la perte) monétaire en 
cas de succès (ou d’échec), puis à estimer a priori leurs chances de réussir à atteindre la cible 
; enfin, ils tentaient d’atteindre la cible mais ne recevaient aucun feedback quant à leur 
performance. Les participants se montraient plus confiants lorsque le challenge pouvait 
conduire à un gain plus important, et inversement moins confiants lorsqu’ils risquaient une 
perte plus importante. Ces distorsions de la confiance pourraient résulter d’une 
« misattribution » de l’état affectif induit par les pertes et gains prospectifs. 
Dans notre troisième étude, nous nous sommes inspirés de récents résultats en 
neuroimagerie pour prédire que les misattributions entre jugements de valeur et de confiance 
pourraient avoir lieu dans les deux sens, y compris lorsque ces jugements portent sur des 
stimuli ou objets logiquement indépendants. Afin de tester nos prédictions, nous avons soumis 
des volontaires à des questions de culture générale plus ou moins difficiles, auxquelles ils 
répondaient tout en entendant des extraits musicaux plus ou moins plaisants, après quoi ils 
étaient invités à rapporter la confiance qu’ils avaient dans leur réponse à la question de culture 
générale, ou bien à noter à quel point ils avaient apprécié l’extrait musical. En accord partiel 
avec nos prédictions, une confiance plus élevée dans la réponse au quiz donnait lieu à une 
appréciation plus élevée de la musique, mais l’effet inverse s’est avéré moins robuste.  
Dans l’ensemble, nous sommes parvenus à isoler, au niveau comportemental, divers cas 
d’interférence entre variables décisionnelles dans un contexte expérimental bien contrôlé, et 
nous avons approfondi la compréhension des mécanismes cognitifs sous-jacents, lesquels 
semblent différer d’un type d’interférence à l’autre. 
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If you are a standard human being, you likely engage several times a day in courses 
of action which imply spending time, energy, and other resources, in the pursuit of 
certain outcomes that you think valuable, but that you are seldom guaranteed to obtain.  
In this work, we explored how some fundamental cognitive processes that 
typically precede and orient the selection of a course of action might interfere together 
and generate inferential and behavioural biases. 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is 1) to present these cognitive processes 
and their relation to observable behaviour, 2) to review current knowledge about their 
neural implementation, 3) to review the various cases of interferences that have been 
reported in the literature to this day, 4) to introduce the research questions that we 
have addressed during this thesis. 
We will approach the topic with a prosaic (yet purely fictitious) scenario.  
 
Let us consider Edouard, a former intern at the NCC1 lab. Despite timid first steps, 
Edouard has done undeniably well for himself in life, and he is now the proud tenant of 
a one-bedroom Parisian flat with a balcony from which one can almost see the Sacré-
Coeur. With just a little more greenery around him, his happiness would be complete. 
Besides nature, Edouard also loves orange juice, so, as he strolls along the aisles of the 
garden center, he thinks he might as well grow an organic orange tree on his balcony. 
But will it survive the drizzly, chilly local weather? Also, how long will he have to wait 
before the tree bears fruit? At least one month, he assumes. And how much orange juice 
can he expect it to yield each year? Wouldn’t it be more reasonable to grow an apple 
tree, which might be more robust and productive, although its fruit is less delicious? 
Besides, Edouard notices that these baby trees are quite pricey, and might need 
trimming and other forms of care that take time and skill, either of which Edouard is 
not entirely certain to have in large amounts...2  
 
Of particular significance to us are the several estimation processes that seem to 
have been occurring in the protagonist’s mind while he was pondering whether to try 
and grow an orange tree: he envisioned the possible outcomes of this endeavour and 
estimated how valuable, or enjoyable, these outcomes would be; he assessed the 
likelihood that these more or less valuable outcomes would occur, and in how long, 
taking into account his gardening skills; he evaluated the different costs entailed by the 
project: the monetary cost of buying the tree, the temporal and physical cost of watering 
it, trimming it and repotting it, etc. 
We shall see now how these estimation processes have received interest from 
economists, psychologists, and neuroscientists over the last centuries, and how they 
have been incorporated into modern theories of action selection. 
 
1 Neuron, Cognition & Computation 
2 For the record, Edouard was seen leaving the garden center about an hour later with three guppy fish in a 
plastic bag. 
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A.  Decisional variables: the cognitive components of action selection 
 
 
 
In this section, we will take a historical tour of the main economic and 
psychological theories of preference-based option or action selection, and in doing 
so, we will get acquainted with three recurring constructs: outcome value, outcome 
probability, and action cost. 
 
 
1) Apples and oranges: the science of choice and value in its early days 
 
a. Value & price in nascent economics 
 
If we were to pinpoint — somewhat arbitrarily — a triggering event in the 
ongoing quest of economists, psychologists and philosophers for an insightful and 
powerfully predictive theory of human choice, a good candidate would be the 
formulation of the “diamond-water paradox” by Adam Smith (1723-1790)1. This 
paradox is in fact pretty unsophisticated: why are diamonds (which are practically 
useless) so expensive, while drinking water (which is vital) is almost free? Or, as 
Adam Smith puts it: 
“Nothing is more useful than water: but it will purchase scarcely anything; 
scarcely anything can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, 
has scarcely any use-value; but a very great quantity of other goods may 
frequently be had in exchange for it.”    (Smith, 1776a) 
 
 
 
1 This paradox had already appeared in much earlier works, such as Plato’s Euthydemus, Nicolaus Copernicus’ 
and John Law’s, and had likely been submitted by numerous Antiquity and Middle Ages children to their parents, 
but Adam Smith is often considered to be its most influential presenter. 
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In this excerpt, Smith contrasts two important notions: use-value, that is, 
how useful it is to own or consume the considered item, and exchange-value, 
better known as “price” in money-based economies. At the time, economists were 
struggling to formalize what determined the price at which goods were exchanged 
on markets. More specifically, they were seeking to establish a reliable and 
quantitative relationship between production costs, exchange-value, and use-
value. To many of them, it seemed intuitive that exchange value should reflect use-
value, in the sense that buyers’ willingness to pay — or, more generally, to give up 
personal resources — for a good should be commensurate to how useful to them 
they expect this good to be, but Smith’s observation suggested that market realities 
did not conform to what their intuition dictated.  
Some economists, like David Ricardo (Ricardo, 1821) and Adam Smith 
himself, saw in this apparent paradox a mere confirmation of their “labour theory 
of value”, according to which production costs, e.g., in terms of hours of labour 
needed to produce the good, play a dominant role in determining exchange-value:  
“The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who 
wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it.”    (Smith, 1776b) 
 
And indeed, a diamond has a higher production cost than a litre of water. Yet, 
other thinkers objected (in essence) that this view did not hold out to the fact that 
a bunch of white ear hair painstakingly assembled into a pocket-size model of 
Versailles would likely not sell for much on most marketplaces. Thus, neither 
production costs nor use-value could be accepted as satisfactory standalone 
determinants of exchange-value, and the diamond-water paradox kept puzzling 
economists until the middle of the next century.  
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b. The Marginal Revolution  
 
What happened in the middle of the nineteenth century was that three 
European economists, William Stanley Jevons (Jevons, 1871), Carl Menger (Menger, 
1871) and Léon Walras (Walras, 1874), almost simultaneously noticed something 
peculiar about prices, which sparked an insight about the psychological value of 
things. Their first step was to realize that the exchange price of a given good, such 
as a litre of water, depended on the quantity that the transactioners already 
possessed. Looking at the price curve of water as a function of the volume 
exchanged, one could see that the price at which each additional (or marginal) litre 
of water was sold and bought diminished with the quantity initially possessed (or 
just acquired) by the agents. 
 
Fig. 1.1: Illustrative curve depicting the exchange-value of water as 
a function of the volume already possessed. From (Caplin & Glimcher, 
2014). 
 
This observation seemingly solved Smith’s paradox, by accounting for the 
cheapness of a litre of water in societies such as theirs where water was abundant 
and owned in large quantities by most citizens, and for the expensiveness of 
diamonds, which were obviously much scarcer. But these economists, now called 
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Marginalists, were not content with that feat, and sought to understand why 
marginal price declined as a function of the possessed quantity of goods. Indeed, 
why should it be that, under some circumstances, people are willing to expend large 
sums for a good, whereas under other circumstances, they would not give a penny 
for the exact same good? Why, in fact, should price depend on scarcity? They 
reasoned that an individual’s willingness to pay for a good must reflect the degree 
of pleasure, or contentment, or happiness, all encompassed by the notion of utility, 
that she expects to derive from owning or consuming it. More specifically, they 
made the decisive assumption that people are striving to maximize their overall 
utility, and that their pricing behaviour must thus relate to the marginal utility that 
they perceive the traded good to carry. Looking at empirical price curves from 
contemporary markets, and noticing their recurring concave pattern, they 
concluded that individuals must experience less utility from each subsequent 
quantity of good that they came to own. Our modern understanding of value-based 
decision-making owes a lot to the Marginal Revolution: perhaps even more 
important than their establishing of a diminishing marginal utility, is their bridging 
of economics with psychology, through explicit incorporation of subjectivity 
aspects, and in particular hedonic feelings, in the scientific study of human choice.  
 
c. The Ordinal and Revealed Preference revolutions  
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Marginal Revolution had drawn a 
horde of economists in its wake, among whom many sought to shed more light on 
the determinants of individual utility. They attempted to quantify its relation to 
other economic constructs such as use-value and scarcity, and to capture it in all its 
functional details (Caplin & Glimcher, 2014). Some of them, like Francis Edgeworth 
(Edgeworth, 1881), inspired by utilitarian thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill, were hoping to apply their findings to a large-scale maximization 
of society’s welfare (Drakopoulos, 1989). 
However, as Vilfredo Pareto soon remarked (and even proved 
mathematically, (Pareto, 1906)), these enthusiastic scholars had missed a crucial 
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point: any utility function could only be specified up to a monotonically increasing 
transformation, such that one could not simply resort to numerical values drawn 
from utility curves to predict which of two bundles of items an individual would 
like better, or to arbitrate which of two individuals liked an item better. Besides, he 
argued, there was no convincing evidence that utility had any grounding in reality, 
not to mention the assumption that agents were indeed acting to maximize it. 
Choices and prices, he claimed, were the only things that economists could 
empirically observe (in those days, self-introspection as a tool for scientific inquiry 
was falling out of popularity, and the “hedonimeter” that some longed for in their 
cardinalist investigation of utility was still pure fantasy (Hands, 2010)). As such, 
choice behaviours were the only sound basis on which to erect theories of decision-
making. Utility could at best summarize a set of preferences already observed in 
reality; it could be a way to express which, of A or B, an agent prefers, but it could 
never tell us how much A was preferred to B. In short, utility was only about 
ordering, not about measuring. Pareto’s dismissal of the cardinal conception of 
utility, instead of which he advocated a purely ordinal approach, initiated the so-
called Ordinal Revolution, and found its way into the mind of the next 
revolutionary thinker in this simplified (his)tory of decision theory.  
Despite its name, the Revealed Preference Revolution which came after 
the Ordinal Revolution did not represent a conceptual break from Pareto’s view, 
but rather followed and built upon it. Yet, it marked a turning point regarding the 
general flavour of economic science. Until then, theories of consumer choice had 
displayed mostly descriptive ambitions, and the Revealed Preference Revolution 
brought about a shift towards a more normative, mathematicised approach. The 
aforementioned “next revolutionary thinker” was Paul Samuelson. His initiation of 
the Revealed Preference movement can be traced back to 1938, when he published 
an article (Samuelson, 1938) in which he argued that economists should, once and 
for all, draw away from the concept of utility, and in particular, from the conception 
that utilities are causing choices. He advocated a radical focus on choice as the only 
acceptable way to reveal preference, and the only valid starting point from which 
to infer theoretical abstractions. In his view, not only was utility intrinsically unable 
to provide a cardinal metric of preference, as Pareto had pointed out, but the very 
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assumption that agents are seeking to maximize utility, that is, the cornerstone of 
Marginalism, should be made questionable, or more precisely, falsifiable. In fact, 
Samuelson came forth with a formal way to challenge the validity of the utility 
maximization theory. He proposed a very simple, seemingly undemanding axiom 
about choice, which constituted a necessary condition that any decision-maker 
should verify for his set of choices to be seen as consistent with utility 
maximization. This axiom is known as the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(WARP), and can be written as follows: if a subject is observed to choose A over B, 
then he cannot strictly prefer B to A. Practically, in terms of choice, this latter 
proposition means that the subject cannot choose  B over a bundle comprised of A 
and an infinitesimal amount of money. 
 Thus, what Samuelson demonstrated is that, if the choice behaviour of an 
agent was shown, in any situation, to violate the WARP, then it must be concluded 
that this agent’s overall choice behaviour cannot be described as maximizing a 
single internal utility function.  
Some years later, Hendrik Houthakker (Houthakker, 1950) went a crucial 
step further by providing the field with a cleverly augmented version of 
Samuelson’s axiom: for an agent’s choice behaviour, satisfying Houthakker’s axiom 
was both a necessary and sufficient condition for being declared consistent with the 
maximization of some utility function. This extended axiom is known as the 
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference, or GARP. It can be expressed as 
follows:  If a subject is observed to choose A over B, and also observed to choose B over 
C, then he cannot strictly prefer C to A. 
If an agent is observed to consistently satisfy the GARP, then it does not mean 
that his choices are actually driven by the will to maximize a monotonically 
increasing utility function, but that they may be described as if it were the case, i.e., 
that there exists a utility function that could fully account for his choice behaviour. 
By virtue of Pareto’s demonstration, the exact functional form of that function can 
never be determined based on choices only, and seeking the functional form is 
intrinsically wrong. Discerning readers may have recognized this axiom as 
belonging to the class of transitivity axioms. In fact, transitivity now serves as the 
very standard defining preference consistency, and is part of the definition of 
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economic rationality. To illustrate this, let us consider someone who strictly prefers 
apples over oranges, oranges over grapes, and grapes over apples. Because of the 
circularity (or, intransitivity) of his preferences, that person could get turned into a 
“money pump” (Davidson et al., 1955): if he was given an apple, he would certainly 
be willing to pay an insignificant fee (say, 1 cent) to exchange his currently owned 
fruit for a preferred fruit (here, grapes), and find himself, after 3000 such 
exchanges, with the original apple in hand and 300€ less in his wallet. This is, 
indeed, the kind of behaviour that would be intuitively qualified as “irrational”.  
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2) Will the tree bear fruit? Incorporating uncertainty in choice problems 
 
a. Expected Value: Blaise Pascal giving gamblers a hand 
 
It is often stated that we are living in an increasingly uncertain world. Yet, 
more than three centuries before people became aware of the threat posed by 
global warming and started debating whether they should keep bringing sentient 
beings into this world (or whether Liverpool FC or Real Madrid would win the next 
Champion’s League), Louis XIV’s subjects were already faced with pretty serious 
matters of worry or hope: will the harvests be good enough for us to make it 
through winter? Will the doctor (who also happens to be the village’s shoemaker) 
be able to save my wife from pneumonia?  Meanwhile, in more frivolous settings, 
aristocrats were pondering whether they should enter the latest game of chance, in 
which they might make or lose a small fortune. In 1654, one of these aristocrats, 
known as Chevalier de Méré, stumbled over one particular gambling problem: if a 
game, opposing two players across several rounds for a pot to which they had 
contributed equally, was interrupted before either player had achieved victory, 
then what would be a fair division of the pot?  
He turned to his friend — and mathematics genius — Blaise Pascal, asking 
for his assistance in solving this “problem of points”. Pascal agreed to take the case, 
and started discussing it in his correspondence with Pierre de Fermat (another 
decent mathematician of the time).  
Although it was intuitive that the division of the pot should somehow reflect 
the current relative score of each player, Pascal and Fermat realized that the focus 
should not be on how many rounds each player had already won, but how many 
additional rounds would have been needed by each player to achieve victory, had the 
game not been interrupted.  
Soon enough, they had laid down the foundations for the theory of 
probability, and Pascal had come up with a new mathematical concept: expected 
value. Expected value formally quantifies the average value that a random variable 
(e.g., the number of rounds played until victory) would take, across a large (actually 
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infinite) number of trials. If we imagine that on each trial, the random variable 𝑋 
can take one of three possible values, {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3}, with respective probabilities 
{𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3}, then its expected value is written: 
𝐸𝑉[𝑋] = ∑ 𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖
3
𝑖=1
 
 
But what definitely earned Pascal a seat in the pantheon of decision theorists 
was his following step: he proposed a universal solution to any gambling problem 
involving uncertain outcomes whose probabilities are known. Imagine that you are 
offered to buy a 15€ ticket to a lottery in which 3 of the 150 sold tickets will yield a 
prize of 1000€. Should you buy it? — ‘You certainly should’, would Pascal reply. 
Indeed, he would argue, — assuming you would rather own more money than less 
— you should always choose whatever option holds the highest expected value. 
And in this specific case, not buying the lottery ticket has an expected value of 0€ 
(you don’t spend nor earn anything), while buying it has an expected value of: 
𝐸𝑉[𝐿𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡] =
3
150
∙ (1000 − 15) +
147
150
∙ (0 − 15) = 5€ 
 
Thus, Pascal formulated a simple yet powerful precept for optimal decision-
making between options involving some form of uncertainty, or risk: maximize 
expected value. He seemed fairly confident in the universal validity of this rule, and, 
in an effort to instil some Christian faith in an (imaginary) atheist interlocutor, he 
went on and famously applied it to a rather significant wager: that of believing in 
the existence of God, which, he explained, had a higher expected value than not 
believing in God. (Pascal, 1670) 
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b. Expected Utility: one Bernoulli may conceal another 
 
As one can see, Pascal’s approach to gambling problems was quite 
prescriptive, or equivalently, normative. It provided decision-makers with a policy 
that they should follow if they wanted to maximize their wealth — at least in the 
long run. A few decades after its formulation, Pascal’s injunction was challenged by 
another mathematician, Nicolas Bernoulli (Eves, 1990); not because of its 
mathematical invalidity, but because it sometimes failed so completely to account 
for choices made by real-world agents, however sane or erudite they might be. To 
illustrate this, he depicted the following (hypothetical) situation: a casino offers a 
game of chance for a single player, in which a fair coin is tossed at each round. The 
initial money stake is $2, and gets doubled every time heads appears. The first time 
that tails appears, the game ends, and the player wins whatever is in the pot. Now, 
the question is: what would be a fair price to pay the casino to enter this game? 
Most people, Bernoulli argues, would not be willing to pay more than $20 to enter 
the game; and yet, had they been able to turn to the late Pascal for advice, he would 
have urged them to pay whatever price was asked, until their last penny if need be, 
to get an opportunity to play this game. The reasoning behind this seemingly 
senseless instruction is in fact quite sensible: trusting that the coin is indeed fair, 
the player has a 
1
2
 probability of winning $2, a 
1
4
 probability of winning $4, etc., such 
that the expected value of the winning pot is: 
𝐸𝑉[𝑃𝑜𝑡] =
1
2
∙ 2 +
1
4
∙ 4 +
1
8
∙ 8 + ⋯ = 1 + 1 + 1 + ⋯ = +∞ 
 
This game has an infinite positive expected value, therefore, regardless of the 
price paid to play it, the expected balance will be in favour of the player. 
A first attempt at solving Bernoulli’s paradox was made by Gabriel Cramer, 
who, considering that “the mathematicians estimate money in proportion to its 
quantity, and men of good sense in proportion to the usage that they may make of it” 
(Pulskamp, 2013), demonstrated that, if men of good sense were indeed seeking to 
maximize their usage of money, and if that usage was a square root function of its 
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face value, then the expected usage of the winning pot was actually finite, and so 
should be the price that these men would be willing to pay to enter the game.  
The canonical resolution of Bernoulli’s paradox, however, is attributed to 
another Bernoulli: Daniel, Nicolas’ cousin, also a prominent mathematician. In 
1738, he published his solution (Bernoulli, 1738) in the journal of the Imperial 
Academy of Science of Saint Petersburg (which is why this paradox is now widely 
known as the “Saint Petersburg Paradox”).  
 
 
Fig. 1.2: Daniel Bernoulli’s proposal of a decreasing marginal utility 
as a function of total wealth. This function is a natural logarithmic one: 
𝑼(𝒘)  =  𝒍𝒏(𝒘). From (Caplin & Glimcher, 2014) 
 
Bernoulli’s argument was largely in line with Cramer’s, but instead of 
proposing that usage, or utility, of the decision-maker was a square-root function 
of the face value of gambling gains, he suggested to quantify it a natural logarithmic 
function of the total wealth of the decision-maker: 
 
“The determination of the value of an item must not be based on the price, but 
rather on the utility it yields… There is no doubt that a gain of one 
thousand ducats is more significant to the pauper than to a rich man though 
both gain the same amount.”   (Bernoulli, 1738) 
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Again, due to such concave transformation of the future wealth of the agent 
after winning the pot, the expected utility of playing the game was finite, 
irrespective of whether he was a pauper or a rich man, and thus he was right in 
balking at the idea of investing his whole current wealth in this game.  
By trying to better account for real-world gambling decisions, Cramer and 
Bernoulli pioneered the concept of decreasing marginal utility, as a descriptive 
addition to Pascal’s prescriptive framework, more than a century before 
Marginalists introduced it to economics. Remarkably, they also pioneered the rule 
of expected utility maximization, two centuries before its first formalization in 
the economics literature. 
 
c. Expected Utility Theory, by Von Neumann & Morgenstern  
 
In 1944, mathematicians (and part-time economists) John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern came forward with a new theory (Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944), which was built up from the revealed preference approach 
developed by Samuelson, and which aimed to address an entire class of decision 
problems that principles of revealed preference and ordinalism alone were unable 
to tackle. One such decision problem could be, for instance: given that Alice was 
observed to choose a lottery offering a 50% chance of winning an orange (or 
nothing otherwise) over the certain prospect of gaining an apple, what choice can 
we expect her to make when offered to pick one of two new lotteries: 25% chance 
of winning an orange, OR, 50% chance of winning an apple? Another decision 
problem that Von Neumann and Morgenstern aimed to address was: given that Bob 
was observed to prefer strawberries over bananas, and bananas over grapes, could 
we somehow devise a lottery between strawberries and grapes that would be as 
valuable to him as a banana?  
In short, this new theory aimed at covering an entire part of choice behaviour 
that had been largely ignored by earlier economists: gambling, that is, decision-
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making between options involving risk, i.e., uncertain outcomes whose 
probabilities are known by the decision-maker. 
Their contribution mainly consisted in identifying a set of four axioms, and 
in demonstrating that compliance with these axioms was a necessary and sufficient 
condition for someone’s choice behaviour to be described as maximizing an 
expected utility function, where the expected utility of a lottery leading to outcomes 
𝑥𝑖 with probabilities 𝑝𝑖  is written: 
𝐸𝑈[𝐿𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦] = ∑ 𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝑢(𝑥𝑖)
𝑖
 
 
and the utility function 𝑢 is continuous and monotonically increasing. 
 
The four axioms of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) are:  
 
Completeness axiom: for any two lotteries A and B, the agent either strictly 
prefers A to B, or B to A, or is indifferent between A and B. 
Transitivity axiom (similar to the GARP): for any three lotteries A, B and C, 
if the agent prefers A to B and B to C, then he prefers A to C. 
Continuity axiom: for any three alternative lotteries A, B and C, if the agent 
prefers A to B and B to C, then there exists a probability 𝑝 such that the agent is 
indifferent between B and the following mixture between A and C: 𝑝𝐴 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐶. 
Independence axiom: for any three lotteries A, B and C, and for any 
probability 𝑝 ∈ [0; 1], if the agent prefers A to B, then he also prefers 𝑝𝐴 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐶 
to 𝑝𝐵 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐶. 
 
Thus, an individual whose choice behaviour constantly obeys these four 
axioms can be seen as maximizing a single internal expected utility function, i.e., as 
summing the subjective values of all the possible outcomes of a lottery, weighted 
by their respective probability, and then selecting the lottery with the highest 
result. (Besides, such an individual is regarded as a rational decision-maker by 
economists.) 
 
Chapter I: Introduction 
16 
 
 
In relation to Bernoulli’s ad hoc assumption that people’s choices maximize 
an expected utility function (where marginal utility decreases with total wealth), 
Von Neumann & Morgenstern’s theory of expected utility maximization is also 
normative, but it has an additional — and substantial — quality: that of being 
falsifiable (at the individual level). Furthermore, it leverages probability as a ruler 
to quantify relative preference between items (at least for agents complying with 
their axioms), thus allowing to determine the shape of an agent’s utility function 
based on her choices, and taking cardinalists one step closer to their Grail 
(however, there still can be no unique utility function — considering the linear 
structure of EUT computation, all positive affine transformations of a given utility 
function make the same predictions).  
Finally, another noteworthy benefit of EUT is that it provides a way to 
translate risk attitude (observed through choices) into value representation. For 
instance, an agent who chooses a sure gain of 8€ over a lottery with 50% chances 
of yielding 20€ (and 0€ otherwise) is said to be risk-averse: he is willing to sacrifice 
an expected value of 2€ to be granted the certain option (or, the sure thing, as some 
economists say) instead of the risky one. The remarkable thing here is that this 
agent’s attitude towards risk is embedded in the shape of his utility function. A 
concave utility function in the value domain corresponds to (or “causes”, or 
“describes” — depending on the relation that one assumes to exist between utility 
and choice) risk-aversion in the choice domain. Conversely, a convex utility function 
corresponds to risk-seeking. 
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Fig. 1.3: Graphical Representation of Risk Attitudes in Expected 
Utility Theory. Here, the decision-maker is given a choice between receiving 
5000€ for sure (“sure thing”), or entering a lottery in which he has 50% chances 
of winning 10000€ (“gamble”). Left: Risk-averse; due to the concavity of the 
utility function, the sure thing has a higher expected utility than the gamble. 
Middle: Risk-neutral; linear utility function. Right: Risk-seeking; convex utility 
function. From The Aspiring Economist website. 
 
 
 
d. Dealing with ambiguity: Savage’s Subjective Expected Utility theory 
 
As explained above, Von Neumann and Morgenstern have substantially 
extended the range of choice problems that can be approached by economists, by 
addressing the case of gambles or lotteries leading to several possible outcomes 
with known probability. Yet, one could object that Von Neumann & Morgenstern’s 
theorem is certainly adequate for studying the behaviour of casino players 
interacting with dice and roulette wheels, but that in most natural circumstances, 
outcome probabilities are not known to the decision-maker. In other words, EUT 
addresses risk, but it does not cover another, even more pervasive type of 
uncertainty, known as ambiguity. 
 
Ten years after the publication of Von Neumann & Morgenstern’s theorem, 
and inspired by the works of Frank Ramsey (Ramsey, 1925) and Bruno de Finetti 
Chapter I: Introduction 
18 
 
(de Finetti, 1937), Leonard Savage proposed an extension of EUT that finally filled 
that uncomfortable gap in decision theory (Savage, 1954). He had identified a set of 
seven axioms (some of which were equivalent to EUT’s axioms) that constituted a 
necessary and sufficient set of conditions for an agent’s behaviour to be described 
as maximizing expected utility computed from a utility function and a well-defined 
internal probability function (that is, a function that complies with the standard 
mathematical definition of a probability measure, and that assigned a subjective 
probability to each possible outcome following each possible act in each possible 
state.) This extension of EUT is called Subjective Expected Utility theory.  
It is worth noting that one of Savage’s axioms, known as the “qualitative 
probability” axiom, postulates that the probability ranking between any two events 
does not depend upon the utility of their consequences. As an illustration, let us 
picture that, to celebrate the kick-off of the Football World Cup, a generous liquor 
merchant is offering a bottle of exceptionally fine wine to anyone who will correctly 
predict the winning team. Savage postulates that, if in such circumstances an agent 
bets on a French rather than German victory, then he would not have bet on 
Germany had the merchant been less generous and had the prize been a can of 
warm beer. Thus, one of the cornerstones of SEU theory is the assumption that, 
regardless of whether subjective probabilities are in line or not with reality, they 
should be independent from the subjective value (that is, utility) of the 
corresponding outcomes. 
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3) The reconciliation of economics and psychology  
 
a. Man versus savage axioms 
 
For all of the elegance of the EU theorem, it was not long before it came under 
the fire of critiques pointing out that it made for a very unrealistic description of 
the behaviour of real-world agents. Among the first whistle-blowers was the 
economist Maurice Allais (Allais, 1953). He had devised a clever set of pairwise 
choices that revealed systematic deviations of people’s preferences from EU 
axioms, and even managed to trick Savage himself (Glimcher & Fehr, 2014). Allais’ 
paradox involved two (hypothetical) choice situations: 
 
 
Situation 1:  
A:  You receive 1 M€ for sure 
B:  You enter a lottery with an 89% chance of winning 1 M€, a 10% chance of 
winning 5 M€, and a 1% chance of winning 0€ 
 
Situation 2: 
A:  You enter a lottery with 11% chances of winning 1 M€ (and 0€ otherwise) 
B:  You enter a lottery with 10% chances of winning 5 M€ (and 0€ otherwise) 
 
 
 
 
The interesting result is that most people prefer option A in situation 1 and 
option B in situation 2.  The reason why it is interesting is that it violates EUT’s 
independence axiom. Indeed, in situation 1, option A (resp. B) can be seen as a 
mixture between a lottery a (resp. b) occurring with a 11% chance (where a leads 
to a sure win of 1 M€, and b leads to a 5 M€ 10 out of 11 times) and a lottery L 
occurring with a 89% chance, which leads to a sure 1 M€ win. According to EUT’s 
independence axiom, the fact that people strictly prefer A over B means that they 
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strictly prefer a to b. However, the same reasoning can be applied in situation 2, 
where A (resp. B) is a mixture between a lottery a (resp. b) (which are exactly the 
same as in situation 1), again occurring with an 11% chance, and a lottery L’ (89% 
chance) leading to a sure 0€. Given that people have already expressed their strict 
preference for a over b in situation 1, it follows from the independence axiom that 
they will again prefer A to B. Yet, this is not the case. Therefore, Allais concluded, 
the independence axiom is wrong, at least for every agent who made different 
choices in situations 1 versus 2. 
Another such paradox was identified by Daniel Ellsberg a few years later 
(Ellsberg, 1961). He came up with two urn-and-marbles scenarios across which 
people consistently showed a preference for the urn with a known ratio of winning 
marbles (the risky urn) over the urn with an unknown ratio (the ambiguous urn), 
even when they implicitly believed (as inferred from their first urn choice) the 
ambiguous urn to contain a higher ratio of winning marbles. This is the first well-
known demonstration of an ambiguity aversion in the general population. 
Incidentally, this is also a demonstration that individuals routinely violate some of 
Savage’s axioms of decision-making. 
 
 
b. The birth of behavioural economics 
 
Allais’ paradox certainly sparked intense questioning about the legitimacy of 
the Expected Utility theory as a descriptive model of human value-based decision-
making under risk. Yet, the real turning point came in 1979, when two economists, 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, published a seminal paper (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979b) in which they laid out a long list of empirically observed violations 
of EU axioms, and proposed a couple of adjustments to be made in economists’ 
decision theoretic model to better account for (in the sense of describe) the choice 
behaviour of real-world agents.  
First, having observed in field and laboratory experiments that people tend 
to be risk-averse when faced with gain prospects and risk-seeking when faced with 
Chapter I: Introduction 
21 
 
loss prospects, they proposed that utility — or “(subjective) value” in their 
terminology — should not be a function of the total wealth of the decision-maker, 
but instead should be defined according to a reference point. This reference point 
sets a frontier between gains and losses along the outcome axis, as well as a frontier 
between pleasure and displeasure along the utility axis. It should be noted that in 
Kahneman and Tversky’s model, the subjective gain/loss framing is not 
necessarily aligned with the objective framing of the outcomes. For example, if an 
individual enters a game which is supposed to yield a 10€ gain on average, then, 
given the individual’s overall expectations, an 8€ gain outcome might be internally 
framed as a 2€ loss. (Influences of expectations and aspirations on reference point 
setting have since been actively explored (Heath et al., 1999; Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; 
Post et al., 2008).) Furthermore, given the pattern of risk-attitude exhibited by their 
subjects, they proposed that the utility function accounting for generic human 
behaviour should be concave in the gain domain, and convex in the loss domain. 
Second, they argued that some of the choices made by their subjects implied 
that the displeasure associated to a loss was larger than the pleasure associated to 
a gain of same numerical amplitude, i.e., that, at a psychological level, losses loom 
larger than gains. To account for that loss aversion — and assuming that an 
outcome of 0 (no gain nor loss) maps to a utility of 0 (no pleasure nor displeasure) 
—, the generic utility curve should be, on average and around 0, steeper in the loss 
than in the gain domain. 
Third and last, choice paradoxes such as Allais’ — which they replicated 
experimentally across several variants: modest outcomes, non-monetary 
outcomes, etc. — seemed to imply that people overweighted, in their decision, the 
utility of low-probability outcomes, and underweighted the utility of high-
probability ones. They proposed that individuals do not maximize their 
mathematical expectation of subjective value, but maximize instead a weighted sum 
of subjective values, where the weights, called “decision weights”, are certainly 
related to objective probabilities but display consistent deviations from them, e.g. 
due to the influence of ambiguity or cognitive biases (among which, the 
overestimation of low probabilities and underestimation of high ones). 
Importantly, decision weights are not constrained to satisfy the mathematical 
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properties of a probability measure (such as summing to 1 across the space of 
possible elementary outcomes — in fact, they typically sum to less than 1, a feature 
that they call subcertainty), and they should not be merely seen as subjective 
probabilities, or degrees of belief, but as deriving from them as well as other factors. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.4: The two functions describing generic human decision-
making, according to Prospect Theory. Left: Utility (or “value”) U(x) 
as a function of outcome x. Right: Decision weight 𝜋(𝑝) as a function of the 
stated probability 𝑝 of an outcome. 
 
 
Because much of their argument was based on the results of behavioural 
experiments which involved offering a choice between alternative prospects 
(conceptually equivalent to EUT’s lotteries), their theory was named Prospect 
Theory.  
It was a turning point in decision theory in that it marked the reconciliation 
of economists and psychologists, and the birth of the behavioural economy 
movement, which incorporated psychological considerations into economics 
models for a better description of choice behaviour, as well as experimental 
methodology from the psychology field for better controlled observations of human 
behaviour. 
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4) Seeing the bigger picture: from options to actions 
 
a. Introducing action: Markov Decision Processes & instrumental learning 
 
As behavioural economists were prompt to point out, there is more to human 
behaviour than choosing which fruit to pick in a basket or which race horse to bet 
on. Neoclassical economists had tended to reason about idealised situations in 
which outcomes occur almost immediately (although possibly stochastically) upon 
the agent choosing between two or more options. By doing that, they had ignored 
the broader, real-life context in which decisions are made, which often implies that 
agents perform an action or sequence of actions beyond the elementary act of 
choosing, in order to transition from their current state to the outcome state. 
One of the earliest mathematical frameworks used to model the behaviour of 
an agent as she transitions, through action and chance, from one state to the next, 
is that of Markov Decision Processes (MDP) (Bellman, 1953).  Specifically, it is 
assumed that, at each time step 𝑡, the agent is in one of a set of states {𝑆1, 𝑆2, … }, and 
performs an action from a set of possible actions {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … }𝑠𝑡 (which is generally 
conditional on the state she is currently in).  In the general form of MDP, each given 
action 𝑎𝑖 performed in a given state 𝑆𝑗 can lead to several possible states at t+1, 
each with a probability 𝑝𝑘(𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑘| 𝑎𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑆𝑡 = 𝑆𝑗), which depends on the 
current state and action performed but not on the past history of states 𝑆𝑡−1, 𝑆𝑡−2, 
etc.: MDP is a memoryless process, hence the Markovian attribute. The transition 
from one {state, action} couple at time 𝑡 to the following state at 𝑡 + 1 is thus 
generally stochastic, although it can be deterministic in the particular case where a 
transition probability equals 1 (see Figure 1.5). Besides its set of states, its set of 
actions, and its set of probability transitions, an MDP includes a set of rewards 
𝑅(𝑆𝑡, 𝑎𝑡 , 𝑆𝑡+1) associated to each transition from one state to another through a 
given action. (Rewards can be positive, negative or zero.) 
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Fig. 1.5: Example Markov Decision Process Here, at each time-step, the 
decision-maker can be in one of two states, 𝑺𝟏 or 𝑺𝟐. In each state, she can 
perform an action 𝒂𝒊, which takes her to state 𝑺𝟏 or 𝑺𝟐 with a given probability. 
The thickness of action-to-state arrows represents the transition probability. In 
this situation, performing 𝒂𝟏 in state 𝑺𝟏 leads to a deterministic transition 
(decision-maker stays in 𝑺𝟏for sure) while every other transition is probabilistic. 
Some transitions (e.g. from 𝑺𝟐 to 𝑺𝟏 via 𝒂𝟏) are rewarded (in this example, +5), 
while other transitions are punished (e.g. staying in 𝑺𝟐 after action 𝒂𝟏).  
 
 
MDPs have been applied to individual decision-making problems where 
outcomes depend partly on the agent’s actions and partly on chance, and where, 
given the set of transition probabilities and rewards, an optimal policy 𝜋, which is 
optimal in that it maximizes the expectancy of future rewards, can be derived. 
Formally, 𝜋 is a function that maps each possible state with an optimal action. The 
MDP framework has received extensions such as the Partially Observable 
Markovian Decision Process (POMDP) (Kaelbling et al., 1998) to account for 
decision problems in which an agent has incomplete information about her current 
state and the transition probabilities to other states (which she learns through 
observation), and in which she discounts rewards which are in a distant future (t+2, 
t+3, etc.) compared to the one that comes immediately (t+1). 
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When rewards and transition probabilities are initially unknown, MDP 
optimization is conducted through reinforcement learning, or Q-learning. 
MDPs were thus particularly suitable to model the behaviour of ideal agents 
learning to maximize their rewards in a stochastic and initially unknown (or 
variable) environment. Such behaviour had been studied in the previous decades 
in (non-ideal) cats, rats and pigeons, first by Edward Thorndike, and later, by B.F. 
Skinner.  
Thorndike famously placed cats in custom-made “puzzle boxes”, in which a 
specific action, such as pulling a lever or pushing a button, had to be performed by 
the animal in order to open the escape hatch and access a food reward. He observed 
that, at first, a large amount of time would elapse before the cat eventually pressed 
the escape button by chance, but that over repeated trials, the animal would 
perform the correct behaviour more and more quickly (Thorndike, 1898). He 
generalized this observation in his “law of effect”, according to which “responses 
that produce a satisfying effect in a particular situation become more likely to occur 
again in that situation, and responses that produce a discomforting effect become less 
likely to occur again in that situation” (Gray, 2010). 
 His work was followed on by Skinner, who conducted extensive operant 
conditioning (as opposed to Pavlov’s classical conditioning) experiments in which 
he studied how modulations in the reward or punishment schedule ensuing a 
particular behaviour (typically, pressing a lever) impacted the propensity of the 
animal to perform the said behaviour (Skinner, 1938). Thus, decades before the 
advent of behavioural economics, Thorndike and Skinner pioneered the 
investigation of the link between outcome values, (simple) animal behaviours, and 
putative mental content, such as feelings, desire or satisfaction. 
 
 
b. From pressing a lever to climbing a mountain: the costs of action  
 
Would you rather enjoy the view from the top of Mount Everest, or the view 
from the top of the chair on which you are currently sitting? 
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In most cases, transitioning from one state (e.g., hungry), to another, 
potentially more valuable state (e.g., satiated), involves not just pressing a button, 
but performing an extensive sequence of actions (e.g., getting up, going down a 
flight of stairs, crossing a busy street, walking in the freezing cold to the nearest 
kebab house, ordering a sandwich, waiting for it to be ready, paying the cashier). In 
Markov Decision Processes, performing an action is cost-free and essentially delay-
free (in that it involves a fixed transition from t to t+1, regardless of the specific 
action performed), but in the real world, actions are resource-consuming. They 
typically spread across time (delay), involve taking risks (i.e., incurring a non-null 
probability of being carried away to low-value states, such as getting hit by a car 
while crossing the street or having your wallet stolen), expending energy and other 
bodily resources, such as muscle integrity and contractility, through physiological 
processes (effort) or other resources such as money, as well as going through 
transitory states of relatively low hedonic value, e.g. in terms of physical or 
psychological well-being1: pain, distress, etc..
Among the various dimensions that might make an action aversive or costly, 
we will now focus on effort.  
 
All other things equal, effort tends to be avoided. The “principle of least 
effort” was coined more than a century ago (Ferrero, 1894), then passed on to 
psychologists by Clark Hull as the “law of less work” (Hull, 1943), and has since 
received mountains of supporting empirical and experimental evidence.  
Perhaps the first scientific field to take an interest in effortful behaviour was 
ethology, or behavioural ecology. The kind of questions that ethologists were 
asking then was: “what motivates a wild animal to travel in search of a new patch 
of food instead of staying in its current patch?”, “how does a predator chooses 
between pursuing a small, easy prey and a fleshier but faster one?”  (Charnov, 1976; 
Krebs, 1977; Stephens & Krebs, 1986). Some researchers, such as Eric Charnov, 
 
1 This is, of course, not always true. A wide variety of resource-consuming actions, such as doing crosswords or 
playing tennis, are reported as entailing higher hedonic states, and as being enjoyable in themselves. This can be 
related to the extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation dichotomy (Deci & Ryan, 2010): actions which are 
accompanied with a relatively low hedonic state (e.g. which are physically painful or emotionally distressful) 
are usually performed in order to reach a high-value future state, and as such are said to be “extrinsically 
motivated”. 
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proposed optimal foraging models describing the behaviour of an (ideal) animal 
acting to maximize its metabolic resources, which are increased by food 
consumption and depleted by effort production. Still in the early days of effort 
research, as interest spread to the investigation (and formalization) of the 
economic and neurobiological determinants of effortful behaviour, researchers had 
animals face food dilemmas in the lab (i.e., a well-controlled environment), such as 
whether to take a left turn and go retrieve one food pellet without trouble, or take 
a right turn and climb a high wire-mesh barrier behind which four food pellets were 
waiting to be devoured (Salamone, Cousins, & Bucher, 1994; Walton, Bannerman, 
& Rushworth, 2002; Walton, Kennerley, Bannerman, Phillips, & Rushworth, 2006; 
Schweimer & Hauber, 2006; Floresco & Ghods-Sharifi, 2007; Hillman & Bilkey, 
2010). 
 
 
Fig. 1.6: A rat in a T-maze experiment. In the left arm of the maze, one food 
pellet can be retrieved effortlessly (low effort/low reward option). In the right 
arm is a 30 cm-high wire-mesh barrier, that the rat will have to climb in order to 
get four food pellets (high effort/high reward option). 
 
 
In a similar paradigm, developed soon after the T-maze one, rodents would 
choose whether to press a lever three times in a row and get two food pellets, or 
press another lever ten times in a row and get 6 food pellets (Kennerley, Walton, 
Behrens, Buckley, & Rushworth, 2006; Walton et al., 2006). Regardless of the 
specifics of the paradigm, it was consistently observed that animals tended to select 
an option more often as the associated reward increased, and less often as the 
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energetic cost of the action required to obtain the reward increased. Thus, animals 
seemed to maximize a trade-off between reward and effort. When animals were not 
given a choice but instead forced to perform a given effort for a cued reward 
(Bouret & Richmond, 2010; Minamimoto et al., 2012; Varazzani et al., 2015), their 
appetitive responses and error rates were modulated by effort and reward 
magnitudes in opposite directions. Overall, effort could be seen as discounting the 
subjective value of a reward. 
These conclusions are unsurprising, even to the naïve reader, because they 
are in line with our subjective, internal experience of effort production. 
Phenomenologically, — in a vast majority of cases — exerting effort is aversive, 
unpleasant, or even painful (Kurzban, 2016). From an evolutionary point of view, it 
is quite easy to conceive why physical effort feels bad: an organism for which usual 
rewards such as food and play feel good and effort also feels good (or neutral) 
would likely engage in much more effortful behaviours in order to obtain 
marginally larger rewards, and, when resources are not available (e.g. in winter), 
would not be particularly inclined to stop playing or foraging, thus depleting its 
metabolic resources faster than it can restore them (and therefore would probably 
die of exhaustion before reaching reproductive maturity). In this scenario, we only 
have considered the case of physical effort; it is widely accepted, though, that effort 
can come in two distinct flavours: physical or cognitive (i.e., mental). Mental effort, 
such as the one needed to compute 34 x 56 in your head or to speak a foreign 
language, also happens to be experienced as aversive (or even “painful”, thus 
placing it very close to the phenomenology of physical effort), but the reasons why 
it is the case are much less clear than for physical effort (Kurzban et al., 2013; 
Kurzban, 2016; Shenhav et al., 2017). In what follows, we will keep our focus on 
physical effort. 
In recent years, there have been multiple attempts at modeling both 
qualitatively and quantitatively the discounting of the subjective value of a course 
of action by the physical effort attached to it. In the first experimental 
implementations of reward-effort trade-offs, effort cost was confounded with delay 
in reward obtention (it takes more time to climb a wire-mesh barrier than to simply 
walk to the end of the maze arm, or to press a lever ten times instead of three). This 
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confound, which is also present in several human studies (Croxson et al., 2009; 
Treadway et al., 2009; Wardle et al., 2011), prevented a proper isolation of 
discounting effects due to effort only. More suitable paradigms have since been 
developed, in which effort is only modulated via its intensity (and not its duration) 
dimension. One such paradigm, now a classic in the field, consists in having the 
(human or primate) subject squeeze a handgrip at a certain force level (usually 
expressed as a percentage of their maximum voluntary contraction, or MVC) for a 
fixed duration in order to receive a reward, whose expected magnitude is either 
fixed (Kurniawan et al., 2010; Burke et al., 2013; Hartmann et al., 2013; Skvortsova 
et al., 2014; Klein-Flügge et al., 2015; Klein-Flügge et al., 2016; Le Bouc et al., 2016; 
Chong et al., 2017; Hauser et al., 2017; Vinckier et al., 2019), or proportional to the 
level of force exerted (Pessiglione et al., 2007; Bonnelle et al., 2015; Le Bouc et al., 
2016; Lopez-Persem et al., 2017). 
 
 
Fig. 1.7: Force production task. (A) Final reward is proportional to the 
maximal exerted force. (B) Choice between two fixed reward-effort bundles. 
Adapted from (Le Bouc et al., 2016) 
 
 
Several forms of discounting functions have been proposed to describe the 
devaluation of an outcome by the effort needed to obtain it. The simplest one comes 
from early animal research. Based on previous experimental observations, (Phillips 
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et al., 2007) proposed that the subjective value SV of a reward magnitude R was 
linearly discounted by the amount of exerted effort E: 
 
𝑆𝑉(𝑅, 𝐸) = 𝑅 − 𝜶 ∙ 𝐸 
where 𝜶 is a fixed parameter (linear coefficient). 
 
Another functional form, known as hyperbolic discounting, accounts well 
for the discounting of outcomes by delay (Mazur, 1988; Laibson, 1997; Frederick & 
Loewenstein, 2002), and was also proposed to model effort discounting (Mitchell, 
2003; Sugiwaka & Okouchi, 2004; Prevost et al., 2010): 
𝑆𝑉(𝑅, 𝐸) =
𝑅
1 + 𝒌 ∙ 𝐸
 
where 𝒌 is a fixed parameter. 
 
 
Fig. 1.8: Hyperbolic model of effort discounting. Subjective value as a 
function of effort cost level. Each curve represents a different value of parameter 
k. Adapted from (Klein-Flügge et al., 2015) 
 
At this point, it should be noted that discounted models predict subjective 
value, but what researchers observe is usually choices. In order to be able to invert 
their model based on observed data and to obtain an estimate for the parameter(s) 
of the model (i.e., to “fit the model”), they thus need an additional function 
(sometimes called “observation function” (Daunizeau et al., 2014)) which predicts 
(observable) choices based on (hidden) subjective value. Following on the utility 
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maximization hypothesis which underlies most economic theories of value-based 
decision-making, such a function should be: 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖
(𝐸𝑈𝑖), 
where 𝐸𝑈𝑖 are the expected utilities of alternative options 𝑖. In reality, however, 
decision-makers do not systematically opt for the option with the highest expected 
utility (or overall subjective value, regardless of the way it is computed): their 
choices are noisy.  To account (descriptively) for this noise, choices are predicted 
probabilistically, by a softmax function in the vast majority of cases: 
𝑃(𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝑖) =
𝑒𝜷∙𝑆𝑉𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝜷∙𝑆𝑉𝑗𝑗
 
 
where 𝑆𝑉𝑗  is the subjective value (or equivalently here, expected utility) of 
each option (or equivalently, course of action) 𝑗, and 𝜷 is a linear coefficient, usually 
called “inverse temperature”, scaling the subjective values and reflecting how 
“precise” (in terms of subjective value maximization) the decision-maker is. 
 
More recently yet, building on the old finding that perceived effort increases 
as a power function of the exerted force (Stevens, 1957), a parabolic discounting 
model was added to the pool (Burke et al., 2013; Hartmann et al., 2013; Klein-
Flügge et al., 2015; Białaszek et al., 2017; Chong et al., 2017):  
 
𝑆𝑉(𝑅, 𝐸) = 𝑅 − 𝜶 ∙ 𝐸𝛾  
 
where 𝜶 is a linear coefficient and 𝜸 is an exponential coefficient scaling the 
effort E. 
 
In several studies quantitatively comparing parabolic models with other 
functional forms (Hartmann et al., 2013; Białaszek et al., 2017; Chong et al., 2017), 
parabolic discounting was found to account best for the reward-effort choices made 
by the participants. In another study, however (Klein-Flügge et al., 2015), an 
additional, sigmoidal model was inverted: 
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𝑆𝑉(𝑅, 𝐸) = 𝑅 ∙ (1 − (
1
1 + 𝑒−𝒌(𝐸−𝒑)
−
1
1 + 𝑒𝒌𝒑
) (1 +
1
𝑒𝒌𝒑
)) 
 
where 𝒌 is a linear coefficient reflecting the steepness of the sigmoid, and 
𝒑 sets its turning point (i.e. the effort level at which the subjective value of a reward 
magnitude R is discounted by half). 
 
 
Fig. 1.9: Sigmoidal model of effort discounting. Left: Subjective value as 
a function of effort cost level. Each curve represents a different set of parameters 
(k,p). Right, individual fits (and average in yellow) of experimental data. Adapted 
from (Klein-Flügge et al., 2015) 
 
In this study, the sigmoidal effort discounting model was found to provide 
the best account for empirical data. It also captured choice behaviour better than 
hyperbolic and parameter-free subtractive or divisive discounting models in Klein-
Flügge et al., 2016. 
Although effort discounting models have only been compared based on 
observed binary choices, they have been applied to other behavioural outputs, such 
as exerted force itself (Le Bouc et al., 2016) or even complete movement 
trajectories encompassing continuous-time decision-making (Rigoux & Guigon, 
2012). 
Chapter I: Introduction 
33 
 
c. What if you fail? Confidence as a special kind of probability 
 
 
When pondering whether to engage in a given course of action or project, 
such as growing an orange tree to eventually produce orange juice, one aspect that 
individuals typically consider is the subjective value of the various possible 
outcomes (e.g., within the next five years, a healthy tree and litres of delicious 
orange juice, or, a healthy tree yet barely any orange, or, a dying tree and no orange 
in sight). As we have seen above, individuals also consider the overall cost entailed 
by this course of action (e.g. the money to buy the tree, the time and effort to take 
care of it). Another crucial judgment generated during the decision process is about 
the subjective probability that the course of action will lead to each of the different 
envisaged outcomes. In many instances, as in the orange tree scenario, these 
outcomes are at least partly contingent on the individual’s specific behaviour (or, 
in this context, performance), and can be situated with respect to a “success” or 
“correctness” (more or less arbitrary) criterion. In the above example, one may be 
a seasoned gardener and estimate that he is very likely to succeed (where his 
success threshold would be, e.g., keep the tree healthy and harvest oranges within 
five years) or he might be inexperienced but overestimate his skills and have the 
same prediction. In any case, as we have seen earlier, expected utility theory 
postulates that the subjective value of each outcome is multiplied with its 
subjective probability (before being summed and discounted by the cost of action). 
Thus, according to this framework, and since “successful” outcomes are in general 
higher valued than “unsuccessful” ones, the more confident a decision-maker is in 
his endeavour being successful, the higher the overall expected utility of the course 
of action, and the likelier he is to initiate it. 
 
The notion of “confidence” has just entered the conceptual picture painted in 
this introductory chapter, and before it is further employed, it might be appropriate 
to settle on an explicit definition. 
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What confidence is, and what it is not 
Confidence may seem like a straightforward concept: we all know what being 
unconfident feels like. Yet (or maybe because of that), over the last decades, 
psychologists and neuroscientists have been using this term to refer to disparate 
constructs, thus hampering progress towards an understanding of its 
computational and neurobiological determinants, as well as its role in action 
valuation and selection. 
We henceforth define confidence as the subjective probability of being correct, 
or successful. It is in essence a “local” judgment, since it applies to a particular action 
sequence or first-order judgment, which one sets against a particular validity 
(correctness or success) criterion.  
Following Pouget, Drugowitsch, & Kepecs, 2016, we distinguish confidence 
from certainty. In their framework, inferentially relevant variables — be they 
concrete or abstract (How heavy is this bag? How honest is this person?), continuous 
or discrete (How far is the nearest village? How many cafes does it have?), external 
or internal (How much does this cost? How much do I like this?), settled in past, 
present or future states of the world (What colour was her dress? When will the bus 
arrive?) — are assumed to be internally represented as probability density 
functions across envisaged values of the variable.1 In this context, they propose that 
certainty refers to the narrowness (or inverse variance) of such a probability 
distribution, while confidence is the integral of that distribution across a subset of 
its domain (corresponding to, e.g., the subjective probability that the bus will arrive 
between now and now + 10 minutes). Although we adopt the same definition of 
certainty, our own definition of confidence is therefore more restrictive than Pouget 
and colleagues’, since, in distributional terms, we define confidence as the integral 
of the probability distribution of an action-dependent2 variable of interest (e.g. 
 
1 See also Pouget, Beck, Ma, & Latham, 2013 for a discussion about their neural implementation. 
2 Or, judgment-supporting, if confidence is not about a behaviour per se, but about a first-order judgment 
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where the ball we served will hit the ground) across the specific subset of correct 
or successful values (e.g. inside the court).1 
This definition nonetheless calls for clarification about what it means, from a 
subjective standpoint, to be correct.  
 
What it means to be correct 
We can distinguish (at least) two ways in which one can be correct, or 
successful: 1) epistemically, 2) behaviourally. The first case applies to a judgment, 
belief or prediction one has internally committed to or will commit to (e.g., thinking 
to yourself: “he will be at least five minutes late”), and being correct means that this 
judgment is in line with some ground truth or observable state. The second case 
applies to a behaviour, or behavioural sequence, one has performed or will 
perform, and being correct or successful means that either the behaviour per se, or 
its outcome, belongs to a set of correct or success states. The criteria defining truth, 
or correctness or validity can be more or less arbitrary, either defined externally 
(e.g. by encyclopaedias, the rules of a sport) or internally (e.g., by your own 
appreciation of what a “good soufflé” is) and applying to objective variables (e.g. 
where the tennis ball lands, how puffy a soufflé is) and/or subjective ones (e.g. the 
elegance of a move or the deliciousness of a soufflé). Thus, generating confidence 
judgments typically implies a discretization (and often even a binarization) of the 
variable(s) of interest. This is not as artificial as it may seem, because in many 
natural situations, the value distribution of possible outcomes tends to be 
multinomial, discrete, or even binary (to take a rather extreme example, if you try 
 
1 In an earlier attempt to lay out a clear theoretical framework for the study of confidence (Meyniel et al., 2015), 
it was argued that two types of “confidence” should be distinguished: distributional versus summary confidence. 
This should not be confused with Pouget et al.’s certainty versus confidence dichotomy. In Meyniel et al., 
information about the uncertainty corrupting a representation can be conveyed either via the probability 
density distribution itself (distributional confidence) or by a readout that extracts a scalar, summary statistic 
from the distribution (specifically, its second moment, i.e. variance: summary confidence, analogous to Pouget 
et al.’s certainty). 
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to jump across a deep rift, either you reach the other side and survive — although 
you may have twisted your ankle in the process — , or you don’t, and die). 
 
A typology of confidence 
There can be many ways to classify confidence judgments into subtypes, but 
we will only propose two distinctions here, as (hopefully) useful landmarks in the 
confidence field which we can refer to later.  
The first one, expounded in the previous paragraph, is the distinction 
between epistemic and behavioural confidence. It can be noted, however, that in 
many recent studies about confidence, these two notions are basically treated as 
one and the same. These studies use paradigms in which the subject is required to 
make a perceptual or mnemonic — often binary —decision (e.g.: Is this cloud of 
dots moving to the left or to the right? Has this word been presented to you earlier?) 
and to report it explicitly, for instance by pressing a key on a keyboard. Then, 
subjects are typically prompted to make a confidence (“second-order”) judgment 
about their perceptual (“first-order”) answer. Therefore, in such cases, confidence 
is both about the correctness of their behaviour (pressing key A rather than key B) 
and that of their internal perceptual judgment (i.e., belief, or epistemic state), since 
there is a systematic mapping between both. One could argue, though, that what 
this kind of experiments probes is, in essence, epistemic confidence. (Bang & 
Fleming, 2018; Boldt, Gardelle, & Yeung, 2017; Gardelle & Mamassian, 2014; 
Hainguerlot, Vergnaud, & Gardelle, 2018; Lebreton et al., 2018; Rutishauser, Aflalo, 
Rosario, Pouratian, & Andersen, 2018; Wagner et al., 1998) 
The second distinction, which has also been touched upon earlier, is that of 
prospective versus retrospective confidence. Quite simply, prospective 
confidence applies to judgments or behaviours not yet performed (e.g., just before 
taking a mathematics exam), whereas retrospective confidence applies to 
judgments or behaviours already performed, but for which some uncertainty 
remains regarding their validity or that of their outcomes (e.g. when leaving the 
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examination room). These two types of confidence are usually studied separately, 
but see (Fleming et al., 2016; Aguilar-Lleyda et al., 2019) for counter-examples. 
 
Where does confidence come from?   
Humans and other animals assess their probability of success in multiple 
ways, based on multiple cues. These depend, among other things, on the 
prospective versus retrospective nature of the confidence judgment.  
In a “Bayesian brain” framework such as the one defended in (Pouget et al., 
2013; Meyniel et al., 2015; Pouget et al., 2016; Paz et al., 2017), confidence as we 
define it here can be viewed as resulting from some integration, or summation, of 
an internal, neurally-encoded density function representing a variable of interest 
(and obeying Bayes’ rule of conditional probability, hence the Bayesian qualifying 
term) across correct or successful values. Regardless of whether we adhere to this 
view, some questions remain: how is the distribution constructed? What external 
or internal evidence does it incorporate? This latter question, in particular, is 
applicable to confidence judgments irrespective of their specific neural 
implementation (which we will address in more detail in section B).  
Several studies have shed some light on this issue. First, in experimental 
contexts where the accuracy of the subjects’ behaviour could be objectively 
evaluated, and where confidence reports were given by the subjects, a consistent, 
positive correlation between actual accuracy and confidence reports was found. 
This is, in particular, a recurring finding in the context of perceptual discrimination 
or other cognitive, or “epistemic” tasks, such as memory retrieval (Baranski & 
Petrusic, 1994; Busey et al., 2000; Barthelmé & Mamassian, 2010; Rutishauser et 
al., 2015; Sanders et al., 2016; Lebreton et al., 2018; Rutishauser et al., 2018). In 
such contexts, the process of assessing one’s own judgment validity is known as 
metacognition. Thus, these studies have demonstrated that humans and other 
animals do have significant metacognitive abilities. However, this confidence-
performance correlation is not perfect, that is, confidence reports are to some 
extent dissociated from actual performance. In the particular case of retrospective 
Chapter I: Introduction 
38 
 
confidence, they have not only been found to be correlated with actual accuracy, 
but also with the time needed to make a response (response time, or “RT”) (Pleskac 
& Busemeyer, 2007; Zylberberg et al., 2012; Kiani et al., 2014). The direction of the 
causality relation (if there is one) between response time and confidence is not 
entirely clear, but it has been proposed, and supported by recent evidence, that 
response time was incorporated as a heuristic cue in confidence judgments 
(Audley, 1960; Kiani et al., 2014). 
Overall, these observations suggest that confidence judgments are built from 
1) performance-modulating variables or cues, such as the size of the target to hit — 
or in a more general sense, the inclusiveness of the validity criterion respective to 
the range of possible epistemic states or behavioural outcomes — or the signal-to-
noise ratio in the case of perceptual confidence (Wei & Wang, 2015; Sanders et al., 
2016; Boldt et al., 2017; Lebreton et al., 2018), 2) (in the case of retrospective 
confidence judgments) performance-modulated cues or variables, such as response 
time or even partial feedback (e.g. proprioceptive or early visual signals about the 
direction given to a tennis ball).  
Post-decision confidence in a perceptual discrimination task was 
additionally found to be influenced by transcranial magnetic stimulation of the 
motor representation associated with the unchosen response, regardless of 
whether TMS was applied before or after a response was selected (Fleming et al., 
2015), which suggests that confidence judgments are not only based on e.g. 
external signal-to-noise ratio or cues about the difficulty of a task, but also 
incorporate late-stage, performance-unrelated, downstream information. 
The accuracy, or predictive quality of confidence judgments themselves can 
be quantified in several ways. One simple approach, when actual success or 
correctness can be observed, is to decompose this quality assessment into a 
calibration and a sensitivity dimension.  
Calibration refers to the difference between average confidence and the 
success rate at a given task. Individuals with positive deltas are said to be 
overconfident; conversely, individuals exhibiting negative deltas are 
underconfident; and individuals with deltas close to zero are well-calibrated. 
Interestingly, individual calibration was found to be correlated across various tasks 
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(West & Stanovich, 1997; Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999), suggesting that 
confidence judgments are subject to stable trait influences over and above the 
specific task at hand, and, further, that confidence may be represented as a common 
currency across tasks and modalities. This latter hypothesis has received consistent 
empirical support over the last years. For example, it has been shown that 
individuals are able to make a comparison between their confidence in two 
responses they made during identical or different perceptual discrimination tasks, 
and that this confidence ordering is as sensitive in the across-task comparison 
condition as in the within-task condition (Gardelle & Mamassian, 2014; Gardelle, 
Corre, & Mamassian, 2016). This brings us to the second dimension of confidence 
accuracy: sensitivity.  
Sensitivity refers to how well performance variations are reflected in 
confidence judgments. One straightforward way to quantify it is to compute the 
difference between the average confidence reported in correct trials and the 
average confidence reported in incorrect trials. In situations where performance is 
not necessarily binary, one can derive another measure of sensitivity, namely the 
correlation between objective performance and confidence judgments. 
Other, more sophisticated metrics of sensitivity (or metacognitive efficiency) 
have been proposed and implemented in empirical work. One of them is the meta-
d’ value derived from Signal Detection Theory formalism, which has been shown to 
be less sensitive to calibration biases than correlational approaches like the one 
presented above. We refer the interested reader to (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012) for an 
extensive introduction to meta-d’. 
 
Confidence and action  
We have reviewed some evidence that people (and other animals) are able 
to estimate their probability of being correct or successful, with some degree of 
accuracy. We will now survey some evidence that these confidence judgments are 
not only generated when experimenters ask for a rating, but are even 
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spontaneously incorporated in action selection, initiation and continuation 
processes.  
Modern confidence research has roots in the study of self-efficacy, a 
construct proposed by Albert Bandura a few decades ago, and defined as the 
individual’s belief in her ability to perform a certain task. Bandura argued that self-
efficacy was a major determinant of high expectations of performance, and of the 
propensity to work hard and persevere in the face of obstacles to meet these 
expectations:  
“Judgments of self-efficacy also determine how much effort people will expend and 
how long they will persist in the face of obstacles or aversive experiences. When beset with 
difficulties people who entertain serious doubts about their capabilities slacken their 
efforts or give up altogether, whereas those who have a strong sense of efficacy exert 
greater effort to master the challenges.”  (Bandura, 1982) 
More recently, in a laboratory experiment involving a search task, as 
individuals became less confident about their searching abilities, they also became 
less likely to keep searching (Falk et al., 2006). Besides, it has been observed that 
individuals exhibiting trait overconfidence tend to engage more and be more 
perseverant in risky professional ventures such as launching a start-up (Koellinger 
et al., 2007; Hayward et al., 2010). Interestingly, in another recent study, 
individuals who displayed higher confidence in their knowledge in a specific 
domain also tended to invest more effort in an unrelated task, suggesting that trait 
confidence modulates general effort investment (Pikulina et al., 2018). 
In fact, humans are not the only beings whose perseverance depends on 
confidence. Rodents were found to commit more to decisions about which they 
were more confident: they waited longer for a potential reward before proceeding 
to the next trial (in this study, confidence was actually inferred from this degree of 
commitment, but also had a reliable proxy in task difficulty) (Lak et al., 2014). 
Yet humans have also been shown to prioritize actions and decisions about 
which they were more confident (Aguilar-Lleyda et al., 2019), and to use confidence 
as a teaching signal in the absence of feedback, thus reinforcing actions about which 
they felt confident (Daniel & Pollmann, 2012; Guggenmos et al., 2015; Hainguerlot 
et al., 2018). 
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d. Putting it all together: a current framework of value-based action selection 
 
In the present work, we adhere to modern frameworks of value-based 
decision-making, which themselves draw on earlier formalizations by economists 
and psychologists. The currently dominant view on action selection (Rangel et al., 
2008) is that it is contingent on action valuation, which itself derives from an 
internal representation of internal (e.g. hunger) and external states (e.g. month of 
the year) of the agent, as well as (of course) the set of feasible actions, and previous 
experiences of action-outcome associations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.10: A modern multi-step framework of value-based action selection. 
From (Rangel et al., 2008) 
 
Here, we focus on the action valuation step, and build on recent cost-benefits 
models, such as the Expected Value of Control model of cognitive effort (Shenhav et 
al., 2013), according to which the overall value (OV) of an action in a given state 𝑆0 
corresponds to the expected subjective value (SV) of all envisaged outcome states 
𝑆𝑗 , minus the costs (pain, energy…) entailed by that action: 
 
𝑂𝑉(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 , 𝑆0) = ∑ 𝑝(𝑆𝑗|𝑆0, 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖) ∗ 𝑆𝑉(𝑆𝑗) − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖)
𝑗
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5) A methodological parenthesis: eliciting decisional variables  
 
Over decades of experimental investigation, behavioural economists and 
psychologists have come up with several methods to elicit and measure the 
components entering the computation of action value, i.e., decisional variables. 
Importantly, the measurement can be made before or after the outcome is 
owned or consumed, or the action is performed, thus prompting either an a priori 
or a posteriori evaluation. 
The most straightforward way to probe a decisional variable — whether it is 
the subjective value (be it positive or negative) attached to a given outcome, its 
subjective probability, or the subjective cost attached to an action — is to ask 
explicitly: “How much do you like this cookie?”, “How likely is it that you will draw a 
winning card?”, “How costly do you find it to climb six flights of stairs?“. Typically, in 
experimental settings, the question is displayed on a computer screen, and the 
answer is made by placing a cursor on a rating scale, which is bounded and features 
either numeric or verbal labels, such as “Not at all” and “Extremely”. This is 
arguably the most frequent approach to the measurement of decisional variables in 
modern cognitive neuroscience research. Likeability or pleasantness ratings have 
been used in a large number of studies over the past fifteen years (O’Doherty, 
Dayan, et al., 2003; Lebreton et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009; Rushworth et al., 2011; 
Lebreton et al., 2015; Genevsky et al., 2017; Schmidt et al., 2017; Vinckier et al., 
2019), as have effort ratings (Schmidt et al., 2009; Rollwage et al., 2018), 
probability ratings (e.g. Genevsky et al., 2017; Lebreton et al., 2015; Sharot, Korn, & 
Dolan, 2011; Szpunar & Schacter, 2013), and confidence ratings (Aridan, Malecek, 
Poldrack, & Schonberg, 2019; Bang & Fleming, 2018; Berg et al., 2016; Gardelle & 
Mamassian, 2014; Sanders, Hangya, & Kepecs, 2016). 
The main benefits of the rating approach are its ease of implementation, in 
most cases its intuitiveness for the subjects, and the direct interpretability of the 
measure. Among its drawbacks are the idiosyncrasy in the way subjects use of the 
scale to report their internal estimate, its transparency as regards the variable of 
interest for the experimenter, the usual absence of any form of commitment to the 
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rating (in other words, subjects have no built-in incentive to be honest or accurate 
in their ratings), and the impossibility to use it with non-human animals or infants.  
 
 
Fig. 1.11: Example of rating paradigm. In this experiment, participants 
were asked to rate the subjective likeability and probability of hypothetical 
events, and to make a second-order confidence judgment about their ratings. 
From (Lebreton et al., 2015) 
 
Another important class of elicitation techniques is that of incentive-
compatible auctions, which involve an incentivization (usually, through monetary 
prospects) of the accuracy of the rating, respective to the subject’s true internal 
estimate. In the context of outcome value or action cost elicitation, it typically 
consists in having the subject report the amount of money that she is willing to pay 
(WTP) in order to acquire a good (Breidert et al., 2006; Lusk & Shogren, 2007), or 
willing to accept (WTA) in order to abandon a good or perform an effortful action 
(Horowitz & McConnell, 2003). Most WTP or WTA elicitations are based on bidding 
procedures such as the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) one (Becker, Degroot, & 
Marschak, 1964), which is still used in modern-day experiments (Plassmann et al., 
2007; Burke et al., 2013; Voigt et al., 2019). One simple BDM variant consists in 
having the subject report a WTP (a “bid”) which is then compared to a randomly 
generated number. If that number (concurrent bid) is lower than the subject’s bid, 
then the subject pays the randomly drawn price and receives the item. Otherwise, 
she does not pay nor receive anything.  
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Similar auction procedures exist for eliciting beliefs, that is, subjective 
probabilities (Schlag et al., 2015; Burfurd & Wilkening, 2018). One of them, called 
“Matching Probability”, consists in the following: 1) the subject gives a probability 
(or confidence) rating 𝑟, 2) a lottery is run, i.e., a number 𝑙 in [0;1] is randomly 
selected with uniform probability, 3)  if 𝑟 > 𝑙, then a monetary bonus is granted to 
the subject if and only if her response is correct; if 𝑙 > 𝑟, then another lottery is 
immediately played, with a 𝑙 probability of leading to the bonus. This procedure has 
been shown to be robust to idiosyncrasy in risk-attitudes (Hollard et al., 2016), and 
has been implemented in a couple of recent studies about confidence judgments 
(Lebreton et al., 2018; Lebreton et al., 2019; Ting et al., 2019).   
 
 
Fig. 1.12: A Probability Matching procedure for confidence ratings. 
Here, the incentive for rating accuracy is a 1€ bonus. From (Lebreton et al., 
2019) 
 
The main advantage of this kind of techniques is that it reduces the reporting 
biases and idiosyncrasy that might occur in non-incentivized the ratings. On the con 
side, one may argue that such procedures are too artificial, explicit and complicated, 
and thus that they are ill-suited to elicit spontaneous judgments and may even be 
misunderstood by the subjects. 
More implicit, indirect approaches exist besides ratings and auctions. As for 
auction procedures, they typically rest on a utility maximization assumption, but 
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further assume a well-defined model for the computation of the subjective expected 
value of an action or option. In those cases, which we will call the revealed 
approaches1, several decisional variables (e.g. probability and energetic cost) are 
objectively known or measurable, which allows inferring an estimate for the 
remaining dimension (e.g. subjective value) from an observed behaviour such as 
choosing, producing effort to obtain a reward (Pessiglione et al., 2007; Cléry-Melin 
et al., 2011; Lopez-Persem et al., 2017), and waiting for a reward after performing 
a behaviour (Kepecs et al., 2008; Lak et al., 2014).  
The main merit of such approaches is their implicitness, which prevents any 
kind of reporting bias from altering the measurement. Yet, because they are 
indirect, they require a model and objective measurability of the other decisional 
variables at play in the observed behaviour, to allow for a conversion of this 
observed behaviour to the variable of interest. Besides, inferences made from 
binary choices are less precise than a rating, and usually require repeated choice, 
until the estimate can be confined to a narrow-enough credible range.  
 
In a comparative study recently carried out (Lopez-Persem et al., 2017), 
subjective value functions of personal gain and charitable donation were elicited 
either via explicit ratings of various combinations of personal gain and charitable 
donation, or via more indirect approaches: having the subject choose between two 
alternative {gain, donation} combinations, or squeeze a handgrip in order to 
increase the probability to receive each proposed {gain, donation} combination. All 
three elicitation methods led to similar value functions and were found to be 
equivalently accurate in the prediction of (out-of-sample) binary choices. 
 An additional class of measurements relies on physical markers such as 
salivation, lipping (Rushworth et al., 2011; Abitbol et al., 2015), or facial 
expressions of pleasure (Berridge et al., 2009) or displeasure, either in reaction to 
reward- or punishment-predicting cues, or upon consumption of the reward (or 
administration of the punishment). This approach is mostly confined to studies on 
non-human animals, which cannot perform ratings but which tend to display more 
 
1 as in the “revealed preferences” approach in economics, where preferences are inferred from choices 
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systematic and decipherable physical reactions than humans. Even more indirect 
measures may be exploited, e.g. in infants, such as their looking time after their 
witnessed someone choosing between options (here, looking time serves as a 
measure of surprise and thus as an indicator of implicit personal preference) (Liu 
et al., 2017). 
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B. Neural correlates of action selection 
 
 
In this section, we will briefly review the current understanding of the neural 
correlates of action selection, which mainly builds upon findings from 
neuroimaging experiments conducted in the three last decades.  
  
 
1) Anticipated & experienced value of outcomes 
 
For now, we will focus on basic item valuation processes (such as the one 
which would be triggered by the following question: “How much would you like to 
receive an orange now (without any delay nor cost of any sort)?”) and put aside 
downstream valuation processes incorporating e.g. delay, risk, or effort.  
Thanks to the countless fMRI studies (as well as intracranial measures of 
neural activity and lesion studies in humans and other animals) that were 
conducted over the last thirty years in the novel field of “neuroeconomics”,  it is 
now well established that, when people are making a judgment about the subjective 
value of an item, the activity in a stable set of brain regions consistently reflects (or 
“encodes”) the subjective value of the considered item, reported via ratings or 
inferred from choices. This set of regions mainly includes: the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), the ventral striatum (VS), and the posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC); the network they form is known as the Brain Valuation 
System (BVS) (Lebreton et al., 2009; Peters & Büchel, 2010; Levy & Glimcher, 2012; 
Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014). 
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Fig. 1.13: The two main components of the Brain Valuation System: 
vmPFC and ventral striatum (VS). Adapted from (Bartra et al., 2013) 
BOLD signal in the voxels highlighted in red was positively correlated to 
subjective value in both anticipation (“decision”) and outcome receipt stages, for 
both monetary and primary (e.g. food) rewards.  
 
 
Over years of neuroimaging studies, several interesting functional properties 
of the BVS have been identified. 
 
Genericity 
The BVS has been found to signal the subjective value of a very wide range of 
stimuli or items, be they primary or secondary, concrete or abstract, prospective or 
retrospective, presented or self-generated: food (Chib et al., 2009; Levy & Glimcher, 
2011; Lebreton et al., 2015), trinkets, tools, toys or other objects (Chib et al., 2009; 
Cunningham et al., 2011; Lebreton et al., 2015), money (Izuma et al., 2008; Chib et 
al., 2009; Levy & Glimcher, 2011; Lin et al., 2012), paintings or sculptures 
(Kawabata & Zeki, 2004; Dio et al., 2007; Lebreton et al., 2009; Abitbol et al., 2015), 
musical pieces (Blood et al., 1999; Abitbol et al., 2015), faces and social stimuli 
(O’Doherty, Winston, et al., 2003; Izuma et al., 2008; Lebreton et al., 2009; Lin et al., 
2012), odours (Rolls et al., 2003; de Araujo et al., 2005; Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2009; 
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Howard et al., 2015), tastes (Plassmann et al., 2008), hypothetical events (Lebreton 
et al., 2015), and so forth.  
Therefore, it would seem that activity in the BVS serves as a “neural 
common currency” for the subjective value of otherwise incommensurable items, 
and supports our ability to compare and choose, e.g., between a new computer and 
a vacation trip (Levy & Glimcher, 2011; Levy & Glimcher, 2012).  
 
Automaticity 
In most studies, neural correlates of subjective valuation have been 
identified by looking for voxels whose activity was higher when subjects were 
actively evaluating an item (specifically, a highly-valued one, based on the subject’s 
behaviour) in order to comply with the instructions of a computer to make a value 
rating or a choice about it. However, the BVS has also been shown to signal the value 
of attended items or stimuli even when no evaluation or choice was asked of the 
subject. For instance, in Lebreton et al., 2009, it was more active when subjects 
were assessing the age of preferred faces, paintings or houses compared to non-
preferred ones (see Fig. 1.14). 
The finding that BVS activity during non-valuation oriented viewing of a 
stimulus predicts later preference manifestations (i.e., choices or likeability 
ratings) has been replicated in a number of studies (Harvey et al., 2010; Tusche et 
al., 2010; Levy et al., 2011; Abitbol et al., 2015). However, a few other studies have 
obtained results contradicting the view of a fully automatic BVS. Grabenhorst & 
Rolls, 2008, have reported that the strength of value encoding by the vmPFC was 
higher when participants focused on the hedonic quality of the taste stimulus (its 
pleasantness), compared to when they focused on a dimension less related to 
subjective valuation (its intensity). Along a similar line, Grueschow et al., 2015, 
found a dissociation between the PCC, which encoded subjective values regardless 
of their relevance to the choice at hand, and the vmPFC, whose value encoding was 
modulated by the relevance to current the decision-making situation.  
 
 
 
Chapter I: Introduction 
50 
 
 
Fig. 1.14: Extract of task design and BVS BOLD Preferred versus Non-
preferred response, in (Lebreton et al., 2009). 
Left: Subjects rated the age of various stimuli (faces, houses, paintings). Middle: 
In other trials, subjects rated the subjective pleasantness of the same stimuli. The 
order of both ratings was counterbalanced across items and subjects. Right: 
Preferred vs. Non-preferred BOLD signal contrast in BVS (following ROI 
extraction and averaging), during pleasantness rating or age rating. Both 
contrasts are significantly positive (no significant different in effect size between 
conditions). 
 
 
Contextual dependency 
Two instances of contextual dependency of BVS signals will be discussed 
here. The first one is due to temporal inertia, such that the offset corresponding to 
baseline BVS activity preceding the valuation of a given stimulus is conserved 
during the BVS response to the stimulus, and interestingly, impacts subjective value 
reports. Abitbol et al., 2015, observed this baseline dependency both in humans and 
in monkeys. In humans, the baseline activity of the vmPFC was modulated via a 
manipulation of (external) contextual pleasantness (exposure to more or less 
pleasant musical background), after which subjects were shown a painting and 
prompted to make a likeability rating about that painting. As would be predicted by 
a baseline dependency in the BVS, the experimenters found that participants gave 
higher likeability ratings to paintings that had been preceded with a pleasant 
musical background. And indeed, paintings ratings were correlated to vmPFC’s pre-
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stimulus (here, the painting) activity. (See Fig. 1.15.) In monkeys, similar results 
were obtained, with the exception that baseline activity in vmPFC homolog was not 
directly modulated by a contextual manipulation, but affected by trial number and 
thus weariness, which can arguably be classified as an internal contextual influence 
(as opposed to the external contextual manipulation performed in humans).  
 
 
Fig. 1.15: Testing paradigm, theoretical predictions and results of a 
study investigating baseline dependency effects in the vmPFC. 
(Abitbol et al., 2015) 
Top row, left: Painting rating task. Each painting display was preceded by an 
extended contextual pleasantness manipulation (via musical background). Top, 
right: Theoretical predictions about baseline dependency of vmPFC activity, and 
its consequences on valuation. Bottom row, left: Painting ratings against music 
pleasantness ratings. Bottom, middle: vmPFC BOLD timecourse from painting 
onset (t = 0), after high-rated versus low-rated music. Bottom, right: Pre-
stimulus vmPFC activity against painting rating. 
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Another instance of BVS contextual dependency is the modulation of BVS 
response and, congruently, of behaviourally reported valuation by prior 
expectations about value. Plassmann et al., 2008, had participants taste Cabernet 
Sauvignons in an fMRI scanner, and “incidentally” announced the price of each wine 
before it was sampled. Participants’ mOFC (here, the ventral part of the vmPFC) 
responded very differently to the exact same wine, depending on whether it was 
labelled as cheap or expensive beforehand. (See Fig. 1.16.) This modulation of 
neural response by prior value expectations was reflected in their actual liking 
ratings, which were higher for ‘expensive’ wine A than for ‘cheap’ wine A.  
These observations were recently replicated in (Schmidt et al., 2017), and, in 
fact, extended to both the vmPFC/mOFC and the ventral striatum. Further, this 
second study demonstrated that the impact of price cues on ‘experienced 
pleasantness’ ratings was actually mediated by BVS activity. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.16: mOFC response to identical but differently priced wines.  
From (Plassmann et al., 2008).  
 
Although we have not distinguished anticipated, decision, and experienced 
values until now, it is worth mentioning that these three kinds of (subjective) value 
have been claimed to refer to distinct psychological processes, and to be 
underpinned by distinct brain networks. Some scholars like Daniel Kahneman 
(Kahneman et al., 1997) or Kent Berridge (Berridge et al., 2009) have proposed an 
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extensive typology of subjective values, or utilities (both terms can be used 
interchangeably here). Largely borrowing from (Berridge & O’Doherty, 2013), we 
will superficially review one possible division of utility into sub-types, how these 
sub-types are related, and what neural substrates for each of them have been 
identified to this date. The most intuitive type of utility is perhaps experienced 
utility. It refers to the extent of pleasure or satisfaction felt by the agent during or 
immediately after exposure to, or consumption of, an outcome. A network of small, 
specific brain regions has been causally implicated in signalling experienced value, 
via the opioid neuromodulatory system. These regions are called “hedonic 
hotspots” and include a fraction of the ventral striatum, as well as a fraction of the 
ventral pallidum (Peciña & Berridge, 2005; Smith & Berridge, 2005; Smith & 
Berridge, 2007). As seen above, based on fMRI experiments in humans, it seems 
that experienced utility is also signalled, or encoded, in the mOFC, although the 
causal (rather than correlational) implication of this region is not clear 
(Kringelbach, 2005). Moreover, reward prediction error signals have been 
observed upon delivery (or omission) of rewards (variable in size) in the 
dopaminergic system (specifically, in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and its main 
output, the nucleus accumbens — which is more or less equivalent to the VS) 
(Schultz et al., 1997). This suggests that experienced utility is an input to RPE 
signals involved in reinforcement (or “habitual”) learning. Another utility type in 
Berridge’s framework is remembered utility. It likely derives from (memories of) 
experienced utility, which may involve distortions both at the encoding and 
retrieval stages. Remembered utility may involve the hippocampus, which, beyond 
its well-established role in episodic memory, has been shown to be implicated in 
subjective valuation of displayed stimuli or imagined outcomes (Lebreton et al., 
2009; Lebreton et al., 2013). Remembered utility is assumed to inform another type 
of utility judgment: anticipated, or predicted, utility. This refers to the pleasure or 
satisfaction that one expects to derive from a potential future outcome. Correlates 
have been mainly found in the ventral striatum as well as in the vmPFC (Diekhof et 
al., 2012; Lebreton et al., 2015; Weber et al., 2018). Since humans are able to 
perform anticipated utility judgments about outcomes they have never 
experienced before (e.g., ”How much do you think you will enjoy your vacation in 
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this country you have never been to?”), it is likely that anticipated utility judgments 
can be derived through generalization of and comparison to similar past 
experiences, as well as more abstract reasoning. Finally, a fourth type of utility is 
decision utility: it is the judgment that directly guides option selection (assuming 
that agents act such as to maximize their decision utility). Berridge has proposed 
that decision utility might not only be based on anticipated utility, but might also 
be influenced by more ‘Pavlovian’ wanting signals (of “incentive salience”) 
conveyed by the dopaminergic system, which could lead an agent to select an 
option not because he expects to derive utility from it (as would be the case in goal-
directed decision-making (Rangel et al., 2008)) but out of craving (as is the case, 
e.g., in drug addiction, and which is supposedly signalled by a Pavlovian system 
(Rangel et al., 2008)). 
 
 
Fig. 1.17: A schematic typology of utility. 
Inspired from (Berridge & O’Doherty, 2013). Several types of utilities can be 
distinguished: anticipated utility (left), whose correlates have been found in the 
VS and vmPFC; decision utility (center); experienced utility (right), whose 
correlates have been found in so-called “hedonic hotspots” (HH), including a part 
of the nucleus accumbens (in VS), as well as in mOFC. Experienced utility seems 
to be signalled by the opioid neuromodulatory system, as well as conveyed in a 
prediction error signal supported by the dopaminergic (DA) system. 
Remembered utility (bottom), may involve the hippocampus.  
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2) Probability & confidence 
Outcome probability 
Neural correlates of prospective reward probability have been found, either 
at a single neuron level or at a population level (BOLD), in a number of different 
regions across the brain. These include: the dopaminergic midbrain, whose phasic 
activity during the display of reward-predictive stimuli was found to correlate 
positively with reward probability (Tobler et al., 2005),  the basal ganglia, in which 
the correlation was either positive (Oyama et al., 2010; Berns & Bell, 2012) or 
negative (Knutson, 2005; Apicella et al., 2009), and in particular, the NAcc/ventral 
striatum whose activity correlates positively with probability (Tobler et al., 2007; 
Yacubian et al., 2007), as well as prefrontal cortical regions such as the mPFC 
(Knutson, 2005; Wu et al., 2011; Studer et al., 2012), the lPFC (Tobler et al., 2007; 
Kennerley et al., 2011), and the ACC (Wu et al., 2011; Kennerley et al., 2011), which 
all encode probability positively. 
Despite the extensive spatial overlap between regions encoding reward 
magnitude (or, not equivalently, subjective value) and reward probability, some 
studies have highlighted an intra-regional dissociation between areas encoding 
these two variables, e.g. in the striatum, although the specifics of the dissociation 
differ from one study (Berns & Bell, 2012) to the others (Yacubian et al., 2007; 
Tobler et al., 2007) (see Fig. 1.18).  
 
Fig. 1.18: Spatial dissociations of reward magnitude and probability 
in the striatum. (A) Adapted from (Berns & Bell, 2012). (B) Adapted from 
(Yacubian et al., 2007) 
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Besides, in some of the works cited above, probability predictors were not 
orthogonal by design (nor orthogonalized a posteriori) to expected value, or 
expected utility (regardless of the specific theory, EU, SEU, PT, that we use to 
compute it), such that some of the identified correlates of reward probability might 
actually encode expected value. A few studies, however, have explicitly shown 
spatial dissociations between magnitude,  probability, and expected value encoding 
(Tobler et al., 2007, see Fig. 1.19) which strongly suggest that some subpart of the 
striatum encodes reward probability specifically. 
 
Fig. 1.19: Spatial dissociation between magnitude, probability, and 
expected value encoding in the striatum and dlPFC.  
Adapted from (Tobler et al., 2007) 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the mPFC  in particular has been found to 
encode reward probability positively, regardless of whether that probability was 
announced numerically (classical lottery), or modulated via the difficulty of a motor 
precision task (motor lottery) (Wu et al., 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.20: Neural correlates of probability weights in classical and 
motor lotteries. From (Wu et al., 2011) 
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Confidence 
The neural substrates of confidence, as a special kind of probability judgment 
(see section A. 4) c.), have also been investigated over the past decade. In memory 
tasks, activity in the ventral striatum, the vmPFC, and the hippocampus has been 
found to correlate positively with confidence in recognition judgments (Chua et al., 
2006; Moritz et al., 2006; Schwarze et al., 2013).  
In binary perceptual discrimination tasks, a wide network of brain areas 
seems implicated as well : the OFC in rodents (Kepecs et al., 2008; Lak et al., 2014), 
the lateral intra-parietal sulcus (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009) and the midbrain 
dopaminergic system (Lak et al., 2017) in monkeys, the ventral striatum (Hebart et 
al., 2016), the ACC (negative correlation, Fleming & Dolan, 2012; Hebart et al., 
2016) and the rostro-lateral prefrontal cortex (negative correlation, Fleming & 
Dolan, 2012) in humans. In Bang & Fleming, 2018, BOLD signal in dorso-medial 
PFC, which the authors refer to as the perigenual ACC, correlated positively with 
subjects’ confidence in their binary judgments about the average direction of a 
continuous dot-motion stimulus. 
 
In judgment tasks about non-perceptual variables, the mPFC was also found 
to encode self-reported confidence as well as confidence inferred from first-order 
judgments, although in a more ventral area than the aforementioned pgACC. 
Specifically, in Lebreton et al., 2015, BOLD signal in the vmPFC correlated with 
second-order confidence judgments (explicitly prompted or not) about first-order 
age, probability or value judgments. Additionally, the vmPFC had been found, in an 
earlier study (De Martino et al., 2012),  to encode confidence in value-based choices. 
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Fig. 1.21: Summary of value-based computational modeling of 
ratings, predictions and findings in Lebreton et al., 2015 
(a) In their model of continuous judgment, a rating is optimal when it minimizes 
the expected squared distance (or error) to the ground-truth value, where the 
subject’s belief about that true value is represented as an internal, continuous 
density function across possible values. The confidence of the subject in giving 
an accurate rating is a decreasing function of the expected error, and thus is 
affected by the variance of her internal belief distribution, in accordance with the 
Bayesian view that distributional variance reflects epistemic uncertainty. 
Besides, when that variance increases, it is on average more optimal (in the sense 
that it minimizes expected error) to give a rating closer to the center of the rating 
scale. (b) From the rating optimization model, it follows that confidence should 
vary quadratically with the punctual rating given by the subject on a bounded 
scale. This is what was observed behaviourally. (c) Traditional view, according 
to which activity in the vmPFC correlates linearly with subjective value ratings. 
(d) In this study, the vmPFC was found to encode both subjective value and 
confidence positively (and presumably linearly), which, given the quadratic 
relationship between ratings and confidence, corresponds to an overall hook-
shaped activity as a function of subjective value ratings, and a parabolic-shaped 
activity as a function of value-unrelated ratings. Figure from (Barron et al., 2015). 
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3) Effort cost 
 
Although not the focus of this PhD work, we will now briefly review recent 
neuroimaging-based findings about the neural correlates of physical effort cost 
judgments and/or effort-discounted action valuation in humans.  
The most recurring brain region in studies investigating the neural 
substrates of effort cost in action valuation is arguably the dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex. However, the reported sign of effort encoding varied from one study to the 
other: it was found to positively encode prospective effort-discounted rewards in 
the absence of choice (i.e. when a given effort-reward combination was imposed to 
the subject) (Croxson et al., 2009) or the effort-discounted value of the chosen 
option when a choice was given between two effort-reward combinations (Klein-
Flügge et al., 2016). Yet, it was also found to positively encode anticipated effort or, 
correspondingly, to negatively encode upcoming effort-discounted value in other 
studies, where subjects were either imposed a unique effort-reward combination 
on each trial (Kurniawan et al., 2013), or given the choice to reject it (Prevost et al., 
2010) or given a choice between two (hidden, to be learned) effort-reward 
combinations (Skvortsova et al., 2014). 
Also based on functional magnetic resonance imaging in humans, other 
regions seem to be involved, such as: the supplementary motor area, which is 
adjacent to the dACC and, similarly, was reported to encode anticipated effort 
positively in (Kurniawan et al., 2013; Burke et al., 2013), but effort-discounted 
outcome value positively in (Croxson et al., 2009), and the difference between 
chosen and unchosen effort negatively in (Klein-Flügge et al., 2016); the ventral 
striatum, which was found to positively encode effort-discounted outcome value 
posterior to effort exertion (Kurniawan et al., 2013); the dorsal striatum, which was 
both found to negatively encode high effort versus low effort choices (Kurniawan 
et al., 2010) and to positively encode anticipated effort in other studies (Kurniawan 
et al., 2013; Burke et al., 2013); the anterior insula, whose activity was positively 
correlated with anticipated effort in (Prevost et al., 2010; Skvortsova et al., 2014). 
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Finally, some researchers have argued that, when effort-involving valuation 
is temporally separated from effort exertion, the main regions involved in value 
discounting by effort cost are the vmPFC and primary motor areas, whose activity 
correlated negatively with prospective level of effort exertion in (Aridan et al., 
2019).  
Overall, the neural network underlying effort cost judgments and effort-
discounting of outcomes seems to include a variety of meso-cortical and striatal 
regions (dACC, SMA, vmPFC, nucleus accumbens, putamen), whose exact function 
remains to be clarified. Besides, although substantial evidence from behavioural 
observations following lesions and intracranial recordings in animal experiments 
point to a central role of the dopaminergic system in favouring high-effort high-
reward actions over low-effort low-reward ones (Walton et al., 2006; Salamone & 
Correa, 2012), the emerging consensus is that the dopaminergic system is primarily 
sensitive to prospective reward, rather than effort costs, and thus promotes 
reward-directed action (Walton & Bouret, 2019). 
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C. Interferences within and between decisional variables 
 
 
 
 
In this section, we will review a collection of behavioural observations, made 
either in the field or in laboratory settings, which document intra- or inter-
dimensional interferences between judgments of value, probability, and effort. 
 
 
1) Intra-dimensional interferences 
 
a. Anchors & expectations 
 
Out of the long list of biases that have been reported to affect human 
judgment, one of the most widely known is arguably the anchoring bias. The 
anchoring effect has been popularized — and partly theorized — by Kahneman & 
Tversky (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), who observed that participants in their 
experiments tended to make higher numerical estimates (e.g. about the percentage 
of African countries in the United Nations, or the length of the Mississippi river) 
when first provided with a high anchor, that is, an arbitrary initial value from which 
they had to adjust their estimate (typically, they would first be asked whether the 
actual value was above or below that arbitrary number drawn by a wheel of 
fortune, and then to give a specific, point estimate of the actual value). Similarly, 
they gave lower estimates when provided with a low anchor.  
Even before Tversky & Kahneman’s seminal paper, anchoring effects had 
been reported in the domain of physical perception. In particular,  judgments about 
the weight of a “target” object were found to be affected by the weight of an 
“anchor” object that subjects had lifted just before (Harvey & Campbell, 1963). 
However, in this study, the effect was not one of assimilation as in Tversky & 
Kahneman’s later observations, but instead a contrast effect, where heavy anchors 
led to lower weight estimates. A more recent and comprehensive study on 
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anchoring of physical perception (including other dimensions than weight, and 
involving other perceptual modalities than proprioception, such as length (vision) 
or loudness (audition)) found the opposite pattern of results, that is, an assimilation 
of estimates to the preceding anchors (LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2006). This divergence 
with earlier results was attributed by the authors to differences in the way 
estimates were elicited (anchors and targets were interspersed and all rated 
sequentially in earlier studies, while later studies followed on Tversky & 
Kahneman’s work and focused on anchoring-and-adjustment, wherein the anchor 
is presented as a potential estimate that the subject has to adjust subsequently). 
Besides affecting judgments of weight (and by extension, effort), anchoring 
effects have been observed in probability assessments about either personally 
relevant or irrelevant events, e.g. the likelihood of a nuclear world war breaking out 
in the next 10 years (Plous, 1989; Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Mussweiler et al., 
2000), or the likelihood of a stranger being a biology or chemistry major 
(Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997). In the line of the anchoring-and-adjustment 
scenario which predicts an assimilation effect, probability judgments were biased 
upwards by high anchors and downwards by low anchors. 
Further, it would seem that anchoring is not restrained to judgments about 
external variables on which the estimator has no influence, but can also distort 
beliefs about one’s ability to solve upcoming cognitive puzzles, that is, self-efficacy 
judgments (which are, in our terminology, a type of prospective confidence 
judgments) (Cervone & Peake, 1986). In this study, anchors modulated not only 
self-efficacy predictions but also actual persistence levels displayed by participants 
during task execution. 
So far, all reported anchoring effects were about objectively measurable 
variables, but it has been shown that subjective evaluations of, e.g., familiar 
products, belongings, or hedonic experiences, were also prone to be biased by 
arbitrary anchors (Mussweiler et al., 2000; Ariely et al., 2003).  
 
Besides incidental anchors, prior expectations have been found to distort 
judgments, and in particular, judgments of subjective value or likeability. Oddly 
enough, many of the studies demonstrating such an effect involved the tasting and 
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rating of alcoholic beverages. On each trial, prior expectations about the gustatory 
qualities of the upcoming sample were set by disclosing some (fake) information 
about its brand or price. Thus-induced high (resp. low) value expectations led to 
significantly higher (resp. lower) experienced pleasantness ratings of the exact 
same beverage (Allison & Uhl, 1964; Lee et al., 2006; Plassmann et al., 2008; 
Schmidt et al., 2017). The same effect was observed when subjects were asked to 
report their enjoyment of vacations or movies instead of beers or wines (Klaaren 
et al., 1994). Overall, the distortion of valuation by expectations could be 
interpreted as the result of an internal, non-numerical anchor (the expected value) 
which is not sufficiently adjusted for upon experiencing the stimulus. It should be 
noted that, apart from insufficient adjustment, other accounts have been proposed 
to explain anchoring effects, see (Furnham & Boo, 2011) for a review. 
 
 
b. Affect as information about value 
 
In parallel with the stream of research investigating anchoring effects on 
judgments, another, related stream emerged. Its focus was on how feelings 
impacted judgments, and in particular, subjective value judgments. It led to the 
development of the influential feeling-as-information theory (Schwarz & Clore, 
1996). 
In this literature, three types of feelings are usually distinguished (Clore, 
1992): affective (e.g. positive mood, anger), bodily (e.g. pain, hunger), and cognitive 
(e.g. feeling of knowing, ease of processing). Because we are interested in cases of 
value-value interferences, and because the mapping from value to affect is much 
more straightforward than to other types of feelings, we will focus on the sub-
construct of affect-as-information. 
Affects can be decomposed, following Russell’s circumplex model, into a 
valence and an arousal component (Russell, 1980), where valence refers to the 
hedonic quality of an affect, ranging from negative to positive, and arousal refers to 
the level of activation or excitement, ranging from low to high. Another classic 
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distinction regarding affects consists in differentiating emotions from moods. 
Although both belong to the class of affective feelings, emotions (such as anger, 
disgust, or relief) are conceptualised as acute, brief, and associated to an 
identifiable referent (they are about something), whereas moods are typically more 
prolonged, less intense, lack a clear referent and mostly unidimensional (moods 
differ from one another in terms of valence) (Schwarz, 2012).  A wealth of 
behavioural studies have manipulated participants’ affect, mainly along the valence 
dimension, mainly in the mood mode, and found repercussions on their 
pleasantness or likeability judgments about various stimuli or items. In one of the 
most influential of these studies (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), healthy individuals were 
asked how satisfied they were with their life, while in a positive or negative mood 
which was induced either by an episodic recall procedure (Experiment 1) or simply 
by the current weather (Experiment 2). Quite interestingly, respondents who were 
in a good mood (e.g. on a sunny day) reported higher levels of life satisfaction than 
those in a neutral mood, who themselves reported a higher satisfaction than those 
in a bad mood (e.g. on a rainy day). Yet more interestingly, the effect of bad mood 
on life satisfaction disappeared when subjects were made aware of the extraneous 
origin of their mood (in Experiment 2, the interviewer on the phone pretended to 
be out of town, and inquired about the weather before conducting the life 
satisfaction survey). These observations implied two things: first, that the influence 
of affect could be incidental, i.e., occur in a context where affect was modulated by 
a factor unrelated to the target of the value judgment; second, that this incidental 
influence, called misattribution of affect, could be moderated by increasing 
awareness about the (unrelated) source of this affective state.  
On top of this empirical work, Schwarz and Clore made an important 
contribution to the field in the form a theoretical proposal: when an individual is 
making an evaluation, her current affective state is incorporated as information 
about the target of the evaluation. As the authors have pointed out, this 
incorporation is not necessarily a bad thing for the accuracy of the evaluation, 
especially when the evaluation is inherently subjective (“How much do you like this 
song?”) and affect is mainly modulated by the target itself. Of course, it can be more 
problematic when the affective state is modulated by a factor irrelevant to the 
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judgment at hand: for instance, academics might evaluate a PhD applicant less 
positively if they have just received a rejection notice from a journal, or if the room 
in which they conduct the interview has a stale smell. 
 Following on Schwarz & Clore’s seminal paper, several studies reported 
similar effects of affect misattribution in value judgments, about e.g. stereo 
speakers, or medical school candidates (Schwarz et al., 1987; Gorn et al., 1993; 
Redelmeier & Baxter, 2009).  
The factors moderating the extent to which affects are (mis)attributed to a 
target during a value judgment have been reviewed recently, based on decades of 
empirical work (Greifeneder et al., 2011). Four main factors have received 
extensive consensus: 
 
1) Salience of the affect: on average, more salient feelings are more 
incorporated into judgments. However, misattribution effects have also 
been found when feelings were induced subliminally (Winkielman et al., 
2005), and on the contrary, it has been consistently shown that making 
the source of the feeling cognitively salient typically decreases 
misattribution effects (Schwarz, 2012). 
2) Representativeness of the affect for the target being judged: the more an 
affect is being viewed as caused by or about the target, the stronger the 
(mis)attribution. 
3) Relevance of the affect to the judgment: the more relevant an affect is 
perceived, the stronger the (mis)attribution. For instance, when 
evaluating the professional competence of a co-worker, feelings of 
sympathy towards this co-worker, although representative in the sense 
introduced above, may be considered irrelevant and thus put aside from 
the evaluation process. 
4) Malleability of the judgment: if, aside from affect, cues to construct a 
judgment are scarce or ambiguous, then this judgment is said to be more 
malleable (e.g., when evaluating the trustworthiness of politicians versus 
their gender, or how good a movie is versus how much it costs to buy it), 
and affect is predicted to have a larger impact upon it.  
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Over the last few years, an interesting proposal has emerged about the 
interactions between mood and the perceived value of outcomes or stimuli (Eldar 
et al., 2016). First, good (resp. bad) mood was hypothesized to result from positive 
(resp. negative) prediction errors between the expected and experienced value of 
an outcome, drawing on previous modeling and empirical findings about reward 
prediction errors and reported well-being (Rutledge et al., 2014). But more 
importantly, Eldar and colleagues proposed that mood would in turn influence the 
perception of obtained outcomes, with more positive (resp. negative) mood 
inducing higher (resp. lower) valuation, thus creating a positive reinforcement loop 
between mood and valuation. Under certain conditions, this positive feedback loop 
could elicit some cases of mood dysfunctions, such as mania or depression. This 
theoretical proposal was accompanied with some converging empirical evidence, 
suggesting that affect and valuation could interact bi-directionally. 
 
 
Fig. 1.22: Schematic of possible mood dysfunctions. Euphoria or 
mania vs. dysphoria or depression, from (Eldar et al., 2016). (A) Mood 
fluctuations over time, depending on relative learning rates from positive 
versus negative prediction errors and outcome history. (B) Positive 
feedback loops reinforcing high versus low mood, and possible transition 
between them. 
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2) Inter-dimensional interferences 
 
a. Value – probability 
 
Judgment interdependences are not restricted to intra-dimensional cases. In 
fact, the literature documenting influences of value judgments on probability 
judgments might be even more abundant. One of the most famous instances of such 
(supposedly unwarranted) influence is the so-called desirability bias. 
Over the last seventy years, it has been repeatedly observed that healthy 
people tend to perceive relatively more desirable (future or hidden) states of the 
world as relatively more likely. In a seminal study (Marks, 1951), Marks presented 
children with decks of cards, a proportion of which were picture cards, while the 
others were blank. After orally stating the proportion of picture cards in a given 
deck, she asked the children to predict if they were going to draw a picture card. 
Considerably more children predicted a picture card draw when it meant winning 
one point versus losing one point. This finding was generalized to adults two years 
later (Irwin, 1953).  
Since then, positive distortions of the perceived probability of an event by its 
desirability have been consistently observed in a wide range of paradigms, mainly 
involving games of chance (e.g., cards drawn from decks, beads drawn from jars), 
in which a subset of outcomes were incentivized monetarily or via other types of 
reward (e.g. food or raffle tickets), and where the dependent variable was either a 
binary prediction, a probability assessment, or a bet from the participant (Bar-Hillel 
& Budescu, 1995; Budescu & Bruderman, 1995; Lench & Ditto, 2008; Lench et al., 
2014; Lench et al., 2016; see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007 for a comprehensive review 
of empirical evidence about the desirability bias). 
 
It has been argued (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004) that the desirability bias 
may underlie the related optimism bias, which also pervades in the general 
population. Overoptimism consists in overestimating the probability of positive 
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events, and underestimating that of negative ones. In a now classic study 
(Weinstein, 1980), Weinstein asked hundreds of college students to judge how 
much more or less likely than their classmates they were to experience various 
positively or negatively valenced events in the future, such as living past 80 or 
divorcing a few years after getting married. He found that on average, participants 
thought themselves more likely than others to experience positive events, and less 
likely to experience negative ones. This observation of a propensity for comparative 
optimism has since been replicated in various settings (Weinstein & Lachendro, 
1982; Burger & Burns, 1988; Baker & Emery, 1993; Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 
2001).  
Given the recurring observation that healthy individuals are unrealistically 
optimistic about future events, some researchers asked the following question: 
how can individuals stay overly optimistic in the face of the reality, which, by 
definition of unrealistic optimism, regularly brings disconfirmation and 
disappointment? 
Sharot and her team have proposed that individuals do not cognitively 
absorb bad news as extensively as they absorb good news (Sharot et al., 2011; 
Sharot et al., 2012). In their experimental paradigm, participants sequentially 
estimated their likelihood of experiencing various adverse life events (e.g., robbing, 
Alzheimer’s disease). After each prior estimate, the actual rate of occurrence was 
disclosed to them, and later in the testing session, they were again prompted to 
estimate their risk, a posteriori. The researchers found that the update of personal 
risk estimates following information about the actual base rate was larger when 
this information had come as good news (the statistical risk being lower than their 
prior estimate) and it implied decreasing one’s risk estimate, than when it had come 
as bad news, and implied increasing one’s risk estimate. This valence-dependent 
belief updating upon information receipt is evocative of a more recent finding from 
the same team, regarding information-seeking (Charpentier et al., 2018). This study 
was motivated by the observation that, although people tend to value knowledge 
positively and to seek information actively, they sometimes reject opportunities to 
receive bad but useful news, e.g. about their current health status (Thornton, 2008; 
Persoskie et al., 2014; Dwyer et al., 2015). And indeed, participants were willing to 
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pay to avoid negatively-valenced information about a potential monetary loss they 
may have incurred. This result lends some additional support to earlier proposals 
— empirically well-grounded already (Karlsson et al., 2009; Ganguly & Tasoff, 
2016) — that belief states carry subjective value in and of themselves, in the sense 
that, all else being equal (and in particular, when one cannot inflect a state of affairs 
upon knowing about it), holding the belief that you are healthy and well-liked by all 
is more valuable than holding the belief that you have cancer and that your relatives 
secretly despise you (Caplin & Leahy, 2001; Kőszegi, 2010; Bénabou, 2015; Golman 
& Loewenstein, 2018). 
Furthering this view, a positive correlation has been found in the general 
population between trait optimism and psychological (or even physical) well-being 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988; Scheier et al., 1989; Taylor et al., 2000). Besides, clinical or 
sub-clinical depressive states have been linked to an absence of optimism bias (cf. 
“depressive realism”, Moore & Fresco, 2012). 
As we have seen in section A., a type of probability judgment that is 
particularly relevant for action selection is confidence. Since confidence refers to 
the subjective probability of a desirable state (being correct or successful), one 
could expect, from the aforementioned evidence about desirability bias and 
overoptimism, that healthy individuals would also tend to be overconfident. This is 
indeed what has been found in numerous instances, in the field as well as in the 
laboratory. In one of the earliest and most famous studies about overconfidence 
(Svenson, 1981), Svenson asked participants to situate their own driving skills 
respective to the other subjects in the room (all college students at the same 
university). In each of the several experiments that were conducted, half of the 
testing group placed themselves in the best 25%, and more than 80% of the 
respondents regarded themselves as above the median driver, both in terms of 
competence and safety, which means that a large proportion of the interviewees 
were probably overconfident about their skills. Beyond this better-than-average 
effect (Alicke et al., 2005; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008) which is a manifestation of 
relative overconfidence, heathy individuals tend to exhibit absolute overconfidence, 
that is, they tend to overestimate their skills or their past or future performance in 
a wide array of laboratory or real-life tasks (Baranski & Petrusic, 1994; West & 
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Stanovich, 1997; Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Dunning et al., 2004; Berner & Graber, 
2008). As for overoptimism, overconfidence has been linked to better mood and 
well-being (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Taylor et al., 2000), higher achievement in 
competitive domains, from academia to war by way of entrepreneurial innovation 
(Koellinger et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Stankov et al., 
2012; Chen & Schildberg-Hörisch, 2018), and has been demonstrated to provide an 
evolutionary advantage to its carriers, under certain environmental circumstances 
(Johnson & Fowler, 2011). Even in the clinical domain, high mood and 
overconfidence seem to co-occur, since excessive confidence is a diagnostic 
criterion of pathological mania, which, contrary to many psychiatric conditions, is 
often accompanied with hyperthymia (DSM - 5, American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). 
Aside from the fact that it feels good to feel confident, it has been suggested 
that fluctuations in affective valence can induce fluctuations in confidence: in the 
lab, subjects whose mood was modulated upwards through an induction procedure 
reported higher levels of confidence (or self-efficacy, in the terminology of the 
paper) about various activities (Kavanagh & Bower, 1985); in real stock markets, 
traders were found to take more risks when the sun shines (Saunders, 1993; 
Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003; Bassi et al., 2013), and less risks in gloomy winter 
days (Kamstra et al., 2003), or when their favourite sports team just lost an 
important match (Edmans et al., 2007). However, the modulation of risk-aversion 
by mood may not be imputable to a change in confidence, or even optimism (given 
that stock trading outcomes are not entirely dependent on the trader’s behaviour), 
but instead to a change in valuation: as we have seen above, moods can distort the 
perceived value of obtained outcomes, and might also distort that of anticipated 
ones. 
On top of the incidental effects of mood, confidence is susceptible to 
influences from the overall value of the context in which this judgment is made, or 
from the expectancy of incurring gains or losses. In (Maddux et al., 1982),  
participants’ “self-efficacy expectancy”, that is, prior confidence about being able to 
perform a behaviour correctly, increased with increasing outcome expectancy (in 
terms of the expected gain resulting from a correct behaviour — no losses were 
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involved). More recently (Lebreton et al., 2018), also in a controlled experimental 
setting, it was found that participants were more confident a posteriori about their 
perceptual judgment when confidence ratings were incentivized by a gain prospect 
(via a “matching probability” procedure, see section A.5)) compared to the neutral 
condition (no incentivization), and less confident when ratings were incentivized 
by a loss prospect. The same team later found that, in a reinforcement learning 
paradigm, participants were less confident in choosing the best option (in terms of 
expected outcome) when they were learning to minimize losses, compared to when 
they were learning to maximize gains (Lebreton et al., 2019). 
 
 
b. Value – effort  
 
Unlike interdependences between value and probability judgments, which 
are usually irrational, those linking outcome value or probability judgments with 
effort judgments are often sensible: all else being equal, in most real-life situations, 
exerting more effort in a task yields larger rewards or smaller losses with higher 
probability, and larger prospective rewards motivate higher effort exertion. Due to 
this general correlation, when direct cues on which to build a prospective or 
retrospective effort judgment (e.g. the weight of a bag to carry, the slope of a 
running trail) are scarce, information about expected or obtained outcome value 
can be rightfully incorporated into this effort cost estimation. And indeed, healthy 
individuals were found to adjust their retrospective effort judgments about a 
laboratory task (Pooresmaeili et al., 2015, see Fig. 1.23) as a function of the reward 
received upon task completion, whose magnitude was, on average and by design, 
contingent on task difficulty (and thus effort cost). In line with a Bayesian cue 
integration mechanism, the incorporation of reward as a source of information 
about effort became more extensive as the effort-reward actual contingency 
increased. This finding was recently extended to vicarious effort judgments: 
participants judged the effort exerted by other participants as higher when their 
effort exertion was followed by a larger reward (Rollwage et al., 2018). 
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Interestingly, reward information was integrated to a larger extent in effort 
judgments about others than about themselves, in accordance with the predictions 
of Bayesian optimal integration (the scarcer other information (e.g., proprioceptive 
feedback) is about effort produced, the stronger the influence of the reward source 
of information), and in contradiction with what would be entailed by an attribution 
bias, whereby individuals attribute their own success to effort and talent, but 
others’ to luck (Weiner, 1972)). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.23: Effort exertion and estimation task, from Pooresmaeili et 
al., 2015. After each effort exertion episode (pushing a virtual ball up a ramp by 
alternately pressing two keys on the keyboard), subjects received a reward of 
variable size, and subsequently estimated the effort they had just expended. To 
make the purpose of the experiment less transparent, subjects were instructed 
to watch for a possible colour change of the ball while they were pushing it up 
the ramp, and to report it after their effort rating. 
 
 
 
However, aside from supporting rational Bayesian inferences, the value of 
effort outcomes (or incentives) has been shown to bias the retrospective 
perception of exerted effort in the opposite direction to what structural effort-
outcome causalities should entail. In (Schmidt et al., 2009), participants reported 
having exerted less effort, or rather, retrospectively perceiving an exerted effort as 
less costly when being more rewarded for it.  
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Conversely, it has been convincingly demonstrated that before the age of one, 
humans are able to infer other people’s preferences towards various items from the 
effort they deploy to reach them (Liu et al., 2017).  
Nevertheless, it would seem that sometimes, people also infer their own 
preferences, i.e., the subjective value of various outcomes, from their own or other 
people’s efforts exerted towards those outcomes. This has been observed in 
numerous instances.  
In one of them (Kruger et al., 2004), subjects attributed a higher value and 
reported a higher liking of poems, paintings, or suits of armour that allegedly took 
more time and effort to be created (by others). The authors conjecture that this 
effect reflects a cognitive “effort heuristic”. As they further note, participants were 
more influenced by information about effort when the quality of the item was more 
ambiguous and difficult to evaluate, consistent with most views about cue 
integration, from affect-as-information wherein malleability is proposed to 
moderate distortion by affect, to Bayesian optimal integration theory.  
Another, related instance where value judgments about an item are 
influenced by the effort invested into the production of that item is the so-called 
“IKEA effect”, referring to the propensity of (healthy) individuals to ascribe a 
higher value (expressed, e.g., through WTA auctions) to objects that they have 
effortfully but successfully assembled themselves compared to identical but pre-
assembled objects (Norton et al., 2012).  
Very similar is the effort justification effect, according to which the fact that 
individuals assign a higher value to outcomes obtained after more effort exertion 
(Aronson & Mills, 1959) results from a need to reduce cognitive dissonance, and to 
justify effort expenditure by the value of its outcome. 
In line with those behavioural effects, recent neuroimaging studies have 
found higher neural responses to rewards following higher effort exertion 
(Hernandez Lallement et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2014). 
 
As we have seen so far, most distortions exerted by effort on value are 
observed in retrospective settings, that is, when effort is already expended. 
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However, some cases of prospective distortions of value by effort have been 
highlighted in a recent review (Inzlicht et al., 2018), which further suggested that, 
at least in some circumstances, effort might intrinsically carry positive value. If this 
is the case, effort could influence cost-benefit computations through other, more 
subtle (and opposite) ways than it does in classical effort discounting (where effort 
bears negative value). This positive influence could take two distinct computational 
forms. In traditional cost-benefit models describing effort allocation, the positive 
value of effort could either be expressed as an enhancement of outcome value (in 
line with the IKEA and effort justification effects, but assuming that this distortion 
also applies prospectively), or as an additional value term (which would be, e.g., 
proportional to the amount of effort deployed), or both.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1.24: Schematic consequences of effort-enhanced value in a cost-
benefit trade-off. From (Inzlicht et al., 2018) Left: Scenario A, effort 
enhances product value. Right: Scenario B, effort as an intrinsic reward. 
Irrespective of the specific scenario, the value-enhancing property of 
effort predicts an increased effort exertion.  
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D. Summary & directions 
 
 
In this introductory chapter, we have seen that modern theories of value-
based action selection have inherited their formalism from economists’ expected 
utility theory (EUT), which posits that, when given a choice, rational agents pick the 
option (or course of action) that maximizes the mathematical expectancy of the 
outcome’s subjective value, or utility. Since its formulation by Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, EUT has been partly supplanted by other economic theories of human 
choice, such as Kahneman & Tversky’s Prospect Theory, which aimed to provide a 
better description of actual choice behaviour observed in the field or in the 
laboratory, e.g. by incorporating distortions of objective probability in the 
weighting of potential outcomes for value expectancy computation. Decision 
models were also extended to account for choices between courses of action 
involving costs, such as pain or energetic expense, as well as delay in outcome 
occurrence.  
Despite these amendments, an implicit assumption has remained enclosed in 
these models until today, that of an independence of judgment between the various 
decisional variables entering the cost-benefit computation: subjective value of 
outcomes, outcome (subjective) probability, and (subjective) costs entailed by the 
considered course of action (e.g. due to effort). In recent years, the neural 
substrates of these decisional variables have begun to be uncovered, while still 
reasoning under that assumption of mutual independence. 
Yet, over the last five decades, psychologists have pointed out a number of 
instances in which value, probability, and effort judgments can influence, or 
“contaminate” each other. However, the computational and neural mechanisms 
underpinning these interferences have scarcely been explored. 
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In the work presented below, we sought to elucidate these mechanisms.  
We conducted three studies on healthy human volunteers, with the aim of 
answering the following questions: 
 
1) How does the prospective value of the endpoint of a sequence of actions (i.e., 
the goal) distort the amount of effort we think that action sequence will 
entail, at a behavioural and computational level? (See Chapter II: Article 1.) 
 
2) When the outcome of an action is contingent on our own behaviour (or 
“performance”), how does the value of the possible success/failure outcomes 
distort our confidence that we will perform this action correctly, at a 
behavioural and neural level? (See Chapter III: Article 2.) 
 
3) Can our confidence in a given behaviour influence how much we appreciate 
an unrelated but concurrent stimulus, and vice-versa? If so, are we able to 
prevent such interferences from arising when motivated to provide accurate 
judgments? (See Chapter IV: Article 3.) 
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No sweat, no sweet? A motivational account of how 
expected benefits inflate anticipated effort cost. 
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Abstract 
 
In order to decide whether an alternative is better than the default course of action, individuals 
typically weigh the expected costs and benefits. Optimal decision-making relies upon accurate 
effort cost anticipation, which is generally assumed to be performed independently from goal 
valuation. Challenging this independence axiom of standard decision theory, we investigated 
whether, and how, goal value may distort anticipated effort cost. For this, we asked healthy 
volunteers to rate the energetic cost of running routes paired with an orthogonally varied 
monetary outcome, after deciding whether they would be willing to take these routes 
programmed on a treadmill. In two experiments (n=46), we observed a positive impact of 
incentive magnitude on prospective effort cost estimates, contrary to the prediction derived from 
an extended planning fallacy perspective.  To better understand this effect, which affected both 
ratings and choices, we introduced various experimental manipulations and computational 
models. Far from ideal observer models exploiting a putative correlation between effort and 
reward, our findings support a motivational account, according to which prospective effort cost 
judgments are biased by the output of a decision-oriented cost-benefit computation. This 
motivation bias might lead human agents to abandon the pursuit of valuable goals that are in fact 
not so costly to reach.   
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Introduction 
 
Should you walk to the nearest bakery, or cycle to your favourite one?  Should you climb a 
little higher to get a better view or just stay below and enjoy what you can see already? This kind 
of choice, about whether or not to trade an effort for a reward, has been investigated and modelled 
in neuro-economic studies. The general idea of decision-making theory is that the subjective value 
of the goal (defined as a desired state) is discounted by some function of the cost (Hull, 1943; 
Mitchell, 2003; Rangel et al., 2008; Kable & Glimcher, 2009; Schmidt et al., 2012; Klein-Flügge et 
al., 2015; Chong et al., 2017) (related to the energetic expense). Crucially, these theories make the 
implicit assumption that individual judgments about goal value and effort cost are made 
independently from each other, before being integrated into a discounted value on which decision 
is based. More generally, most choice models assume that the different costs integrated in the 
decision value computation (not only effort, but also delay, risk etc.) are estimated separately, a 
principle known as the independence axiom. 
Yet, it has been several decades since the first reports of an interplay between goal value and 
effort cost judgments have appeared in the psychology literature (Lewis, 1965). One line of 
research has described numerous instances in which exerted effort inflates the perceived value of 
the associated outcome (Aronson & Mills, 1959; Arkes et al., 1994; Inzlicht et al., 2018). Some 
authors have considered this phenomenon as an attempt to justify effort expenditure, following 
on a need to reduce cognitive dissonance (Inzlicht et al., 2018). For example, yielding to the so-
called “IKEA effect” (Norton et al., 2012), individuals tend to ascribe greater value to an object that 
they assembled themselves compared to one that was assembled by an expert. A distinct line of 
research has documented cases in which the value of a pursued goal modulates one’s 
retrospective judgment about the amount of effort invested to reach it. For example, people tend 
to incorporate the monetary reward into their retrospective judgment of effort intensity, using 
the positive correlation between reward and effort in a Bayes-optimal fashion (Pooresmaeili et 
al., 2015; Rollwage et al., 2018).  
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Thus, the foundational assumption of mutual independence between judgments of effort cost 
and goal value appears at odds with a large body of empirical observations. However, all cases of 
mutual influence between effort and value reported in the literature were only observed once 
effort was already expended. The question of whether effort cost judgments might be modulated 
by goal value prospectively has so far received little attention. Yet this seems an important 
question, given that decisions are obviously based on prospective, not retrospective, effort cost 
estimates.  
The most widespread instance of systematic cost distortion is perhaps the “planning fallacy”, 
that is, the tendency observed in healthy agents to underestimate the time necessary to complete 
a task or a project (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979a; Buehler et al., 1994; Brunnermeier et al., 2008), 
even when they have extensive experience about it . While this fallacy has mainly been reported 
in the context of delay estimation, it also occurs for other types of cost, such as money (Peetz & 
Buehler, 2009; Peetz & Buehler, 2013) and effort (Morgenshtern et al., 2007). The planning fallacy 
has been proposed to result from an excessive focus on the future goal, to the detriment of 
information accumulation about both the intermediate steps to be taken, and declarative or 
experiential knowledge about the task at hand (Buehler & Griffin, 2003; Kruger & Evans, 2004). 
This attentional bias could have been selected to favour engagement in strenuous actions, by 
partially ignoring their costs. If more attractive goals capture more attention, then effort costs 
should be even more underestimated when the goal is assigned a higher value.  
Therefore, our research aimed to 1) assess the potential impact of goal value on prospective 
effort cost judgments, and if present, 2) elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this 
impact. To this end, we set up a novel experimental paradigm in which healthy participants 
prospectively appraised the energetic cost of various action sequences leading to a more or less 
valuable outcome. The action sequence was a run on a treadmill, composed of multiple segments 
with varying speed and slope, which was rewarded with a financial payoff of varying magnitude. 
Specifically, participants first viewed animations depicting a cartoon character running along a 
more or less effortful multi-segment route, and subsequently estimated the energetic cost of the 
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route. Critically, each route was explicitly paired with a monetary incentive, whose magnitude was 
varied orthogonally to energetic cost fluctuations. In order to trigger decision-oriented 
cost/benefit computations, participants were offered a choice between a high-effort high-value 
new route and fixed low-effort low-value reference route. We ensured that cost judgments and 
incentives had personal significance to the participants by having a randomly selected fraction of 
their choices implemented in reality, meaning that they were requested to perform the chosen 
action sequence on the treadmill, and were given the associated payoff. In line with our planning 
fallacy hypothesis, we predicted that participants would anticipate a lower energetic cost for 
routes paired with a higher-value monetary outcome.  
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Results - Experiment 1 
 
With this experiment, we intended to measure the impact of goal value onto the 
anticipated effort cost of an action sequence. We used composite running routes, each consisting 
of 4 segments of varying slope and speed, as the action sequences about which participants would 
make a priori energetic cost judgments. We manipulated the value attached to the completion of 
each route by offering monetary rewards of varying magnitude (from 0.01€ to 5€). Specifically, 
in each trial, participants were first presented with the picture of a monetary amount (the 
incentive, or potential reward) on a computer screen, followed by a short animation depicting a 
cartoon character running along a computer-generated route (see Fig. 1). Next, subjects were 
required to choose between accepting this High-Effort High-Gain (or HEHG) offer (namely, 
running this route on a treadmill in order to earn the displayed incentive) or discarding it in favour 
of a fixed Low-Effort 0-Gain (or LE0G) option (namely, running a default ‘comfort’ route for no 
reward). Last, they were prompted to estimate the energetic cost of this route, which was our 
main behavioural measure of interest, by placing a cursor along an analog scale.  
Of note, trials were grouped in blocks of 18, and once a block had been completed, one trial 
was randomly drawn from this block and executed: participants were asked to complete the 
selected running route (or the comfort route if they had declined the HEHG offer) on a treadmill, 
and the attached monetary reward was then added to their final payment. This procedure was 
intended to reinforce the personal relevance of the displayed reward magnitudes and of the 
energetic cost estimates made by our participants. 
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Fig. 1 – Experiment 1 design 
 
Top row: Example trial. Each trial includes 3 phases: 1) display of the running route animation and the 
associated incentive, 2) choice between this High-Effort High-Gain (HEHG) option or an implicit (not 
displayed) Low-Effort 0-Gain (LE0G) option, 3) rating of Anticipated Energetic Cost (AEC). 
Middle row: Structure of a session. Each session includes a training phase, 3 blocks of 18 trials, a 
recalibration of AEC ratings, and 3 additional blocks.  
Bottom row: Random draw performed at the end of each block among its 18 just-completed trials. Choice 
made by the participant during the randomly selected trial is reminded and then executed: if the participant 
accepted the HEHG offer, she must get onto the treadmill and complete the effortful running route, after 
which the concurrently displayed reward is added to her total earnings. If she declined the HEHG offer, she 
must complete a default low-effort running route, and her total earnings remain unchanged. 
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Critically, the reward magnitude and the real energetic cost (REC) of the route were 
orthogonal by design, so the incentive cue was in no way informative about the rating that 
participants should provide. Before the experiment, participants were trained to estimate the REC 
of various running routes, whose objective value was computed using standard equations in the 
physical exercise literature. Participants were trained again with objective feedbacks between the 
two halves of the experiments. Also, it was in their interest to make sound judgments during the 
experiment, as a monetary bonus could be earned on the basis of rating accuracy. Thus, any impact 
of incentive level we might observe on the anticipated energetic cost (AEC) would qualify as a bias 
(i.e., a manifestation detrimental to local optimality) rather than as the result of an appropriate 
inference.  
Twenty-two healthy adults gave their consent to participate in this experiment and were 
tested one after the other. 
 
Choice 
As illustrated in Fig. 2a, participants tended to accept the HEHG option more often as the 
attached incentive level increased, and as the REC level decreased (with a sigmoid-like 
nonlinearity in the acceptance rate curve, characteristic of floor and ceiling effects for low and 
high HEHG values, respectively). For a more quantitative yet straightforward assessment of these 
effects, we inverted a sigmoidal model of choices between HEHG and LE0G options, including 
𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐻𝐺 and 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐻𝐸𝐻𝐺 as explanatory variables. Choice data (but not rating data) from 4 
participants were excluded before model inversion, due to a total rate of “No” (resp. “Yes” for 1 
participant) choices ≤ 5/108, i.e. a percentage of “Yes” (resp. “No”) choices > 95%. Unsurprisingly, 
we found a negative effect of 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐻𝐺 (?̅? = −1.1, 𝐶𝐼 = [−1.5; −.62], 𝑡(17) = −5.0, 𝑝 = 1.2 ∙
10−4), and a strong positive effect of 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐻𝐸𝐻𝐺 (Fig. 2a bottom, ?̅? = 4.1, 𝐶𝐼 =
[3.1 ;  5.1], 𝑡(17) = 8.8, 𝑝 = 9.4 ∙ 10−8), on the probability to accept the HEHG offer. 
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Anticipated Energetic Cost (AEC) 
As expected, AEC ratings about routes were strongly influenced by the Real Energetic Cost 
(REC) of these routes (?̅? = 15, 𝐶𝐼 = [14; 17], 𝑡(21) = 20, 𝑝 < 10−14), whose effect was tested in a 
generalized linear model (GLM) that included both REC and Incentive Level as factors of interest. 
This effect was significant despite a ‘regression-to-the-mean’ bias (i.e. overestimation for low 
levels and underestimation for high levels, apparent on Fig. 2b, top).  Thus, after training subjects 
were able to estimate energetic cost of a running route with good accuracy (82 ± 3 %), defined as 
the complement to distance from target (REC-AEC, see methods). 
Most interestingly, we found a robust positive effect of incentive level (i.e., ordinal value) 
on AEC ratings (Fig. 2b bottom, ?̅? = 2.0, 𝐶𝐼 = [1.2; 2.7], 𝑡(21) = 5.3, 𝑝 = 2.8 ∙ 10−5). That is, all 
other things being equal, subjects tended to anticipate a higher energetic cost for better-rewarded 
running sequences. Because the relation between incentive level and AEC ratings seemed in fact 
slightly supralinear (see Fig. 2b), and in order to test more directly for the effect of the incentive 
magnitude (i.e., cardinal value, which is the feature primarily relevant to participants) we inverted 
the following complementary model: 
𝐴𝐸𝐶 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑅𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐼𝑚
𝛼  
where 𝐼𝑚 is the incentive magnitude and 𝛼 a nonlinearity parameter which we expected to be 
below 1, in line with the typical observation of a concave magnitude-utility mapping(Schoemaker, 
1982; Glimcher & Fehr, 2013). 
We found a significant positive impact of the transformed incentive magnitude onto AEC (𝛽2̅̅ ̅ =
.32, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 18; .46], 𝑡(21) = 4.7, 𝑝 = 1.1 ∙ 10−4), with an average nonlinearity parameter ?̅? =
0.74. 
Given the strong positive relation between incentive magnitude and acceptance rate of the 
HEHG option, one could hypothesize that the impact of Incentive on AEC was fully mediated by 
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choices, with ‘Yes’ choices leading to higher cost estimates than ‘No’ choices. However, the 
incentive effect on AEC remained strongly significant even when the 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 predictor was 
orthogonalized to a binary 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 predictor (?̅? = 2.4, 𝐶𝐼 = [1.3; 3.5], 𝑡(21) = 4.7, 𝑝 = 1.3 ∙
10−4). Moreover, alternative regressors 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐻𝐸𝐻𝐺  and 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐿𝐸0𝐺 conditional on the 
choice made (respectively the HEHG option or the LE0G one) were both significant positive 
predictors of AEC ratings (𝐻𝐸𝐻𝐺: ?̅? = 2.4, 𝐶𝐼 = [1.4; 3.4], 𝑡(21) = 5.0, 𝑝 = 6.9 ∙ 10−5;  𝐿𝐸0𝐺: ?̅? =
2.0  𝐶𝐼 = [. 70; 3.4], 𝑡(21) = 3.2, 𝑝 = 5.0 ∙ 10−3), meaning that the effect of Incentive on AEC was 
present within both ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ trials. Therefore, prospective reward inflated anticipated 
energetic cost over and above choices made by the participant.  
Another mechanism could have accounted for this phenomenon: despite the orthogonality 
of incentive and REC in our design, subjects may have assumed that these two variables were 
correlated in the task, just like effort and reward are generally correlated in real-life situations, 
and they may have used the incentive cue to inform their AEC estimate. Therefore, we sought to 
appraise the persistence of this incentive effect across session blocks, expecting that, if such a 
confound were true, the effect would decrease or even disappear as subjects progressed through 
the session and sampled more {incentive, REC} couples.  
In a GLM of AEC ratings including REC, incentive level, block index, as well as the three 
corresponding interaction terms (orthogonalized to the main factors), we found no evidence for 
a 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∗ 𝑖𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 interaction (?̅? = −.47, 𝐶𝐼 = [−2.5; 1.5], 𝑡(21) = −.49, 𝑝 = .63), nor did we 
find evidence for a main effect of block index (?̅? = .71, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.54; 2.0], 𝑡(21) = 1.18, 𝑝 = .25), or 
other kinds of interaction effects (𝑅𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: ?̅? = 2.6, 𝐶𝐼 = [−3.5; 8.8], 𝑡(21) = .88, 𝑝 =
.39;  𝑅𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝑖𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘: ?̅? = −.039, 𝐶𝐼 = [−6.6; 6.6], 𝑡(21) = −.012, 𝑝 = .99). Additionally, the effect 
of incentive on AEC ratings was significant within each block of the experimental session (e.g. 
block 6: ?̅? = 1.4, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 57; 2.3], 𝑡(21) = 3.5, 𝑝 = .0023).  
Thus, the overall effect was not driven by the first blocks of trials, but was instead 
maintained across the whole session. This observation casts doubt on a scenario in which the 
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inflation of AEC by prospective reward would be solely due to a strong prior belief in a reward-
effort correlation in our task. Yet further investigation is needed before we can confidently rule 
this scenario out, which we pursued in Experiment 2. 
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Fig. 2 – Choices and AEC ratings in Experiment 1  
a. Choices: Rates of acceptance of the High-Effort High-Gain offer, plotted against incentive levels. Top: 
Cross markers indicate Acceptance rate averaged across all subjects for a given incentive level (x-axis) 
and a given Real Energetic Cost (REC) level (marker colour). Bottom: Purple cross markers indicate 
Acceptance rate, averaged across all REC levels and across all subjects for a given incentive level. Black 
dots indicate averaged predictions of a logistic regression model (see main text). 
***: Positive effect of incentive level on Acceptance rate, 𝑝 < 0.001 
b. Anticipated Energetic Cost (AEC) ratings, plotted against incentive levels. 
Top: Cross markers indicate AEC ratings averaged across all subjects for a given incentive level (x-axis) 
and a given Real Energetic Cost (REC) level (marker colour). Dotted lines indicate the target rating for 
each REC level. Bottom: Purple cross markers indicate AEC ratings, averaged across all REC levels and 
across all subjects for a given incentive level. Black dots indicate averaged predictions of a generalized 
linear model (GLM, see main text). 
***: Positive effect of incentive level on AEC ratings, 𝑝 < 0.001 
Solid lines represent a linear interpolation between averaged data points (or model predictions), for illustrative 
purposes only.  Shaded area around curves or error bars across dots represent the standard error to the mean 
(s.e.m), computed across subjects. 
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Interim Discussion 
 
In Experiment 1, we observed an unexpected positive impact of potential reward onto 
anticipated effort cost. Because it was opposite to our predictions, a replication study was 
necessary to better establish this finding. We took this opportunity to specify the underlying 
cognitive mechanisms. Below are described the three types of cognitive mechanisms that we 
considered, hereafter denoted as the ‘belief’, ‘affect’ and ‘motivation’ scenarios. 
First, given that most healthy individuals hold the belief that obtaining more reward 
typically requires investing more effort (Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Van-
Yperen & Duda, 2007; Frieze & Snyder, n.d.), our participants might have used the incentive cue 
as implicit evidence informing their effort cost estimation. One slightly different possibility is that 
participants may have explicitly assumed that reward and effort cost were correlated in this 
specific task. We henceforth refer to this account as the “Belief” scenario, which can be rephrased 
as individuals carrying a non-flat p(Cost|Incentive) representation, that they integrate as a 
likelihood signal into a posterior cost estimate. This Belief scenario is the basis of ideal Bayesian 
observer models that capture the integration of reward magnitude into retrospective effort 
estimates, in paradigms where effort and reward levels are actually correlated by design 
(Pooresmaeili et al., 2015; Rollwage et al., 2018). 
Second, because of its personal relevance, information about reward is likely to trigger an 
affective reaction from the viewer, as previously demonstrated in similar contexts (Knutson & 
Greer, 2008; Wu et al., 2014). In line with the affect-as-information theory, and its associated 
observations that internal affective states are incorporated as evidence into various kinds of 
judgments (Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Storbeck & Clore, 2008; Schwarz, 
2012), affect may have mediated the impact of incentives on cost anticipation. In the psychology 
literature, affective states are classically parametrized in a two-dimensional space: arousal by 
valence (Russell, 1980; Posner et al., 2005). The mediating role of affect could therefore be specific 
to one of these dimensions, or rely on both. In particular, since both prospective and exerted effort 
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has been shown to increase arousal (Gellatly & Meyer, 1992; Schmidt et al., 2009; Vassena et al., 
2014; Varazzani et al., 2015), it is possible that the cognitive system responsible for effort 
anticipation may use arousal state as one of its inputs. Moreover, because prospective rewards 
also increase arousal (Knutson & Greer, 2008; Wu et al., 2014), individuals might misinterpret 
incentive-triggered arousal as a cue about the upcoming effort, such that anticipated energetic 
cost would be higher when a higher reward is at stake. A similar reasoning could apply in a 
valence-based scenario, since it is well established that prospective reward positively modulates 
affective valence (Knutson & Greer, 2008). Yet this scenario would imply that prospective effort 
is assigned a positive valence in our group of participants, which is not implausible given that they 
all practised sports regularly (this was one of our inclusion criteria). We henceforth refer to this 
as the “Affect” scenario, which comprises an “Arousal” and a “Valence” variant. 
Third, at a motivational level, information about reward is a crucial input to the cost-benefit 
computations that adjust both the direction and intensity of behaviour, according to standard 
decision theory (Rangel et al., 2008; Croxson et al., 2009; Glimcher & Fehr, 2013). Since our 
participants were systematically required to decide whether to accept a new reward-effort 
combination, it is likely that they injected the reward information into some expected value 
computation which would later guide their choice. From there, two specific mechanisms can 
account for a positive influence of prospective reward on anticipated effort cost. In any case, the 
most parsimonious formalization is that some output of the cost-benefit computation (dependent 
on prospective reward) would be integrated as evidence about the energetic cost. Our two 
motivation models detailed below differ as to the nature of the computational output that is 
integrated into cost estimation.  
According to what we hereafter call the “Maximal Budget” hypothesis, as soon as individuals 
receive complete information about the potential reward, they compute the maximal energetic 
cost they would be willing to invest, that is, the cost above which they would rather choose the 
Low-Effort 0-Reward option. This preliminary computation may entail easier subsequent 
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decision-making, since choice could then result from a direct comparison between the maximal 
budget and the estimated energetic cost. 
Here, we assume a subtractive parabolic effort-cost discounting of subjective incentive values 
(Hartmann et al., 2013; Białaszek et al., 2017), such that the decision variable, i.e. the difference 
in utility U between the HEHG and the LE0G option, can be written as: 
𝐷𝑉 = 𝑈𝐻𝐸𝐻𝐺 − 𝑈𝐿𝐸0𝐺 = (𝑅
𝜌 − 𝐶𝐸 ∙ 𝐸𝐶
𝛼) − (0 − 𝐶𝐸 ∙ 𝐸𝐶0
𝛼) (1) 
Where 𝑅 is the reward obtained upon completion of the HE route, 𝜌 is the nonlinearity parameter 
controlling the curvature of magnitude-to-utility mapping (typically, 𝜌 <  1 (Schoemaker, 1982; 
Glimcher & Fehr, 2013)), 𝐶𝐸 is the scaling coefficient of the effort cost discounting variable (EC 
and EC0  corresponding to the HEHG and LE0G option, respectively), 𝛼 is the nonlinearity 
parameter controlling the curvature of effort discounting. 
Thus: 
𝐷𝑉 = 𝑅𝜌 − 𝐶𝐸 ∙ (𝐸𝐶
𝛼 − 𝐸𝐶0
𝛼) (2) 
therefore, the maximal energetic cost such that DV = 0 is: 
𝐸𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 = (𝐸𝐶0
𝛼 +
𝑅𝜌
𝐶𝐸
)
1
𝛼
(3) 
The main proposal of this “Maximal Budget” model is that subjects’ anticipated energetic cost 
derives from a mixture between the relevant visual information (slope and speed, underlying 
REC), and the maximal effort cost they are willing to expend:  
𝑨𝑬𝑪 = 𝑩𝟎 + 𝑩𝟏 ∙ (𝜸 ∙ 𝑹𝑬𝑪 + (𝟏 − 𝜸) ∙ 𝑬𝑪𝐦𝐚𝐱) (4) 
As this “contaminated” cost judgment likely reflects the cost which subjects are planning to invest, 
it may in turn be incorporated in an updated decision variable: 
𝐷𝑉′ = 𝑅𝜌 − 𝐶𝐸 ∙ (𝐴𝐸𝐶
𝛼 − 𝐸𝐶0
𝛼) (5) 
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This updated decision variable then leads to a choice via a softmax rule: 
𝑷(𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒊𝒄𝒆 = 𝒀𝒆𝒔) = 𝒔𝒐𝒇𝒕𝒎𝒂𝒙(𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 ∙ 𝑫𝑽
′) (6) 
As evidenced by equations (3) and (4), this model indeed predicts a positive impact of monetary 
incentives on anticipated energetic cost. 
In an alternative scenario, which we call the “Optimal Expense” hypothesis, we propose that 
it is the output of an optimal expense computation, instead of a maximal budget one, that is 
subsumed as evidence about the actual cost. Here, we build upon the intuition that subjects might 
not fully internalize the mapping rule between expended energy and the probability of reaching 
their goal (obtaining the reward). In our experiment, the effort-reward contingency is 
deterministic: the participant should be sure to win the full reward if running the high-effort 
route, and nothing otherwise. Thus, the mapping from effort to reward obtainment probability is 
a step function with a 0 to 1 discontinuity at EC = REC. Indeed, as this discontinuity is due to the 
fact that energetic expense is strongly constrained in our experimental setting (running on a 
treadmill at a defined slope and speed), it might not reflect most ecological situations, in which 
increasing effort would naturally increase the probability of reaching one’s goal in a continuous 
fashion. Therefore, we propose that individuals hold a sigmoidal (rather than step-like) 
𝑃(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠| 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)  =  𝑓(𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒) internal mapping function, whose 
inflection point abscissa and slope may be adjusted depending on the specifics of the considered 
task. Here, to make the sigmoid parameter values easier to interpret, we express the energetic 
expense variable as relative to REC and normalised by 𝐸𝐶max : 
𝑃(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠|𝐸𝐶) = 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝜅0 + 𝜅1 ∙
𝐸𝐶 − 𝑅𝐸𝐶
𝐸𝐶max
) (7) 
In line with classical expected utility theory (Friedman & Savage, 1952), this subjective probability 
of success enters the computation of the decision variable DV by scaling the utility of prospective 
outcomes: 
𝐸[𝑈𝐻𝐸(𝐸𝐶)] = 𝑃(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠|𝐸𝐶) ∙ 𝑅
𝜌 − 𝐶𝐸 ∙  𝐸𝐶
𝛼  (8)   
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By definition, the optimal energetic cost to expend is the one maximizing 𝐸[𝑈𝐻𝐸(𝐸𝐶)]: 
𝐸𝐶∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐸𝐶
(𝐸[𝑈𝐻𝐸(𝐸𝐶)]) (9) 
As with the “Maximal Budget” hypothesis, we postulate that subjects incorporate this optimal 
energetic expense (which they intend to invest) as a piece of evidence about the actual (or 
‘typical’) energetic cost of the route: 
𝑨𝑬𝑪 = 𝑩𝟎 + 𝑩𝟏 ∙ (𝜸 ∙ 𝑹𝑬𝑪 + (𝟏 − 𝜸) ∙ 𝑬𝑪
∗) (10) 
The decision variable being the difference between 𝐸[𝑈𝐻𝐸(𝐴𝐸𝐶)] and 𝑈𝐿𝐸 , it is written: 
𝐷𝑉′ = 𝑃(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠|𝐴𝐸𝐶) ∙ 𝑅𝜌 − 𝐶𝐸 ∙ (𝐴𝐸𝐶
𝛼 − 𝐸𝐶0
𝛼)                                  (11) 
Finally, this decision variable is incorporated into a softmax rule to determine choice 
probability: 
𝑷(𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒊𝒄𝒆 = 𝒀𝒆𝒔) = 𝒔𝒐𝒇𝒕𝒎𝒂𝒙(𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 ∙ 𝑫𝑽′) (12) 
We henceforth refer to this couple of models as the “Motivation” scenario, which comprises a 
“Maximal Budget” and an “Optimal Expense” variant. (See Fig. 3 for an illustration of this 
scenario.) 
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Fig. 3 – Schematic illustration of the motivation scenario 
 
According to this hypothetical mechanism, information about the monetary incentive attached to the High-Effort 
(HE) option enters a cost-benefit computation. According to the Maximal Budget variant (left panel), participants 
compute the maximal energetic expense above which the Low-Effort (LE) option would bear a higher Expected 
Utility (EU). According to the Optimal Expense variant, they compute the energetic expense optimizing the EU 
attached to the HE option. In both panels, the computation is illustrated for two different reward magnitudes, R1 
(small, light colour) and R2 (large, dark colour). Both variants predict that larger incentives would result in a higher 
‘energetic expense’ (whether maximal or optimal) computational output. 
This output is next incorporated into an Anticipated Energetic Cost computation, which also integrates a pre-
estimate that is exclusively based on the running animation depicting the multi-segment route, and is thus a noisy 
reflection of the Real Energetic Cost (REC). Finally, the resulting (hidden) AEC estimate affects (observable) AEC 
rating and HE versus LE choice. 
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Practical implementation & predictions 
In order to assess the validity of these three alternative — albeit not mutually exclusive — 
scenarios, we formulated critical modifications of our task design, in preparation for a second 
experiment. These changes were devised in such a way that each of our hypotheses would make 
a specific set of predictions about measured behavioural outputs. 
Under the “belief” scenario, we reasoned that if we emphasized the orthogonality between 
monetary incentive and effort cost, we should observe a decreased impact of prospective reward 
on anticipated energetic cost.  We made this orthogonality intuitive and salient to the subjects by 
introducing a lottery animation at the beginning of each trial. This virtual lottery depicted the roll 
of a slot machine, where a running route was selected in the left slot and a monetary amount was 
selected (independently) in the right slot. Additionally, the “belief” hypothesis predicted that the 
extent to which prospective reward impacted anticipated energetic cost should correlate, across 
individuals, with the strength of the belief in a Reward - Effort positive correlation. We measured 
the strength of this belief by appending a computerized question after arousal ratings, which was 
phrased as follows: “Do you think that, in life, the less effort one makes, the less reward one 
receives?”, with four possible answers, ranging from “Absolutely yes” to “Not at all”. 
Under the “affect” scenario, incidental fluctuations in affective state should have 
repercussions on anticipated energetic cost. Thus, we introduced two novel features to the task in 
order to manipulate affective arousal and valence independently. First, to address the ‘valence’ 
variant, we complemented prospective gains with prospective losses (in a distinct set of trials), 
which, we assumed, would trigger negative affect (increasingly with increasing loss amplitude), 
which should in turn decrease anticipated energetic cost. Second, in order to address the ‘arousal’ 
variant, we added a musical background to two-thirds of the running animations. Based on 
previous reports of music-based arousal manipulation(Gomez & Danuser, 2007; Gingras et al., 
2015), we expected our musical extracts to modulate subjects’ arousal, depending on the varying 
low- or high-level features of each extract (slow versus fast tempo, high versus low predictability, 
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soothing versus epic impression, etc.). As arousal induction may vary a lot across individuals, we 
played again each music extract at the end of the experiment, and had every participant reporting 
subjective arousal on a rating scale. Using eye-tracking to measure pupil diameter during the 
rating task, we checked that subjective report of arousal level was following, across music 
extracts, arousal level in a physiological sense (activation of the autonomic nervous system). 
Additionally, regardless of the characteristics of our musical extracts, we expected the presence 
of music to increase average arousal, compared to the testing blocks in which music would be 
absent(Gomez & Danuser, 2004). Therefore, this manipulation provided us with two ways of 
testing for a positive impact of incidental arousal fluctuations on anticipated energetic cost, which 
was predicted by the arousal variant of the affect scenario.   
 Finally, under the motivation scenario, and given the previously introduced experimental 
changes, we expected a distinct set of observations: a positive effect of incentive on anticipated 
energetic cost in both Gain and Loss conditions (and despite the introduction of a lottery 
animation), no inter-individual correlation between the magnitude of this effect and the strength 
of the belief in a Reward - Effort correlation, and finally, no effect of our music-based arousal 
manipulation on anticipated energetic cost. To further arbitrate between the ‘Maximal Budget’ 
and ‘Optimal Expense’ variants, we planned to perform group-level Bayesian model selection 
based on choice and rating data. 
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Fig. 4 –Experiment 2 design 
Top part, top row: Example trial in the Gain x With_Music condition. Each trial includes 4 phases: 1) lottery 
animation, during which a running route and an incentive level are independently and (seemingly) randomly 
selected, 2) display of the running route animation and the associated incentive (reward here) while a musical 
extract plays in subject’s headset, 3) choice between this High-Effort High-Gain (or 0-Loss) offer and an implicit 
Low-Effort 0-Gain (or High-Loss) option (not displayed), 4) rating of Anticipated Energetic Cost (AEC). 
Top part, bottom row: Random draw performed at the end of each block among its 18 just-completed trials. 
Choice made by the participant is reminded then executed: in the Gain condition, if the participant accepted the 
High-Effort High-Gain (HEHG) offer, she must get onto the treadmill and complete the effortful running route, 
after which the concurrently displayed reward is added to her total earnings. If she declined the HEHG offer, 
she must complete a default low-effort running route, and her total earnings remain unchanged.  
Middle part: Structure of a session. Each session includes a training phase, 3 blocks of 18 trials, a recalibration, 
3 additional trial blocks, a rating of arousal induced by all 72 musical extracts, and eventually a question about 
their belief in a general effort-reward correlation. Here, Gain and Loss conditions are alternated across blocks 
(green and red, respectively), and all blocks except B3 and B4 include musical extracts during display of route 
& incentive. 
Bottom part: Same as Top part, but in Loss condition. See details above. 
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Results - Experiment 2 
 
Twenty-four healthy adults gave their consent to participate in this experiment and were 
tested one after the other. 
Choice 
Here, we replicated the observations made in Experiment 1, with an extension into the Loss 
domain: participants tended to accept the HEHG (resp. HE0L) option more often as gain (resp. 
loss) level increased, and as REC level decreased. We inverted a sigmoidal model of choices 
between HE and LE options, including gain and loss magnitudes 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐻𝐸𝐻𝐺  and  𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐸𝐻𝐿,  as well 
as 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐸, as explanatory variables. Choice data (but not rating data) from 10 participants were 
excluded before model inversion, due to a total rate of “No” choices ≤ 5/108, thus a percentage of 
“Yes” choices > 95%. As expected, we found a a strong positive effect of 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐻𝐸𝐻𝐺 (Fig. 5a 
bottom, ?̅? = 3.7, 𝐶𝐼 = [2.8 ;  4.6], 𝑡(13) = 8.5, 𝑝 = 1.1 ∙ 10−6) and 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐸𝐻𝐿 (?̅? = 3.7, 𝐶𝐼 =
[2.7 ;  4.8], 𝑡(13) = 7.8, 𝑝 = 2.9 ∙ 10−6), and a negative effect of 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐸  (?̅? = −1.2, 𝐶𝐼 =
[−1.7; −.76], 𝑡(13) = −5.6, 𝑝 = 8.5 ∙ 10−5) on the probability to prefer the High-Effort offer over 
the Low-Effort one. 
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Fig. 5 – Choices and AEC ratings in Experiment 2  
a. Choices: Rates of acceptance of the High-Effort offer, plotted against incentive levels. Top: Cross 
markers indicate Acceptance rate averaged across all subjects for a given incentive level (x-axis) and 
a given Real Energetic Cost (REC) level (marker colour). Bottom: Cross markers indicate Acceptance 
rate, averaged across all REC levels and across all subjects for a given incentive level. Black dots 
indicate averaged predictions of a logistic regression model (see main text). 
***: Positive effect of Loss and Gain level on Acceptance rate, both 𝑝 < 0.001 
b. Anticipated Energetic Cost (AEC) ratings, plotted against incentive levels. Top: Cross markers indicate 
AEC ratings averaged across all subjects for a given incentive level (x-axis) and a given Real Energetic 
Cost (REC) level (marker colour). Dotted lines indicate the target rating for each REC level. Bottom: 
Cross markers indicate AEC ratings, averaged across all REC levels and across all subjects for a given 
incentive level. Black dots indicate averaged predictions of a generalized linear model (GLM, see main 
text). 
**: Positive effect of Loss level on AEC ratings, 𝑝 < 0.005 
***: Positive effect of Gain level on AEC ratings, 𝑝 < 0.001 
Solid lines represent a linear interpolation between averaged data points, for illustrative purposes only.  
Shaded area around each curve represents the standard error to the mean (s.e.m), computed across subjects. 
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Anticipated Energetic Cost 
In order to evaluate the impact of experimental factors on AEC ratings, and similarly to 
Experiment 1, we inverted a generalized linear model comprising the following regressors: the 
real energetic cost REC, the prospective Gain level (0 in Loss condition), and the prospective Loss 
level (0 in Gain condition) (Fig. 5b). Beyond the unsurprising positive effect of REC on AEC (?̅? =
15, 𝐶𝐼 = [14 ;  16], 𝑡(23) = 24, 𝑝 < 10−14), we replicated the positive effect of prospective Gain 
level (?̅? = 2.8, 𝐶𝐼 = [1.4 ;  4.3], 𝑡(23) = 4.0, 𝑝 = 6.3 ∙ 10−4). We found no significant difference in 
effect size with that observed in Experiment 1 (?̅? = −.89, 𝐶𝐼 = [−2.6 ; .78], 𝑡(44) = −1.1, 𝑝 =
.29), thus contradicting one of the predictions of the “Belief” scenario. Importantly, we also found 
a significant positive effect of prospective Loss level on AEC (?̅? = 2.8, 𝐶𝐼 = [1.2 ;  4.4], 𝑡(23) =
3.6, 𝑝 = .0016), which contradicts the main prediction from the Valence variant of the “Affect” 
scenario. These effects were also significant in a model of AEC depending on Gain and Loss 
magnitudes rather than levels (Gain: ?̅? = 1.6, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 72 ;  2.5], 𝑡(23) = 3.7, 𝑝 = .0012; Loss: ?̅? =
1.7, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 66 ;  2.8], 𝑡(23) = 3.4, 𝑝 = .0027). 
 
Pupil dilation & arousal manipulation 
Next, we assessed the impact of our arousal manipulation procedure on AEC ratings. First, 
we found that arousal ratings made about each musical extract during the Arousal Rating phase 
were a significant positive predictor of pupil diameter around 2s after music onset (time window: 
[1.67 – 2.55] s post music onset, 𝑝 = 3 ∙ 10−4, corrected for multiple comparisons; see Suppl. 
Material, Figure S2), suggesting that ratings faithfully reflected the arousal state actually felt by 
participants while listening to the musical extracts. Second, we incorporated these individual 
arousal ratings as an additional linear regressor in our GLM of AEC ratings (see above). We found 
no significant effect of this predictor (?̅? = .19, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.35 ; .74], 𝑡(23) = .73, 𝑝 = .47), nor did we 
find an effect of a binary “Music/NoMusic” regressor indicating whether music was played during 
a given trial (?̅? = −.16, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.93 ; .61], 𝑡(23) = −.43, 𝑝 = .67). These observations suggest that 
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incidental arousal fluctuations do not affect anticipated energetic cost, and therefore challenge 
the main prediction of the “Affect -Arousal” scenario. 
 
Belief in an Effort => Reward implication 
We measured the individual strength of belief in an Effort - Reward correlation by asking 
the following question (via the computer), once all trials were completed: “Do you believe that in 
life, the less effort one makes, the less reward one gets?”. Participants answered on a 4-point Likert 
scale ranging from “Not at all” to “Absolutely”.  We found no correlation between the strength of 
their belief and the magnitude of the effect of Gain or Loss, or both Gain and Loss combined, on 
AEC (resp. 𝑟 = −.18, 𝑝 = .39;  𝑟 = −.049, 𝑝 = .82;  𝑟 = −.12, 𝑝 = .59). This finding is in 
contradiction with one of the predictions of the “Belief” scenario. 
 
Exploring the motivation scenario: computational modeling 
 As introduced in the Interim Discussion, we propose two computational models which 
could explain the positive effect of goal value on anticipated energetic cost from high-level, 
decision-oriented cognitive processes. Specifically, the ‘Maximum Budget’ hypothesis proposes 
that, as soon as the goal value is known, individuals compute the corresponding maximal effort 
they are willing to invest to attain it. Subsequently, they (partly) intermingle what they are willing 
to invest with what they must invest. As an alternative, the ‘Optimal Expense’ scenario proposes 
that individuals compute the optimal amount of effort they should invest to maximize the 
expected utility of their action, i.e. to secure the outcome, assuming the effort-outcome 
contingency is uncertain. This ‘optimal effort’ variable is then (partly) confused with the objective 
effort which is demanded from them. 
In order to assess the significance of these hypotheses, and to arbitrate between them 
based on the relevant data (AEC ratings and Yes/No choices), we inverted each of these two 
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models (both predicting ratings and choices simultaneously) based on the datasets from 
Experiments 1 and 2. Within each model family, two variants were inverted. First, was a ‘Standard’ 
variant described in the Interim Discussion (with an additional Loss term when fitting data from 
Experiment 2, see Methods), in which the probability of choosing the high-effort option is a 
sigmoidal function of the AEC estimate (also derived from the model). Second was an ‘Null Choice’ 
variant in which choices did not depend on AEC estimates, but directly on the Real Energetic Cost 
(i.e., the subjective distortions of effort cost were not incorporated into decision-making). 
Additionally, we inverted purely descriptive models featuring linear terms which accounted for 
the influence of prospective Gain or Loss on AEC ratings (the first variant of these descriptive 
models – hereafter labelled ‘Linear’ - only included main effects, the second one, ‘LinearInterac’, 
further comprised terms of interaction with REC). 
We first inverted each of our models on data from Experiment 1 (with agnostic priors on 
parameters’ density functions), which allowed us to derive empirically-informed prior parameter 
distributions, before inverting the models again on data from Experiment 2. Corresponding model 
fits for standard ‘Maximal Budget’ and ‘Optimal Expense’ models are illustrated in Fig. 6. Both 
models do predict the qualitative pattern observed in high-effort choice rate and AEC ratings. 
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Fig. 6 – Comparison of modelled and observed data in Experiments 1 and 2    
 
Left column: Rate of acceptance of the High-Effort offer, plotted against incentive levels. Right column: AEC 
ratings, plotted against incentive levels.  
Cross markers indicate data averaged across all REC levels and across all subjects in Experiment 1 or 2 (top or 
bottom line, respectively) for a given incentive level.  
Triangles and circles indicate averaged predictions of the ‘Maximal Budget’ and ‘Optimal Expense’ models 
respectively. Predictions were computed from models fitted to each subject’s data (both ratings and choices 
in both experiments).  
Solid lines represent a linear interpolation between averaged data points or model predictions, for illustrative 
purposes only.  Shaded area around each curve represents the standard error to the mean (s.e.m), computed 
across subjects. 
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In order to arbitrate between model families from a quantitative standpoint, we pooled 
free-energy approximations of model evidence across the two groups of participants (Exp. 1 and 
Exp. 2), and performed several group-level random-effects Bayesian model family comparisons. 
First, we compared ‘Standard’ models, wherein choice probability is a function of the model’s AEC 
estimate, to ‘Null Choice’ models, wherein choice probability is a function of REC (see Fig. 7, right 
part, top row). This resulted in a protected exceedance probability 𝑃𝐸𝑃 > 0.99 strongly in favour 
of the ‘Standard’ family. This provided support for the fact that AEC estimates, which incorporated 
several distortions of REC, including those relating to Gain or Loss influences, were a better 
predictor of choices than the Real Energetic Cost itself. Second, we compared a ‘Cost-benefit’ 
family (comprising both variants of ‘Maximal Budget’ or ‘Optimal Expense’ models) to a ‘Linear’ 
family (comprising both variants of ‘Linear’ and ‘LinearInterac’ models). This revealed a very likely 
dominance of the ‘Cost-benefit’ family over the purely descriptive ‘Linear’ family (again, 𝑃𝐸𝑃 >
 0.99), suggesting that most healthy subjects are indeed incorporating the output of a cost-benefit 
computation into their prospective cost judgment. However, a third comparison between 
‘Maximal Budget’ and ‘Optimal Expense’ families did not reveal any likely dominance of the 
‘Maximal Budget’ mechanism over the ‘Optimal Expense’ one (𝑃𝐸𝑃 = 0.52) or vice-versa. 
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Fig. 7 – Bayesian model comparison across Experiments 1 & 2  
 
Left: Model attribution probability, for each subject in Exp. 1 and Exp. 2 and each inverted model.  
Right: Estimated frequency and protected exceedance probability (PEP) of each model family.  
PEP is the probability that a given model family is more frequent than any other one in the population, 
corrected for chance fluctuations of observed individual model evidences.  
Here,  𝑃(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒=𝑓(𝐴𝐸𝐶) > 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒=𝑓(𝑅𝐸𝐶)) > 0.99, 𝑃(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 > 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟) > 0.99 and 
𝑃(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 > 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒) = 0.52. 
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Discussion 
In this study, we investigated the putative influence of goal value onto the effort cost 
individuals anticipate they will have to expend in order to achieve this goal. To this end, we 
devised a novel experimental paradigm in which healthy participants made prospective energetic 
cost estimates about composite running routes paired with a monetary outcome, whose 
magnitude was varied orthogonally to the actual energetic cost of the routes. In our first 
experiment, despite a financial incentive for accurate cost estimates, and contrary to our 
expectations, we found a positive impact of incentive magnitude on prospective effort cost 
estimates. To our knowledge, this is the first time such an effect has been isolated in a controlled 
laboratory setting. It questions a fundamental axiom of rational decision theory, according to 
which effort cost and goal value should be estimated independently of each other. 
We next set out to elucidate the cognitive processes underlying the value dependency of 
cost estimates, which we hereafter call the motivation bias. Three main cognitive scenarios could 
be put forth: 1) a ‘Belief’ scenario, in which individuals incorporate information about goal value 
as a cue about effort cost, due to an implicit or explicit belief in a positive correlation between 
these two dimensions, 2) an ‘Affect’ scenario in which affective states are modulated (along their 
valence or arousal dimension) by prospective gains or losses and in turn inform prospective effort 
cost judgments, 3) a ‘Motivation’ scenario in which prospective effort cost judgments are partly 
contaminated by the output of cost-benefit evaluations related to effort investment (either the 
maximal effort one is willing to invest in the pursuit of the goal, or the optimal effort one should 
invest to maximize their expected utility). We extended our task design to improve the 
discriminability between these three scenarios based on behavioural data, and we performed a 
second experiment. Our new findings contradicted the predictions of the ‘Belief’ and ‘Affect’ 
scenarios, but were in line with those of the ‘Motivation’ scenario.  
Indeed, there was no significant link between the motivation bias and the reported belief 
in a general (in real life) correlation between effort and reward. Moreover, demonstrating to 
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participants the absence of correlation between effort and reward in the experiment, by playing 
lottery animations, did not change the motivation bias. This finding extends previous reports that 
reward is used as a cue for retrospective effort judgment (Pooresmaeili et al., 2015; Rollwage et 
al., 2018), which was observed in experiments where reward and effort were actually correlated, 
and therefore interpreted as a rational Bayesian inference.  Although such a Bayesian inference 
might be implemented in situations where it does produce valid conclusions, our results show 
that reward also impacts prospective effort estimates that drive decision-making even when this 
influence is not instrumental. This impact should therefore be seen as an irrational bias, imposed 
by a cognitive process that is automatically triggered despite its irrelevance in the context of the 
experiment. It is impossible with our design to know whether the putative cognitive process 
inducing a bias on effort cost estimates was triggered when receiving the information about 
incentive levels and running routes, when making the decision about whether to accept the offer, 
or when reporting subjective cost on the rating scale. By automatic, we just mean that the bias 
was not (fully) controlled, since it occurred despite the monetary bonus offered for accurate 
judgments. 
This automatic process could have involved affective reactions to incentive presentation, 
following on affect-as-information theory (Clore & Storbeck, 2006). The idea is that the brain 
inverses a general implication from information to affective state. For instance, anticipating an 
important effort goes with activating the autonomic nervous system, which is perceived as 
enhanced arousal level. Therefore, perceiving enhanced arousal level could signal that an 
important effort is to be exerted soon. We discarded this possibility by manipulating arousal level 
through music extracts played when participants viewed the running routes and the associated 
incentives. Although music did increase autonomic measures (pupil size) in proportion to arousal 
ratings, it did not influence effort cost estimates. Thus, the impact of incentives is unlikely to have 
been mediated by arousal state. However, we must acknowledge that arousal ratings were not 
recorded during the experiment, so it remains possible that the music was actually ineffective for 
modulating arousal level when participants performed the main task. A variant of this affect 
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scenario would be that incentives modulate the affective state along a valence dimension. 
Participants would overestimate effort costs not because they feel more excited with higher 
incentives but because they feel more excited in a positive way. This mediation by valence is also 
unlikely, because negative incentives (prospective losses) had the same impact as positive 
incentives (prospective gains) on effort cost estimates. Furthermore, it would imply that 
participants feel better when they have to exert more effort, which may be plausible in sporty 
people but not generalizable to the average person. 
Finally, our findings are in line with the predictions of the motivation scenario, which 
assumes that participants automatically translate reward into effort. This ability would arise from 
the cost-benefit trade-off machinery responsible for the motivational control of behaviour. 
Bayesian family model comparison provided strong evidence in favour of cost-benefit models, 
relative to purely descriptive, non-principled models (generalized linear regression). However, 
further comparison between the two variants of this hypothesis (‘Maximal Budget’ and ‘Optimal 
Expense’) did not suggest that one was more prevalent than the other in the sampled population 
of participants. This could mean that these two underlying mechanisms are equally prevalent in 
the population, or simply that statistical power was not sufficient to detect a difference in 
prevalence. Besides, it is possible that both mechanisms are at play within a given individual, 
either at the scale of a single effort estimate, or across several estimates, such that none of these 
mechanisms clearly dominates the other. In any case, we must assume that these computations 
are implicitly performed by the brain, because participants did not spontaneously report them 
during post-experiment debriefing interview.  
The general conclusion remains that the positive distortion of effort cost ratings by goal 
incentive value, observed in model-free analyses, is likely due to a contamination of prospective 
effort cost judgments by the product of a prescriptive, decision-oriented cost-benefit computation. 
Indeed, we found higher evidence for models in which the probability of choosing the high-effort 
option was a function of anticipated effort cost (including distortions of the real effort cost by 
monetary incentives) rather than a direct function of real effort cost. This suggests that subjective 
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distortions induced by goal value affect not only ratings of effort cost but also decisions about 
whether to exert more effort for a higher benefit. Since choices were made before ratings, it is 
unlikely that decision making was biased because of explicit cost judgments, although one cannot 
exclude that participants prepared their ratings beforehand. In any case, this motivation bias 
makes ambivalent the role of goal value in expected utility computation: on the one hand, it 
increases the expected benefit of the action, but on the other hand, it also increases the perceived 
cost of the action. The net effect of the motivation bias is to make high-value goals less attractive 
than they should be, if participants had not anticipated that they would come at higher costs.  
Although we think this work is an important step towards a mechanistic comprehension 
of how effort anticipation and other action-related judgments can interfere, further investigation 
will be needed to assess the robustness and generalizability of these findings, to circumscribe the 
scope of this phenomenon, and to gain a fine-grained understanding of its computational and 
neural bases. Specifically, one remaining question to be addressed is whether other types of 
prospective cost judgments, about e.g.  delay or risk, are subject to the same distortions from goal-
value as effort cost judgments. Another crucial issue regards the impact of this effect on action 
execution. In the present study, the actual effort expended during running was controlled by the 
treadmill speed and slope. However, earlier studies have reported a positive effect of goal value 
on force production, even when it is non-instrumental or in fact detrimental to performance (Dam, 
2017; Oudiette et al., 2019), which could indeed originate from a higher anticipated effort cost.  
This observation leads us to interrogate the potential adaptiveness of such an influence of 
goal value on effort cost anticipation. We can speculate that, in environments where the invested 
effort and the value of the attained goal are strongly correlated, information about this goal value 
is on average informative about the effort that will be required. Thus, using such a heuristic might 
help prepare the action, in situations where value is known with precision whereas information 
about the cost is more uncertain. A better preparation, for an overestimated difficulty, may later 
result in higher persistence towards high-value goals in the face of fatigue, pain, or other forms of 
adversity that might be encountered during action execution. However, overestimating the cost 
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may lead people to abandon the pursuit of high-value goals that they actually have the ability to 
reach. These missed opportunities may be particularly frequent in patients suffering from 
depression, who might be trapped in a paradoxical behaviour: ignoring attractive goals just 
because their high values are seemingly signalling high costs.  
We acknowledge that, even if it provides a well-controlled proof of concept, the size of the 
effect was rather small in our data. Yet, this critically depends on the specifics of the experimental 
situation, notably the fact that participants were heavily trained (and encouraged) to make 
accurate effort cost judgments. Further research is needed to investigate how preponderant the 
effect is in more naturalistic situations where people have only vague ideas about the actual costs. 
Another critical feature of our design is that the incentive level was clearly indicated when ratings 
and choices were made, while the effort cost had to be estimated and memorized while viewing 
the running animation. A question for future investigation is whether the phenomenon of 
contamination might manifest in the opposite direction when information about effort cost is 
available for a precise subjective estimate, while information about goal value remains vague. This 
opposite contamination would result in overestimated goal value when effort cost is obviously 
high, and would lead people to another paradox: engaging in strenuous actions just because they 
seem costly enough (to bring valuable reward, presumably).  
  
Chapter II: Article 1 
112 
 
Methods 
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee for Biomedical Research of the Pitié-
Salpêtrière Hospital, where both experiments were conducted.  
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited via the Relais d’Information en Sciences Cognitives (RISC) website 
and screened for exclusion criteria: age below 18 or above 39; less than 1-hour physical exercise 
(and/or less than 30 minutes of cardio-respiratory training) per week; regular use of drugs or 
medications; history of psychiatric, neurological, cardiac, or respiratory disorders. 
All participants gave informed consent prior to partaking in the study.  
Experiment 1 
22 participants (10 F, 12 M; mean age = 25.6 ± 4.7 y) were recruited for Experiment 1. One 
participant could not complete the last testing block due to a technical failure, but data from the 
first 5 blocks were nevertheless included in the analyses.  
Subjects received an initial endowment of 18€, and earned financial bonuses during the session, 
leading to final payment of 30.7€ on average (s.d. = 4.5€).  
Experiment 2 
24 participants (12 F, 12 M; mean age = 26.0 ± 5.0 y) were recruited for Experiment 2 and were 
all included in the analyses.  
Because subjects incurred a risk of monetary loss during this experiment, they received an initial 
endowment of 30€, which ensured a non-negative final payment. This final payment was 41.8€ 
on average (s.d. = 4.4€). 
 
Apparatus 
We programmed all tasks and data analyses with MATLAB (MathWorks ®) and used the 
Psychophysics Toolbox 3.0 (Kleiner et al., 2007) for stimuli presentation. Participants ran on a 
Tech med Cardio 270 treadmill, whose speed and inclination were controlled by the computer. 
In Experiment 2, pupil dilation was measured with a The Eye Tribe ET1000 eye-tracker (60 Hz 
sampling frequency) attached below the computer screen, and participants’ head position was 
stabilized with a chin-rest placed 70 cm away from the 23” screen. Choices and ratings were 
made using a standard keyboard. 
 
Task design 
In this study, we designed a novel behavioural task aimed at measuring the influence of goal 
value on the anticipated energetic cost of reaching this goal. 
 
Chapter II: Article 1 
113 
 
Experiment 1 
The general idea of our experimental paradigm was as follows: each subject was shown short 
on-screen animations depicting a cartoon character running various routes, each associated to a 
varying amount of reward, and was asked to estimate a priori the energetic cost of each given 
route. Subject was additionally asked whether she would agree to run each given route in reality 
(on a treadmill) in order to earn the associated reward. 
More specifically, after giving their consent, each subject completed a single 3-hour session 
comprising these steps: 
1) Training 
Subjects went through an extensive training in order to familiarize themselves with the 
task.  
i. Comfort speed 
First, they performed a 3-minute physical warm-up run on the treadmill, which was 
pre-set at a 7 km.h-1 speed and a 4% slope. Then, while they kept running, they were 
instructed to adjust the treadmill speed to their “comfort” level, which was described 
to them as the speed at which they would be able to run for 30 minutes without 
interruption nor excessive fatigue. They tuned the speed by 0.5 km.h-1 increments via 
“plus” and “minus” buttons and received immediate motor feedback (but no numeric 
feedback about the current speed was given, in order to encourage them to rely on a 
proprioceptive rather than a strictly numeric benchmark), until they reported having 
reached such a “comfort” speed and had spent at least 2 minutes in the speed 
adjustment phase (in order to ensure a minimal warm-up duration of 5 minutes). 
 
ii. Familiarization with speed and slope levels 
Running routes which were to be displayed during the testing phase would be 
comprised of 4 segments, each a combination of 1 of 3 speed levels (110%, 125%, 
and 140% of comfort speed, expressed via the on-screen scrolling speed of dashes 
symbolizing the road) and 1 of 3 slope levels (0%, 4%, 8%, represented by 0, 12 and 
24° slopes, respectively, to make levels more distinguishable visually). 
In order to allow participants to map visual, on-screen features characterizing each 
route segment with proprioceptive sensations (and in particular, an effort cost 
internal signal), we instructed them to run 6 “elementary” routes successively, each 
corresponding to a single 1-minute segment {𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖; 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 =  0} then 
 {𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 = 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡;  𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖} with  𝑖 ∈ ⟦1; 3⟧. Differences in speed or slope were thus 
experienced with the other dimension being held constant. 
 
iii. Familiarization with global route display and energetic cost rating 
This training phase was critical in that it allowed participants to map together, for a 
given route 1) its corresponding on-screen animation, 2) the physical sensations 
perceived while and after running this route (and associated internal effort signal), 
and 3) a cursor position on the energetic cost rating scale. 
First, subjects were instructed that their accuracy at the energetic cost estimation 
task would condition their final payment, and were advised to picture themselves in 
the shoes of the running character during the animation display in order to produce 
accurate estimates. This was to encourage them to rely on internal simulation rather 
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than visual cues to build their cost estimate, as they would do in real-life situations. 
Then, they completed 2 trials in which they sequentially watched a running 
animation, ran the corresponding 2-minute route on the treadmill, and were finally 
shown the corresponding cursor position on the energetic cost scale. Next, they 
completed 2 trials similar to the two previous ones, except that subjects now tried to 
estimate each route’s energetic cost by placing the cursor on the rating scale after 
having run the route and before receiving a feedback from the computer. 
This was followed by 12 additional trials, in which subjects estimated the energetic 
cost directly after seeing the running animation, i.e. without actually running the 
route, and were then given feedback about the actual energetic cost (still as a 
position on the rating scale), as well as numerical feedback about their estimation 
accuracy (e.g. “Accuracy: 83%”), computed as the complement of the actual distance-
to-target relative to the maximal possible distance-to-target:  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 = 100 (1 − 
|𝜔−?̂?|
max{1−ω ;ω}
), where 𝜔 is the actual energetic cost (on a 
normalized [0;1] scale) and ?̂? is the estimated energetic cost. 
 
iv. Training block 
Before beginning the actual testing blocks, subjects performed a training block of 
trials, which was identical to later testing blocks except that it did not entail any real 
financial stake (as made clear to the subjects before the beginning of the training 
block).  
 
 
2) Testing 
The testing phase was composed of 6 blocks, each comprising 18 trials. Each trial went 
as follows:  
 
i. Display of prospects  
First, the static picture of a monetary reward was displayed on the right side of the 
screen for 2s. This reward was one of 6 possible amounts: {0.01, 0.10, 0.50, 1, 2, 5} € 
and corresponded to a bonus that would be added to the subject’s final payment if 
she actually ran the associated route. Next, a running animation was displayed on the 
left side of the screen for 10 s. The animation depicted a character running along a 
route composed of 4 segments, each corresponding to a (𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒) couple, 
pseudo-randomly drawn from the levels described above, and lasting a pseudo-
random duration (between 25 and 45s in reality, i.e. between 2.08 and 3.75s on-
screen). An in-house algorithm ensured that the total duration of the animation was 
10s (corresponding to a real duration of 120s), and that the actual energetic cost of 
the corresponding route equalled one of 6 pre-determined energetic cost levels: 𝜔 ∈
{.20, .32, .44, .56, .68, .80} such that 𝐸𝐶𝜔 = (1 − 𝜔)𝐸min + 𝜔𝐸max , with 𝐸min  the 
energetic cost of a 2-minute run at the easiest speed and slope levels: 
{110% ∗ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡; 0%}, and 𝐸max  the energetic cost of a 2-minute run at the 
hardest speed and slope levels: {140% ∗ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡; 8%}. Subjects were not aware that 
energetic costs systematically belonged to one of 6 possible levels. The instantaneous 
metabolic cost (power) of a given {Speed; Slope} couple was computed following 
American College of Sports Medicine’s (ACSM) metabolic equation for running, 
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which has been shown to predict actual energetic expense with good accuracy (Hall 
et al., 2004). 
 
ii. Choice 
Once the animation stopped playing, subjects were presented with a choice: “Do you 
prefer to run this route?”. Selecting the “YES” answer meant that they preferred 
running the route just displayed in order to win the monetary reward 
simultaneously displayed, selecting the “NO” answer meant that they preferred 
running a “comfort” route (2 minutes at comfort speed with 0% slope) for no 
monetary reward. Choice was self-paced, and was not executed immediately 
afterwards. 
 
iii. AEC rating 
Once they had validated their choice, subjects were prompted to estimate the 
energetic cost of the running route depicted by the animation they had just watched. 
This self-paced rating was made by placing a cursor along a horizontal scale 
(implicitly bounded by 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥). Subjects were incentivized to produce 
accurate ratings via the following rule: if, by the end of each block, their average 
accuracy exceeded 80%, they would receive a 1€ bonus for this block. (Participants’ 
average accuracy was 82.3 ± 3.8 % in Experiment 1.) 
 
At the end of each block, one trial among the 18 just completed was randomly drawn by 
the computer; the corresponding route and the associated monetary reward were 
displayed, along with a reminder of the participant’s choice (“You accepted/refused to 
run this route.”). The participant was then instructed to step onto the treadmill and to 
run the effortful (resp. comfort) route if she had accepted (resp. refused) the offer. Upon 
completion of the effortful route, the associated monetary reward was added to her final 
payment. (Notably, all participants completed all running routes - except for one 
participant who chose to stop before the end of the most effortful run in the training 
session - so the risk dimension was negligible.)  
Upon completion of the running sequence, participants were given a numerical feedback 
about the accuracy of their energetic cost estimates (averaged across the last 18 trials) 
along with a notification about their accuracy bonus (“You (do not) win a 1€ accuracy 
bonus for this block”). Their updated cumulative payment was also displayed (“Your 
current payment is 33.4€”). 
 Before subjects began the 4th block, they went through a short recalibration procedure, 
aimed at helping them maintaining accurate cost estimates, and consisting in two trials 
identical in structure to the last 12 trials at step iii. Familiarization with global route 
display and energetic cost rating of the training phase.  
Since our experimental design involved 6 energetic cost levels * 6 reward levels, the 
prospect matrix comprised 36 possible cost-reward combinations, each repeated 3 times 
across the 108 trials, in a random order. 
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Finally, they completed a written survey and a subsequent oral debriefing with the 
experimenter. This allowed us to gather their general thoughts about the experiment, 
enquire about the heuristics or strategies they may have used to perform the task, or the 
influences they may have felt from the various experimental variables, and last, make 
sure that they had not guessed the real purpose of the experiment or explicitly assumed 
a correlation by-design between the Incentive and Effort Cost factors of the task.  
 
 
Experiment 2 
We adapted the design of Experiment 2 from that of Experiment 1, such that the various 
mechanisms we proposed to explain the effect of interest observed in Experiment 1 (see Interim 
Discussion) would each make a distinct set of predictions about the behavioural outputs 
measured in Experiment 2. We therefore introduced the following modifications to the design:  
1) Each trial in the Testing phase would start with a lottery animation, akin to a slot 
machine roll and lasting 0.8s, in which a running route and a monetary incentive amount 
were shown to be randomly and independently selected on either side of the screen. The 
goal of this manipulation was to make the orthogonality of energetic cost and monetary 
incentive variables intuitive and salient to the subjects. In fact, the order in which {cost, 
incentive} couples would be displayed was still determined at the beginning of the 
session via a pseudo-random permutation performed by our computer program. 
 
2) Additionally, we probed subjects’ belief in a Reward => Effort general implication by 
asking (via the computer) the following question: “Do you think that, in life, the less 
effort you make, the less reward you receive?”, with four possible answers, ranging from 
“Absolutely yes” to “Not at all”. 
 
3) Testing blocks would alternate between a GAIN (as in Exp. 1) and a LOSS condition. In 
the GAIN condition, a ‘Yes’ answer at the Choice stage meant that the participant 
preferred running the route depicted by the animation in order to win the monetary 
amount displayed within the green ‘GAIN’ frame (subsequently referred to as the High-
Effort High-Gain, or HEHG, offer), rather than running the ‘comfort’ route (see Exp. 1 
description for details) for no reward (Low-Effort 0-Gain, or LE0G, offer). In the LOSS 
condition, a ‘Yes’ answer meant that the participant preferred running the route depicted 
by the animation in order not to lose the monetary amount displayed within the red 
‘LOSS’ frame (High-Effort 0-Loss, or HE0L), rather than running the ‘comfort’ route and 
having this monetary amount deducted from her final payment (Low-Effort High-Loss, or 
LEHL). 
The GAIN/LOSS condition was displayed before each testing block began, and reminded 
in each trial by the coloured and labelled frame surrounding the monetary incentive 
picture.  
 
In order to maintain a number of 3 repetitions for each {energetic cost level x incentive 
level x GAIN/LOSS condition} combination, while keeping a session duration that would 
avoid excessive fatigue effects, only 3 incentive levels were used: {0.01, 0.5, 10} €.  
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During the Testing phase, participants’ arousal state was manipulated independently from 
energetic cost and incentive fluctuations via music. On each trial, once a running route and an 
incentive level had been selected by the lottery, and concomitantly with the running animation, a 
musical extract was played in the headset participants were wearing. For each {energetic cost 
level x incentive level x GAIN/LOSS condition} combination, 3 levels of arousal were tested: 
strongly arousing music, weakly arousing music, or no music (in blocks 3 and 4). Strongly and 
weakly arousing musical extracts were pseudo-randomly interleaved within each musical block.  
We pre-selected 128 extracts (each 17-second long) from moderately familiar to little-known 
classical music pieces, and had a small panel (N = 4, including EB and CT) rate the emotional 
arousal evoked by each extract. Next, we retained the 36 most and 36 least arousing excerpts 
based on this score, which allowed us to classify our music stimuli into a priori high vs. low 
arousal categories. Note that this procedure was only meant to ensure a sufficiently wide and 
approximately symmetrical distribution of arousal level, and that the external validity of this 
classification (relative to e.g. the physiological or reported arousal measured from a large 
sample of the population) was not crucial to test the “affect – arousal” hypothesis. Indeed, we 
additionally acquired a direct measure of the subjective arousal felt by participants in reaction to 
our musical extracts. Upon completion of the 6th testing block, participants listened again to each 
of the musical extracts they had previously heard (without any concurrent visual stimulation, in 
a randomized order) and were asked to report the amount of arousal they felt “due to the 
musical extract”, on an analog rating scale ranging from “None” to “Extreme”. 
Pupil dilation was recorded during each Testing and Arousal Rating trial. In order to mitigate 
motion-related noise in the data, participants laid their head on a chin-rest during all 
computerized phases of the experiment, from the training to the end of arousal ratings. The 
luminance of all visual stimuli was roughly equalized before data acquisition, and was 
subsequently measured with a Dr Meter LX1010B digital luxmeter, which we placed at the same 
position as participant’s eyes in front of the computer screen, and exposed to all stimuli 
combinations. 
 
 
Statistical analysis 
 
All statistical analyses were performed with Matlab and its Statistics and Machine Learning 
Toolbox, as well as the Variational Bayesian Analysis (VBA) toolbox (Daunizeau et al., 2014). 
 
Generalized Linear Models (GLM) were inverted with Matlab’s built-in glmfit function. All 
regressors were z-scored prior to GLM inversion so as to enable direct comparison of the 
amount of explained variance between regressors. 
We subsequently tested for group-level random effects of the regressors in our models by 
performing one-sample two-tailed Student t-tests on each vector of beta posterior estimates. 
Non-linear models were inverted using a variational Bayes approach under the Laplace 
approximation, implemented in the VBA toolbox. The algorithm used in VBA not only inverts 
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nonlinear models but also estimates their evidence, which represents a trade-off between 
accuracy (goodness of fit) and complexity (degrees of freedom).  
Experiment 1 
 
Choice 
To assess the impact of our main experimental factors on preference for the HEHG option, we 
fitted a simple logistic model to binary choices made by each participant, formalized as follows: 
𝑃(𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑠) =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝐵0+𝑘𝑅𝐸𝐶∙𝑅𝐸𝐶+𝑘𝐼∙𝐼)
 (1) 
 
where 𝐵0 is a bias parameter, 𝑅𝐸𝐶 is the real energetic cost of the HEHG route,  𝐼 is the incentive 
(or potential reward) level of the HEHG option, and 𝑘𝑅𝐸𝐶and 𝑘𝐼 are the linear coefficients scaling 
the energetic cost and the incentive level, respectively.  
 
Anticipated Energetic Cost 
We fitted several GLMs to the AEC ratings made by each participant. 
In order to evaluate the impact of our two main experimental factors, we started with a very 
simple model: 
𝐴𝐸𝐶 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶 ∙ 𝑅𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽𝐼 ∙ 𝐼 (2) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝐶 is the real energetic cost of the route, 𝐼 is the incentive level, and 𝛽s are the linear 
coefficients of our model. 
 
Next, we tested whether the incentive level factor had an impact on AEC over and above choices 
made by the participant. For this, we orthogonalized our factor of interest to the potentially 
confounding factor: 
𝐴𝐸𝐶 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶 ∙ 𝑅𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽𝐶 ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒
∗ +  𝛽𝐼 ∙ 𝐼
∗ (3) 
 where 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒∗ is the choice made by the subject (encoded as 1 for Yes, 0 for No, and 
subsequently orthogonalized to the REC vector), and 𝐼∗is the incentive level, orthogonalized to 
𝑅𝐸𝐶 and 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒∗.  
Finally, we looked into a possible decrease in the effect of reward across experimental blocks. To 
that end, we added an 𝑖𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 factor indicating the index of the current block, as well as all 
corresponding interaction terms, including 𝐼 ∗ 𝑖𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 which was our regressor of interest here: 
 
𝐴𝐸𝐶 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶 ∙ 𝑅𝐸𝐶 +  𝛽𝐼 ∙ 𝐼 + 𝛽𝐵 ∙ 𝑖𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 + ⋯
                                           𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶∗𝐼 ∙ 𝑅𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐼 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶∗𝐵 ∙ 𝑅𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝑖𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽𝐼∗𝐵 ∙ 𝐼 ∗ 𝑖𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 (4)
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We also measured the reward effect for each block separately by fitting the following model: 
𝐴𝐸𝐶 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶 ∙ 𝑅𝐸𝐶 +  ∑ 𝛽𝐼𝑖 ∙ 𝐼𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖
6
𝑖=1
(5) 
 
where 𝐼𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖indicates the incentive level within Block i (and equals 0 elsewhere). 
 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Choice 
We performed a similar analysis to that in Experiment 1, by inverting the following logistic 
model (adapted from equation 1 to include a Loss factor): 
𝑃(𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑠) = 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐵0 + 𝑘𝑅𝐸𝐶 ∙ 𝑅𝐸𝐶 + 𝑘𝐺 ∙ 𝐺 + 𝑘𝐿 ∙ 𝐿) (6) 
 
where 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥: 𝑥 →
1
1+𝑒−𝑥
 , 𝐵0 is a bias parameter, 𝑅𝐸𝐶 is the real energetic cost of the High 
Effort route, 𝐺 is the gain level of the High Effort option (0 in Loss blocks), 𝐿 is the Loss level of 
the Low Effort option (0 in Gain blocks), and 𝑘𝑅𝐸𝐶, 𝑘𝐺  and 𝑘𝐿 are the linear coefficients scaling 
the energetic cost, reward level, and loss level, respectively.  
 
Anticipated Energetic Cost 
Again, we fitted several GLMs to the AEC ratings made by each participant. 
We started with a very simple model, extended from eq. 2 to include a Loss factor: 
𝐴𝐸𝐶 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶 ∙ 𝑅𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽𝐺 ∙ 𝐺 + 𝛽𝐿 ∙ 𝐿 (7) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝐶 is the real energetic cost of the route, 𝐺 is the gain level, 𝐿 is the loss level, and 𝛽s are 
the linear coefficients of our model. 
 
Next, in order to assess the effect of the arousal evoked by the musical extracts onto AEC ratings, 
we fitted the following GLM: 
𝐴𝐸𝐶 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶 ∙ 𝑅𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽𝐺 ∙ 𝐺 + 𝛽𝐿 ∙ 𝐿 + 𝛽𝐴 ∙ 𝐴 (8) 
where 𝐴 is the arousal rating made by the participant about the same musical extract during the 
arousal rating phase, and 𝛽𝐴 is the corresponding coefficient. 
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Pupil dilation 
We acquired two pupil diameter timeseries per subject (one for the main task, and one for the 
arousal rating task), that we pre-processed as follows: 
1) Invalid data points (lost signal, mostly due to a blink or fixation outside the screen) were 
discarded, as well as all data points pertaining to a [-100;200] ms window around these 
timepoints 
2) Outlier samples (outside 3 median absolute deviations from the median) were discarded 
3) A shape-preserving piecewise cubic interpolation was performed on the remaining 
timeseries 
4) An 11th order median filtering was applied to the interpolated signal (for smoothing) 
5) A 
1
128
 Hz high-pass filter was applied to correct for low-frequency drift 
6) Timeseries were split into trial sequences 
7) Trial timeseries were baseline-corrected (by subtracting the pupil diameter averaged 
across the [-200;0] ms window preceding trial onset) 
Next, in order to assess the effect of music-related arousal on pupil diameter, we fitted the 
following minimal GLM to each timepoint in arousal-rating timeseries: 
𝑃𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑚 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐴 ∙ 𝐴 (9) 
where 𝐴 is the arousal rating made by the participant about the musical extract being played. 
Finally, we smoothed the t-statistic timeseries derived from fitting this GLM by convolving them 
with a gaussian kernel (𝜎 = 50 𝑚𝑠) in order to ensure that the assumptions of the Random Field 
theory were met, and we applied the RFT_GLM_contrast function (from the VBA toolbox) to our 
smoothed timeseries. This allowed us to test the significance (in a random-effects approach) of 
each regressor at each timepoint while correcting for multiple comparison at cluster level. 
 
Inversion of non-linear cost-benefit models of Choice and AEC 
We inverted non-linear models predicting both AEC ratings and Choices as a function of the real 
energetic cost (REC), the nominal gain magnitude (G) and the nominal loss magnitude (L). (See 
Interim discussion for details about the models applied to Exp. 1 data.)  
In Exp. 2, the ‘Maximal Budget’ model was extended from that presented in the Interim 
discussion, to account for the presence of a Loss condition. The decision variable was now 
written: 
𝐷𝑉 = 𝑈𝐻𝐸 − 𝑈𝐿𝐸 = (𝐺
𝜌 − 𝐶𝐸 ∙ 𝐸𝐶
𝛼) − (−𝜆 ∙ 𝐿𝜌 − 𝐶𝐸 ∙ 𝐸𝐶0
𝛼) (10) 
 
Where 𝐺 and 𝐿 are the prospective Gain and Loss magnitudes attached to the HE and LE options 
respectively, 𝜌 is the nonlinearity parameter controlling the magnitude-to-utility mapping 
(typically, 𝜌 <  1 (Schoemaker, 1982; Glimcher & Fehr, 2013)), 𝜆 is a loss aversion parameter 
(typically, 𝜆 > 1 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tom et al., 2007)), 𝐶𝐸 is the scaling coefficient of 
the effort cost discounting variable, and 𝛼 is the nonlinearity parameter controlling the 
curvature of effort discounting. 
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Thus: 
𝐷𝑉 = 𝐺𝜌 + 𝜆 ∙ 𝐿𝜌 − 𝐶𝐸 ∙ (𝐸𝐶
𝛼 − 𝐸𝐶0
𝛼) (11) 
 
therefore, the maximal energetic cost such that DV = 0 is: 
𝐸𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 = (𝐸𝐶0
𝛼 +
𝐺𝜌 + 𝜆 ∙ 𝐿𝜌
𝐶𝐸
)
1
𝛼
(11) 
 
And the updated decision variable was written: 
𝐷𝑉′ = 𝐺𝜌 + 𝜆 ∙ 𝐿𝜌 − 𝐶𝐸 ∙ (𝐴𝐸𝐶
𝛼 − 𝐸𝐶0
𝛼) (12) 
 
The ‘Optimal Expense’ model was extended in a similar fashion. The expected utility from the 
high- and low-effort option were now written (respectively): 
𝐸[𝑈𝐻𝐸(𝐸𝐶)] = 𝑃(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠|𝐸𝐶) ∙ 𝐺
𝜌 − (1 − 𝑃(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠|𝐸𝐶)) ∙ 𝜆 ∙ 𝐿𝜌 − 𝐶𝐸 ∙  𝐸𝐶
𝛼 
𝐸[𝑈𝐿𝐸(𝐸𝐶)] = −𝜆 ∙ 𝐿
𝜌 − 𝐶𝐸 ∙  𝐸𝐶0
𝛼  (13)   
 
Such that the updated decision variable was: 
𝐷𝑉∗ = 𝑃(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠|𝐸𝐶∗) ∙ (𝐺𝜌 + 𝜆 ∙ 𝐿𝜌) − 𝐶𝐸 ∙ ((𝐸𝐶
∗)𝛼 − 𝐸𝐶0
𝛼) 
 
As befits a Bayesian approach, we set non-trivial prior probability distributions over model 
parameters. We set agnostic distributions (centered on ‘null’ values, e.g. 𝜌 and 𝛼 were centered  
on 1) before inverting models on our first dataset (Exp. 1), and used the posterior distributions 
derived from this first inversion stage as the prior distribution in our second inversion (Exp. 2, 
except for the 𝜆 parameter, which was absent from the models in Exp. 1 and was attributed an 
agnostic prior distribution centered on 1). 
 
Model comparison  
The log-evidences, estimated for each participant and each model via the VBA scheme, were 
submitted to a group-level random-effect analysis (Rigoux et al., 2014). This analysis was used to 
generate family-level protected exceedance probabilities, which quantify the likelihood that a 
given family of models is more frequently implemented by the population than any other family 
in the comparison set. This allowed us to compare the evidence for ‘Standard’ versus ‘Null Choice’, 
‘Cost-benefit’ versus ‘Linear’, and ‘Maximal Budget’ versus ‘Optimal Expense’ families, over and 
above the variants tested within each family. 
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Supplementary figures 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. S1 – Distribution of arousal ratings in Experiment 2 
 
Histogram plot, left y-axis: Distributions of arousal ratings made about 72 musical extracts (ratings 
normalized to [0; 1]) overlaid across all subjects. Grey shade indicates number of subjects who reached a 
given count (or above) for each given rating bin. Purple area delineates the group-averaged distribution. 
Whisker plots, right y-axis: All ratings and summary statistics of each subject. Each dot represents a rating, 
main vertical grey bar is the median, left and right ends of boxplot are first and third quartile of the 
distribution, respectively. 
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Fig. S2 – Pupil diameter during arousal rating task in Experiment 2 
 
Main graph: Pupil diameter as a function of elapsed time since the onset of each musical extract. 
Timecourses were median-split between trials in which a high versus low arousal rating was given. Solid 
lines represent timecourses averaged across corresponding trials and all Exp. 2 subjects. Shaded area 
around each curve represents the standard error to the mean (s.e.m), computed across subjects. Vertical 
grey area highlights the time window during which pupil diameter was larger for high-arousal extracts 
(time window: [1.67 – 2.55] s post music onset, 𝑝 = 3 ∙ 10−4,  corrected for multiple comparisons). Vertical 
dotted line indicates rating onset. 
Top right insert: Distributions of response times (RT) overlaid across all subjects. Grey shade indicates 
number of subjects who reached a given count (or above) for each given RT bin. Purple area delineates the 
group-averaged distribution. Vertical dotted line and black arrows indicate rating onset. 
 
 
  
Chapter III: Article 2 
124 
 
 
Chapter III: Article 2 
 
The battle for confidence: a tug-of-war between 
prospective gain and loss 
  
Chapter III: Article 2 
125 
 
 
The battle for confidence: a tug-of-war between prospective gain and loss 
Emmanuelle Bioud, Mathias Pessiglione 
Motivation, Brain and Behavior lab, Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle épinière (ICM); 
Inserm U1127 ; CNRS UMR7225 ; Sorbonne Université, Paris, France 
 
 
  
Chapter III: Article 2 
126 
 
Abstract 
Before taking on a challenge, healthy individuals contemplate two crucial notions: the outcomes 
in case of success versus failure, i.e., the stakes of the challenge, and their own chances to succeed 
versus to fail, i.e., their confidence. Here, we question an implicit assumption made by modern 
decision theory, that confidence judgments are independent from, and therefore insensitive to, 
the outcomes at stake. In a series of three experiments, we asked participants to express their 
prospective confidence in succeeding at an upcoming motor challenge, whose stakes were gains 
and losses of varying magnitude. Contrary to the predictions that could be derived from either an 
assumption of stake-confidence independence or various existing psychological constructs such 
as the “desirability bias”, we found that larger prospective gains boosted individuals’ confidence 
in their future success, while larger prospective losses hindered it. Our behavioural findings are 
evocative of another well-established psychological construct, that of “affect-as-information”, in 
the sense that positive/negative affect (related to the perspective of gain/loss), is interpreted as 
signaling a higher/lower chance of success.  
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Introduction 
Should you follow your ski partner on to that black run? Should you start your own 
business? Should you try to repair that coffee maker yourself?  
Over the course of their life, individuals are presented with a number of important or 
mundane challenges to be taken or avoided. One of the most robust principles of human behaviour 
is that one tends to select the course of action which maximizes one’s expected utility. By 
definition, the expected utility of an action is computed by multiplying the subjective value, or 
utility, of each possible outcome of that action, with its perceived probability. In the context of an 
upcoming challenge, modern decision theory therefore stipulates that agents can generate and 
combine two types of judgments: a judgment about the utility (or disutility) that a success (or 
failure) would bring about, that is, a value judgment about the stakes of the challenge, and a 
judgment about the probability to succeed at the task, that is, a confidence judgment.  
  Aside from its cardinal principle of expected utility maximization, modern decision theory 
rests on an implicit assumption about how the very building blocks of expected utility are created 
before being combined together: that of a mutual independence between value and probability 
judgments. Yet, just as humans have been reported to violate the expected utility maximization 
principle in various circumstances (Allais, 1953; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979b; MacCrimmon & 
Larsson, 1979), they have been reported to exhibit puzzling inter-dependencies between value 
and probability — and sometimes, more specifically, confidence — judgments. Among the 
observations that defy the aforementioned independence assumption, is that of a so-called 
“desirability bias” (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007; Giardini et al., 2008; Tappin et al., 2017), which 
refers to the propensity of healthy individuals to attribute a higher probability to more desirable 
(i.e., prospectively valuable) states, all other things being equal.  In one of these studies (Giardini 
et al., 2008), when success at a task was made more desirable by modulating the performance-
contingent reward, participants displayed higher levels of retrospective confidence in their 
performance.  Another instance of value-confidence interplay is the observed impact of affective 
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states (or, at longer timescales, moods) induced by more or less pleasant stimuli (e.g., nice versus 
gloomy weather) on self-confidence (Kavanagh & Bower, 1985; Briñol et al., 2007; Koellinger & 
Treffers, 2015). In such cases, the stimuli eliciting the value judgment are largely unrelated to the 
task eliciting the confidence judgment, which suggests that the mechanisms underlying value-
confidence interferences are not restricted to integral judgments and can also operate 
incidentally. 
In the present study, we aimed to explore how the stakes of an upcoming enterprise (i.e., 
the value of success-contingent outcomes) might distort associated prospective confidence 
judgments, in a context where actual success probability is not contingent on the degree of 
motivation of the agent. To our knowledge, this question had never been addressed before in a 
controlled laboratory setting, despite the substantial repercussions that such confidence 
distortions may have on action selection, initiation and persistence, and, at larger scales, on 
individual and collective risk-taking, social status, evolutionary fitness, and psychological well-
being (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Koellinger et al., 2007; Johnson & Fowler, 2011; Anderson et al., 
2012). For this investigation, we first trained healthy participants on a novel motor task requiring 
a high degree of precision, which constituted the challenge that they would subsequently be faced 
with. Critically, we chose this particular task such that participants’ actual performance would not 
depend on their level of motivation, which mostly depends on stakes, to perform well. This 
independence was a prerequisite to a clear-cut demonstration of any putative value-confidence 
interplay above and beyond any value-performance dependency: indeed, if the chance of success 
objectively increases with expected value, then it is rational to feel more confident. If it is 
independent, then a boost in confidence can be considered as a bias. On each trial of the testing 
session, we presented them with information about the difficulty and the stakes of the upcoming 
challenge. The difficulty was adjusted via the width of a virtual target to hit, which determined the 
objective probability of success (whose exact value was unknown to the participant). The stakes 
consisted in a variable monetary gain in case of success, and a variable monetary loss in case of 
failure. Importantly, the difficulty, gain, and loss factors were manipulated orthogonally across 
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trials. Next, participants were prompted to estimate their probability of succeeding at the motor 
challenge, that is, to express their prospective confidence, which was our main measure of 
interest.  
Interestingly, the several pre-existing lines of investigation on value and confidence (and 
their interaction) yielded conflicting predictions about what pattern of results we should obtain. 
If participants were subject to a desirability bias, they should display a higher level of confidence 
when success was made more desirable by either high prospective gains, or high prospective 
losses, or both. The same should be observed in the case of a misattribution of arousal, or “stake-
likelihood effect”, which has been put forth as an intriguing alternative to the desirability bias 
account of overoptimism (Vosgerau, 2010): according to this theory, higher stakes, irrespective 
of their valence, should elicit higher arousal, which in turn should increase the perceived 
probability of the considered event — in this case, a success at the motor challenge, and thus, 
confidence ratings. However, a different scenario, inspired from the long-standing “affect-as-
information” construct (Schwarz & Clore, 2003; Schwarz, 2012), as well as recent behavioural and 
neuroimaging observations, predicted that participants should not be more confident when faced 
with a larger potential loss, but in fact less so. Indeed, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), 
which is considered a key node of the brain valuation system (BVS) since it was repeatedly found 
to linearly encode the subjective value of considered items or even background stimuli (Lebreton 
et al., 2009; Bartra et al., 2013; Abitbol et al., 2015), has been recently shown to also correlate 
positively with the degree of confidence in one’s judgment (De Martino et al., 2012; Lebreton et 
al., 2015). This regional overlap could reflect the fact that the codes for value and confidence are 
not independent, such that a change in prospective value could be misread as a change in success 
probability. In short, this scenario predicts that confidence judgments should be commensurate, 
at least to some extent, to value-related affective states. Very recently, this line of reasoning has 
received some support from three behavioural studies in which participants displayed higher 
retrospective confidence in the correctness of their choice when success lead to a reward, and 
lower confidence when failure led to a loss (Lebreton et al., 2018; Lebreton et al., 2019; Ting et al., 
Chapter III: Article 2 
130 
 
2019). Our primary goal was thus to study the impact of stakes — and in particular, potential loss 
— on prospective confidence judgments; our secondary goal was to elucidate the brain regions 
and cognitive mechanisms involved in the distortions we expected to observe.  
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Results 
 
Experiment 1 
We designed our first experiment so as to probe the impact of the stakes of an action onto 
three variables of interest: an individual’s prior confidence about her performance (before 
performing the action), the choice of whether to perform the action, and her posterior confidence 
(after performing the action). In this paradigm, the action to perform was a brief hand movement 
requiring a high degree of motor precision, consisting in briefly squeezing a handgrip, so that the 
peak of exerted force would reach a given, pre-defined level. We chose this action because it was 
likely new to every participant at the beginning of the experiment (no associated history of 
performance), it could be quickly learned, and, in previous pilot and published studies (Vinckier 
et al., 2018), we found subjects’ accuracy at this task to be largely independent of their motivation 
to perform correctly. We manipulated the difficulty of this action, or “motor challenge”, by varying 
the width of the force range that the force peak should belong to (or, more figuratively, the “target” 
to hit) in order for the movement to be successful. We also manipulated the magnitude of 
monetary gains or losses contingent on success at the challenge, which ranged from 1€ to 50€. All 
three task factors (difficulty, gain, loss) were varied orthogonally across trials. 
 As illustrated in Fig. 1, we structured experimental sessions as follows: first, subjects 
went through an extensive calibration phase, during which they learned to perform the required 
movement and were given some feedback about their motor variability, which would later help 
them appraise their probability to succeed at the motor challenge (i.e., form a confidence 
judgment). Next, they started the testing trials, which were of three types: Choice, Prior 
Confidence rating, and Posterior Confidence rating. In all types of trials, subjects were first 
presented with information about the upcoming motor challenge: its difficulty (set by the size of 
the green target to hit), the monetary gain in case of success, and the monetary loss in case of 
failure. Then, in Choice trials, subjects could accept or decline the challenge, then squeezed the 
handgrip without receiving any feedback about the exerted force (without any monetary 
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consequence if they had declined the challenge); in Prior Confidence trials, subjects first estimated 
their a priori chances of succeeding at the challenge (i.e., of hitting the target), then they squeezed 
the handgrip without any feedback; in Posterior Confidence trials, subjects first squeezed the 
handgrip without any feedback, then they estimated their a posteriori chances of having 
succeeded at the challenge.  
Importantly, irrespective of the trial type, subjects were not given any feedback about 
their performance during or after their movement. Nevertheless, once all Choice (resp. all 
Confidence rating) trials were completed, a subset (5%) of these trials was randomly drawn by 
the computer and the corresponding gains or losses (or 0 for Choice trials in which the subject 
had declined the motor challenge) were averaged together, to form a bonus (or malus) on the 
subject’s initial monetary endowment. 
Twenty-four healthy adults gave their consent to participate in this experiment and were 
included in our analyses (except for two of them, where mentioned). The focus of this article being 
the impact of the stakes of an action on the associated a priori confidence, we restrict the analyses 
below to Prior Confidence trials. 
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Fig. 1: Design of Experiment 1 
 
a. Session structure.  Each experimental session began with a calibration phase, in which 
participants learned to perform the required movement with decent precision and were given 
feedback about their motor accuracy (see Methods for details). This was followed by two testing 
phases: a CHOICE phase and a CONFIDENCE phase, each comprising 100 and 200 trials, 
respectively. Participants went through a recalibration procedure every 100 trials. At the end of 
each testing phase, 5 or 10 trials were randomly drawn, and the corresponding gains or losses 
were averaged, which constituted a bonus/malus to the compensation eventually paid to each 
participant. 
The order of CHOICE and CONFIDENCE phases was pseudo-randomized across subjects. 
 
b. Motor challenge. The required movement consisted in briefly squeezing a handgrip such that the 
force peak would fall within a target range around 40% of the participant’s maximal force, which 
was represented as a green window on a virtual thermometer. Four example force timecourses 
are illustrated. The green line represents a successful trial. Participants could fail because they 
squeezed too much (upper red line), not enough (lower red line) or for too long (more than 400 
ms, grey line). 
 
c. Trial structure. At the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross was displayed at the center of the 
screen, followed by a representation of the motor difficulty and the financial stakes of the trial: the 
green target window on the thermometer varied in size across trials, as did the monetary gains  
(resp. losses) ensuing a motor success (resp. failure). Then, three different series of tasks could 
occur: 1) in CHOICE trials (n = 100), participants were asked whether they wished to accept the 
bet, i.e., take up the motor challenge and its potential monetary outcomes. Next, upon appearance 
of a ’Squeeze!’ cue, participants would squeeze the handgrip, with potential monetary 
consequences depending on their precision (in case of a YES answer) or no monetary 
consequences (in case of a NO answer). 2) in PRIOR CONFIDENCE RATING trials (n = 100), a scale 
ranging from 0% to 100% was displayed, prompting participants to report their a priori chance of 
success at the challenge (which they could not refuse). Then, upon appearance of the ‘Squeeze!’ 
cue, they would squeeze the handgrip and try to hit the target. 3) in POSTERIOR CONFIDENCE 
RATING trials (n = 100), participants performed the motor challenge first, and then were 
prompted to estimate their a posteriori chance of success. All PRIOR and POSTERIOR confidence 
rating trials were randomly interleaved within the CONFIDENCE phase. 
Regardless of the trial type, after completing the series of tasks (which always included squeezing 
the handgrip), participants would proceed to the next trial without receiving any feedback about 
their motor performance. 
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Success rate 
We first performed a logistic regression of individual motor success across trials (1 if target hit, 0 
otherwise), which comprised the following regressors:  the (objective) expected probability of 
success based on the size of the target (unknown to the participant, see Methods for details), the 
Gain level associated to a success, the Loss level associated to a failure. Reassuringly, we found a 
strong positive effect of the expected probability of success (“pSuccess”) predictor (?̅? = .66, 𝐶𝐼 =
[ .51 ;  .81], 𝑡(21) = 9.1, 𝑝 < 10−8) on the actual probability of success. As expected based on 
former observations, we found no effect of neither prospective gain level (?̅? = − .0043, 𝐶𝐼 =
[− .14; .14], 𝑡(21) = − .065, 𝑝 = .95) nor prospective loss level (?̅? = −.074, 𝐶𝐼 =
[− .21 ; .06], 𝑡(21) = −1.1, 𝑝 = .28). 
Two subjects were excluded from this random-effects analysis because their motor accuracy was 
extremely low (success rate = 1%) on this set of trials, although they had performed the training 
correctly, and although their confidence ratings were sensitive to the difficulty level and did not 
reflect much awareness of their poor performance. 
 
Prior confidence 
We next inverted a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) of prior confidence ratings made by each 
subject across trials, comprising the same predictors as the logistic model of motor success. We 
found a strong positive effect of the expected probability of success (?̅? = .15, 𝐶𝐼 =
[ .11 ;  .18], 𝑡(23) = 9.5, 𝑝 < 10−8) on confidence ratings, which confirms that subjects were able 
to extract information about the difficulty of the upcoming motor challenge from the visual display 
(green target of varying size in a virtual thermometer), and were careful enough in their 
confidence ratings for this information to be reflected. However, we did not observe any 
significant impact of neither prospective gain level (?̅? = .0073, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .0050; .020], 𝑡(23) =
1.2, 𝑝 = .23) nor prospective loss level (?̅? = −.0094, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .021 ; .0021], 𝑡(23) = −1.7, 𝑝 =
.10) on prior confidence ratings. 
 
Chapter III: Article 2 
136 
 
Experiment 2 
 
In Experiment 1, we failed to detect any significant impact of prospective gain or loss on prior 
confidence judgments in spite of the predictions derived from two well-established psychological 
phenomena (desirability bias and affect-as-information). We sought to elucidate whether this 
absence of finding was due to an absence of true psychological effect, or rather due to a lack of 
statistical power (or some other design flaw) in our first attempt. Indeed, each individual set of 𝛽 
estimates was derived from 100 trials, which might be too few to yield a reliable estimate. 
Therefore, we performed a second experiment in which we increased the focus on prior 
confidence judgments, as well as the number of corresponding ratings made by each participant. 
In order to reduce the information load resulting from the display of the prospect panel (difficulty, 
gain and loss), and thus to increase awareness of the monetary stake, we introduced trials in 
which no loss or no gain could be incurred (“Gain-only” and “Loss-only” types, respectively). One 
more minor change was the introduction of more frequent feedbacks (once every 10 trials) about 
the gains and losses incurred over the last trials, so as to preserve the subject’s interest and 
engagement in the task throughout the testing session (see Fig. 2). Another minor change was the 
introduction of a lottery choice task at the end of the testing session. This task consisted in making 
binary choices between risky monetary lotteries and sure (but modest) monetary gains. The aim 
of this lottery task was to derive a loss aversion parameter from those binary choices, for each 
participant. 
 Twenty-one healthy subjects consented to take part in this experiment and were included 
in our analyses, which follow on from those performed on our Experiment 1 dataset.  
 
Success rate 
Again, and as intended, the probability of hitting the target was  strongly modulated by the 
expected probability of success (?̅? = .54, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 44 ; .63], 𝑡(20) = 12, 𝑝 < 10−9), but revealed no 
significant influence from either prospective gain level (?̅? =  .041, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .018; .10], 𝑡(20) =
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1.5, 𝑝 = .16) or prospective loss level (?̅? = − .054, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .12 ; .0084], 𝑡(20) = −1.8, 𝑝 = .086), 
although there was a trend for a negative impact of the latter. 
 
Prior confidence 
As in Experiment 1, prior confidence ratings were positively modulated by the expected 
probability of success (?̅? = .066, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 039 ; .093], 𝑡(23) = 5.1, 𝑝 < 10−4). This time, however, 
we additionally found a positive effect of prospective gain level (?̅? = .012, 𝐶𝐼 =
[. 0051; .018], 𝑡(23) = 3.7, 𝑝 = .0013) and a negative effect of prospective loss level (?̅? =
− .0071, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .014 ; − .0002], 𝑡(23) = −2.2, 𝑝 = .044 ) on prior confidence judgments. There 
was no evidence for a difference in absolute magnitude of the two effects (|𝛽𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛| − |𝛽𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠|̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
− .00027, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .0094 ;  .0089], 𝑡(19) = − .062, 𝑝 = .95, in a paired t-test) 
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Fig. 2: Design of Experiment 2 
 
a. Session structure.  Each experimental session began with a calibration phase, in which 
participants learned to perform the required movement with decent precision and were given 
feedback about their motor accuracy (see Methods for details). This was followed by a testing 
phase comprising 270 prior confidence rating trials, split into 3 blocks each including 9 games 
of 10 trials. At the end of each game, a feedback was given about the averaged monetary 
outcomes of the last 10 trials. Participants went through a recalibration procedure every 90 
trials. After all 27 games were completed, one of them was randomly drawn by the computer 
and its averaged outcomes were added (or subtracted) to the participant’s payment. This was 
followed by a lottery task, comprising 90 trials in which participants chose between a 50/50 
gain/loss lottery and a certain smaller gain. (See Methods for details.) 
 
b. Trial structure. This was similar to the structure of PRIOR CONFIDENCE trials in Experiment 1, 
with three variants regarding the format of the financial stakes attached to the motor 
challenge. In « gain-only » trials (n = 60), participants would incur no loss in case of failure, 
whereas in « loss-only » trials (n = 60), they would obtain no gain in case of success. The 
remaining 150 « gain & loss » trials involved non-null outcomes for both success and failure, as 
in Experiment 1. Trials of the three types were randomly interleaved across the experiment. 
 
 
Chapter III: Article 2 
139 
 
Experiment 3 
 
In this follow-up experiment, we pursued two main goals: first, to assess the robustness of the 
previous two-fold finding of a positive impact of prospective gain, and a negative impact of 
prospective loss, on prior confidence judgments; second, to identify the brain regions and 
mechanisms involved in such a value-to-confidence spillover, with the help of functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). Regarding the latter issue, our working hypothesis was that the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was a major site of interference between value-encoding 
and confidence-encoding signals, and that individuals exhibiting a larger spillover effect at the 
behavioural level would also exhibit a higher degree of similitude between patterns of value-
encoding and confidence-encoding respectively, at the neural level. 
For this, we made a few minor changes in our experimental design, with the aim of increasing its 
efficiency and compatibility with fMRI constraints (Fig. 3). We also added post-block feedbacks 
about the subject’s success rate over the past 50 trials, so as to help their confidence judgment 
stay calibrated on their true performance, without providing too much information about it 
(which would be less in line with real-life situations, where individuals rarely have the 
opportunity to refine their confidence judgment over hundreds of successive trials and 
feedbacks). 
We recruited ten healthy participants for a pilot experiment, in which only behavioural data was 
acquired, then recruited twenty-four additional participants, who performed the same tasks in an 
fMRI scanner.  
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Fig. 3: Design of Experiment 3 
 
a. Session structure.  The calibration & training phase (see Methods for details) was followed by a 
testing phase comprising 250 prior confidence rating trials, split into 5 blocks each including 5 
games of 10 trials. At the end of each game, a feedback was given about the averaged monetary 
outcomes of the last 10 trials. Participants went through a recalibration procedure every 50 
trials. At the end of each block, they were informed of their success rate over the last 50 trials. 
After all 25 games were completed, one of them was randomly drawn by the computer and its 
averaged outcomes were added (or subtracted) to the participant’s payment (this random 
draw procedure was repeated 5 times in the fMRI group). This was followed by a lottery task, 
identical to that in Experiment 2. 
 
b. Trial structure. All testing trials involved a prior confidence rating similar to that of 
Experiments 1 and 2. See Methods for details. 
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Behaviour 
We repeated our previous analyses on this third behavioural dataset. For both the success 
rate and prior confidence ratings, we replicated the findings of Experiment 2. 
 
Success rate 
As before, the probability of hitting the target was strongly modulated by the expected probability 
of success (?̅? = .64, 𝐶𝐼 = [ .57; .71], 𝑡(33) = 18, 𝑝 < 10−15), but did not show any influence from 
either the prospective gain level (?̅? = − .031, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .086; .024], 𝑡(33) = −1.2, 𝑝 = .26) or the 
prospective loss level (?̅? = − .030, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .088 ; .028], 𝑡(33) = −1.1, 𝑝 = .29). 
Prior confidence 
Again, expected probability of success (?̅? = .086, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 069 ; .10], 𝑡(33) = 10, 𝑝 < 10−11) and, 
more interestingly, prospective gain level (?̅? = .0073, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 0011; .013], 𝑡(33) = 2.4, 𝑝 = .022) 
had a positive impact on prior confidence ratings, whereas prospective loss level had a negative 
impact (?̅? = − .011, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .018 ; − .0042], 𝑡(33) = −3.3, 𝑝 = .0024). There was no evidence 
for a difference in absolute magnitude of the gain versus loss effects (|𝛽𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛| − |𝛽𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠|̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
− .0012, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .0076 ;  .0052], 𝑡(32) = − .38, 𝑝 = .71, in a paired t-test). 
 
fMRI 
Univariate approach 
First, we sought to identify the brain regions respectively involved in processing the monetary 
stakes of the motor challenge, and in encoding the confidence judgment subsequently expressed 
in the rating. Hoping to replicate an earlier finding that the vmPFC encodes both value (monetary 
stakes) and confidence judgments(Lebreton et al., 2015), we adopted a similar — conventional — 
massively univariate approach. (See Methods for details about BOLD response models.) Although 
contrasts of non-interest such as  “Squeeze Onset > Prospects Onset” did reveal an involvement of 
the expected regions (in the contrast mentioned above, we found a cluster in the primary motor 
cortex, or M1: cluster peak coordinates [−34  − 24  54], 𝑇 = 15.7, 𝑍 = 7.5, 𝑝𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑊𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 <
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10−15) , no voxel crossed the significance threshold in a Confidence contrast, nor in a Gain or even 
an Expected Value contrast (whether expressed as Gain – Loss or as Confidence*Gain – (1 – 
Confidence)*Loss). 
 
Multivariate Pattern Analysis (MVPA) 
 Despite this failure to identify brain regions involved in value and/or confidence processing via a 
univariate approach, we moved on to an MVPA analysis, which has been shown to yield more 
statistical power (Norman et al., 2006; Allefeld et al., 2016), and which would allow us to quantify, 
in each individual, the similarity (here, as a simple inter-voxel correlation) in the patterns of 
encoding of value versus confidence in pre-defined regions of interest (here, the vmPFC). This 
purpose followed from the intuition that a higher degree of behavioural interference between 
value and confidence would correspond to a higher degree of similarity or “overlap” in neural 
codes. We therefore derived a vector of 𝛽 weights for each subject and each variable of interest 
(various combinations of gain and loss, confidence) across the voxels of the vmPFC, then 
computed the correlation between the value and confidence weight vectors. However, contrary to 
our expectations, we found no significant relationship between the degree of similitude in value- 
and confidence- encoding patterns on the one hand, and the magnitude of behavioural effect of 
interest (positive effect of prospective gain, 𝑟 = −.16, 𝑝 = .49, negative effect of prospective loss 
on prior confidence judgments, 𝑟 = −.18, 𝑝 = .44, or overall effect of Gain – Loss, 𝑟 = −.26, 𝑝 =
.26). 
 
Experiments 1 to 3, pooled. 
In order to increase statistical power and to achieve a more accurate estimate of the size 
of our effects of interest, and because that size estimate did not vary between our three 
experiments (one-way ANOVA on individual estimates of 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛: 𝐹2 =  .32, 𝑝 =  .73; on 
𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠: 𝐹2 = .21, 𝑝 =  .81), we pooled the three datasets and reiterated the same  
statistical analyses. 
Chapter III: Article 2 
143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Confidence ratings and motor success, pooled across experiments 
 
a. Prior confidence ratings. Left: Individual 𝛽 estimates of target p(Success), Gain level, and Loss 
level regressors in a GLM model of prior confidence ratings. Subjects were pooled across 
Experiments 1 to 3, and those exhibiting an impact of prospective gain and/or loss on their 
motor success were excluded from this analysis (N = 64 remaining). In each whisker plot, 
horizontal line is the median, and subjects are drawn as outliers (circles) if their parameter 
estimate is larger than 𝑄3 + 1.5 ∗ (𝑄3 − 𝑄1) or smaller than 𝑄1 − 1.5 ∗ (𝑄3 − 𝑄1), where Q1 
and Q3 are the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively. Right: Prior confidence ratings, 
averaged across subjects, plotted against stake level (gain or loss). Dots are inter-subject 
averages; error bars represent s.e.m between individual averages (on each stake level) 
corrected for individual average confidence overall. 
 
b. Motor success rate. Left: Individual 𝛽 estimates of target p(Success), Gain level, and Loss level 
regressors in a logistic model of motor success. Right: Success rate, averaged across subjects, 
plotted against stake level (gain or loss). 
 
∗: 𝑝 < .05  ∗∗: 𝑝 < .01   ∗∗∗: 𝑝 < .001 
 
Chapter III: Article 2 
144 
 
Success rate 
When pooling all subjects from Experiments 1-3 (N = 77 after exclusion of 2 subjects from 
Experiment 1 for the analyses of success rate, see Exp. 1 section), we found, as anticipated, a strong 
positive effect of target size (?̅? =  .62, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 56 ; .67], 𝑡(76) = 22, 𝑝 < 10−15) on actual success 
rate. More interestingly, although the level of prospective gain was not a significant predictor of 
success (?̅? = − .0036, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .051; .044], 𝑡(76) = − .15, 𝑝 = .88), the level of prospective loss 
appeared to deteriorate success rate (?̅? = − .049, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .097 ; − .0015], 𝑡(76) = −2.1, 𝑝 =
.043). This deterioration was likely related to the fact that participants, who on average overshoot 
the target (i.e., squeezed the handgrip too hard), tended to produce more force in high-stakes 
trials, in line with some “choking-under-pressure” effects reported in the literature (Chib et al., 
2014; Oudiette et al., 2019). Because we were interested in whether stakes impacted prior 
confidence judgments all other things being equal, and especially, actual success probability being 
held constant, we performed a second run of the same statistical analyses after having excluded 
all subjects whose success rate was even marginally impacted by stakes (either gain or loss) (N = 
15 excluded, with a 𝑝 < .1 threshold on individual 𝛽𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 and 𝛽𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 estimates). Expected 
probability of success was still a strong positive predictor of actual success (?̅? = .61, 𝐶𝐼 =
[. 55 ;  .68], 𝑡(61) = 19, 𝑝 < 10−15) but in this subset of participants, as intended, neither 
prospective gain level (?̅? = − .0067, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .040; .027], 𝑡(61) = − .40, 𝑝 =  .69) nor prospective 
loss level (?̅? = − .032, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .072 ;  .0086], 𝑡(61) = −1.6, 𝑝 =  .12) had an overall impact on 
success rate (Fig. 4a). 
  
 Prior confidence 
Across all subjects from Experiments 1-3 (N = 79), prior confidence ratings were strongly 
influenced by expected probability of success (?̅? = .099, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 083 ; .11], 𝑡(78) = 13, 𝑝 <
10−15). Critically, they were also positively predicted by prospective gain level (?̅? = .0084, 𝐶𝐼 =
[. 0037; .013], 𝑡(78) = 3.6, 𝑝 = .00060) and negatively predicted by prospective loss level (?̅? =
− .0095, 𝐶𝐼 = [− .014 ; − .0048], 𝑡(78) = −4.0, 𝑝 = .00014). (No interaction term between these 
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main predictors was found to have any significant impact, all p > .6). After excluding subjects 
whose success rate was sensitive to stakes, these results were all maintained: expected 
probability of success was still a significant predictor of confidence ratings (?̅? = .094, 𝐶𝐼 =
[. 077 ; .11], 𝑡(63) = 11, 𝑝 < 10−15), as were prospective gain level (?̅? = .0084, 𝐶𝐼 =
[. 0030; .014], 𝑡(63) = 3.1, 𝑝 = .0029) and prospective loss level (?̅? = − .0087, 𝐶𝐼 =
[− .014 ; − .0031], 𝑡(63) = −3.1, 𝑝 = .0028) (Fig. 4b). Again, all interaction terms were non-
significant, p > .5. 
Remarkably, we found individual estimates of 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 and 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 to be negatively 
correlated across participants ( 𝑟 = −.50, 𝑝 < 10−4, 𝐅𝐢𝐠. 𝟓), with individuals exhibiting a larger 
positive distortion of confidence by prospective gain also exhibiting a larger negative distortion 
by loss. Besides, we did not find any evidence for an interindividual correlation between 
𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 and 𝛽𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 (𝑟 =  .024, 𝑝 =  .83;  𝑟 = − .046, 𝑝 =  .72 after excluding subjects 
whose performance was incentive-dependent), nor between 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 and 𝛽𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 (𝑟 =
 .057, 𝑝 =  .62; 𝑟 =  .16, 𝑝 =  .21 after excluding subjects whose performance was incentive-
dependent). Therefore, the distortion of an individual’s confidence judgments by the stakes of the 
challenge was dissociated from the impact that these stakes could have on her actual probability 
of success.  
Besides, it would seem that subjects were not aware of this impact of stakes on their 
confidence, as the vast majority of them denied, in the post-session debriefing, having been 
influenced in their confidence ratings by anything else than the size of the virtual target and 
psychomotor factors such as physical fatigue, perceived history of performance over the past 
trials, etc. 
Finally, we did not find any inter-individual correlation between the loss aversion 
parameter estimates 𝜆 derived from binary choices made during the lottery task on the one hand, 
and various aggregates of beta estimates quantifying the relative impact of prospective gains and 
losses on confidence ratings on the other hand (we tested correlations between 𝜆 and 𝛽𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 −
𝛽𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,
𝛽𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝛽𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛
 𝑜𝑟 
|𝛽𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠|
|𝛽𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛|
, all 𝑝 >  .33). 
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Fig. 5: Inter-individual correlations between 𝜷 estimates in Confidence and Success models 
 
Left panel: Individual 𝛽 estimates of Loss level predictor in a GLM model of Prior Confidence ratings, against 
individual 𝛽 estimates of Gain level predictor in the same GLM. Yellow dots represent subjects included in 
the correlation computation (N = 64), grey dots represent subjects excluded from it (N = 15) because their 
motor success probability was significantly (or marginally so, p < .1) impacted by prospective gain and/or 
loss.  
We found a significant negative correlation (𝑟 =  − .50,  𝑝 <  10−4) between 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓Gain and 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓Loss 
across subjects. 
 
Middle panel: Individual 𝛽 estimates of Gain level predictor in a GLM model of Prior Confidence ratings, 
against individual 𝛽 estimates of Gain level predictor in a logistic model of motor Success. Green and grey 
dots represent included (N = 62) and excluded subjects (N = 17), respectively. (Inclusion criteria were: as 
above, no marginal impact of prospective gain and/or loss on motor success probability, and success rate > 
5% so as to allow the inversion of the logistic model.) 
We found no significant correlation between 𝛽𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠Gain and 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓Gain. 
 
Right panel: Individual 𝛽 estimates of Loss level predictor in a GLM model of Prior Confidence ratings, 
against individual 𝛽 estimates of Loss level predictor in a logistic model of motor Success. Red and grey dots 
represent included and excluded subjects (following the same criteria as above), respectively.  
We found no significant correlation between 𝛽𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠Loss and 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓Loss. 
 
In all panels, the red line illustrates a simple linear regression of the y-axis variable by the x-axis variable, 
computed only for the subset of subjects included in the correlation computation (N = 64). 
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Discussion 
 
Here, we examined how the stakes of an upcoming challenge may affect one’s perceived 
chances of success, that is, one’s prospective confidence judgment. For this, in a series of three 
experiments, we presented healthy participants with a succession of motor challenges varying in 
difficulty, but also in the magnitudes of gain and loss that could be incurred depending on their 
success or failure at the challenge, and we had them estimate their a priori chances of hitting the 
virtual target. Overall, we found confidence judgments to be sensitive to both prospective gain 
and prospective loss, to a similar extent but in opposite directions: confidence was increased by 
larger prospective gain, and diminished by larger prospective loss. Importantly, the effect of 
prospective gain was negatively correlated, across participants, to the effect of prospective loss, 
but the influence of monetary stakes on confidence ratings was dissociated from their impact on 
actual probability of success. Besides, based on their reports during the written and oral post-
session debriefing, it would seem that participants were largely unaware of the stakes-induced 
distortion of their confidence judgments. 
Among the various mechanisms or psychological constructs that have previously been put 
forward to account for observed interferences between value and probability — and more 
specifically, confidence — judgments, several fail to explain our pattern of findings. First, if 
participants had been subject to a desirability bias, i.e., a tendency to perceive more desirable 
events as more likely to occur (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007), then their confidence should have 
increased in the face of higher prospective losses (and thus more desirable success at the motor 
challenge).  Similarly, if the positive distortion of confidence by prospective gains was 
underpinned by a misattribution of the arousal (Vosgerau, 2010) elicited by large prospective 
gains, then, large prospective losses being more arousing than small ones (Knutson, 2005; 
Knutson & Greer, 2008), we should have observed an effect of prospective losses in the same 
direction as gains. Neither could our findings be explained by some strategic confidence 
adjustment, which would consist for individuals in artificially boosting their confidence reports, 
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especially so in high-stakes situations, with the hope — presumably derived from some self-
fulfilment conception of performance prediction — that it would boost their chances of success. 
Finally, we can rule out another scenario that might have accounted for a positive effect of reward 
incentives on confidence. According to this scenario, healthy subjects hold an internal “theory of 
motivated control”, that is, they reason that, when they are more motivated to succeed (because 
of a large incentive), they will invest more effort into performing the task correctly, and therefore 
are more likely to succeed. Again, such a scenario predicts an increase in confidence in the face of 
larger prospective losses, and is thus in contradiction with our findings. 
Instead, the incentive-confidence interplay isolated here was evocative of an “affect-as-
information” (Schwarz, 2012) mechanism. Indeed, confidence covaried with the utility (or 
subjective value) of prospective stakes; this covariation could have been mediated by the affective 
states elicited by those stakes, which could in turn have informed confidence estimation, in the 
sense that a region or network representing the current affective state might send a positive (or 
in neural terms, excitatory) input to the cognitive network in charge of building a confidence 
signal.  
Given that high prospective gains or losses not only modulate affective state but also 
attract attention (Anderson, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2015; Hickey & Peelen, 2015; Vuilleumier, 2015; 
Müller et al., 2016; Schomaker et al., 2017), an alternative explanation for their opposing impact 
on confidence is that particularly large gains (resp. losses) captured participants’ focus during the 
display of challenge difficulty and stakes, and that their attentional dwelling on the “GAIN” (resp. 
“LOSS”) potential outcome increased the perceived probability of such an outcome occurring, in 
line with the “repeated simulation” mechanism which has been proposed as an account for 
preference-related likelihood distortions (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007) and has since received 
some empirical support (Szpunar & Schacter, 2013). Finally, beyond their effect on attentional 
focus or affective state, the stakes of an action are obviously a major determinant of initiation of 
that action (Vinckier et al., 2018). Thus, another possibility is that, even when not given the choice 
to engage or not, subjects had generated some internal signal of their determination to engage 
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(which would be higher for larger prospective gains, lower for larger prospective losses), and that 
this signal would have influenced confidence judgments. 
Unfortunately, we could not assess any of the candidate neural mechanisms, because we 
failed to identify the neural representations of value and confidence in our experimental settings.  
Irrespective of its underlying mechanisms, it would be worth investigating the 
repercussions of this value-related distortion of confidence judgments on the propensity for 
individuals to engage and persevere in risky courses of action. One reason is that it might allow us 
to gain insight about the potential adaptiveness of what would at first seem prejudicial to 
forecasting and decision-making processes, as has been undertaken for the related 
overconfidence bias (Johnson & Fowler, 2011). One can speculate that this interplay would be 
advantageous in relatively safe and resource-abundant environments, where individuals might 
benefit from a supplement of confidence in daily enterprises involving no risk of substantial loss, 
whereas behaviours susceptible to lead to massive or even immeasurable losses such as major 
injury or death would be discouraged. Besides, if, following on Bayesian conceptualizations of 
confidence, we assume that little-informed (that is, uncertain, or distributionally wide, or 
entropic) confidence judgments are more sensitive to influences from action stakes, then this 
distortion might modulate the weight of outcome value as a decision variable in action selection, 
and especially amplify it in contexts where evidence is too scarce to yield a reliable confidence 
judgment as a basis for expected utility computation. This uncertainty-dependent modulation 
strength hypothesis could be easily tested by appraising the magnitude of confidence distortions 
in more or less ambiguous contexts (regarding probability of success). A second, more pragmatic 
and present-oriented reason to take a closer look at the consequences of stakes-induced 
confidence distortions is that it might motivate a leveraging of this phenomenon at a public-policy 
level, in order to modulate confidence in under- or over-confident populations and eventually 
promote or refrain audacious, or risky, behaviours. 
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Methods 
 
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee for Biomedical Research of the Pitié-
Salpêtrière Hospital and carried out in accordance with French guidelines and regulations. 
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the Relais d’Information en Sciences Cognitives (RISC) 
volunteer database and screened for exclusion criteria: age below 18 or above 39; left-
handedness; regular use of drugs or medications; history of psychiatric or neurological 
disorders. 
A total of 81 healthy participants were recruited. All participants gave informed consent prior to 
partaking in the study.  
Experiment 1 
24 participants were recruited (12 M, aged 23.6 ± 3.2 years). They were endowed 20€ at the 
beginning of the experimental session, and could obtain monetary gains or incur losses across 
the experiment, depending on their choices, on their performance at the task (based on motor 
precision) and on the pseudo-random draws of the computer among completed trials (which, 
unbeknownst to the participants, were biased such that they could not incur large losses 
overall).  If participants incurred more losses than gains overall, their final payment was raised 
back to 20€ (this was not disclosed to the participants before the end of the session), or 
unchanged otherwise. Their final compensation was 22.4€ on average (range [20.0; 33.9] €). 
Experiment 2 
23 participants were recruited, two of which were excluded before data analysis [one failed to 
perform the task correctly, one fell asleep during the experiment] (10 M, aged 24.9 ± 3.9 years in 
the remaining sample, N = 21). The payment procedure was similar to that in Experiment 1, the 
main difference here being that participants received an additional bonus from random draws in 
a subsequent lottery task (see details below). Participants’ final compensation was 26.4€ on 
average (range [21.5; 30.1] €). 
Experiment 3 
10 participants were recruited for a behavioural pilot (5 M, aged 24.5 ± 3.6 years). The payment 
procedure was similar to that in Experiment 2 (see details below). Participants’ final 
compensation was 27.9€ on average (range [25.0; 30.9] €). 
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24 participants were recruited for the fMRI task (13 M, aged 24.8 ± 3.6 years). Although they 
were told that they were endowed an initial 50€ and could win or lose up to that same amount 
depending on their performance at the precision task (with an additional bonus of up to 5€ for 
their accuracy at predicting their performance, and another bonus from the random draws of a 
subsequent lottery task), they were eventually paid a fixed amount of 75€ regardless of their 
performance or the outcome of the draws.  
 
Apparatus 
We programmed all tasks and data analyses with MATLAB (MathWorks ®) and used the 
Psychophysics Toolbox 3.0 (Kleiner et al., 2007) for stimuli presentation. Choices and ratings 
were made using a standard keyboard (or an MRI-compatible response device in Experiment 3 – 
fMRI task). Grip force was measured with a hand dynamometer (Software and Technology, 
Beaverton, Oregon, USA) interfaced with Matlab so as to readout force in Newtons (or a custom-
made MRI-compatible pneumatic dynamometer in Experiment 3 – fMRI task). 
 
 
fMRI data acquisition 
Functional echo-planar images (EPIs) were acquired with a T2*-weighted contrast on a 3 T 
magnetic resonance scanner (Siemens Trio). Interleaved 2 mm slices with a 2.5 mm interslice 
spacing and oriented along a 60° tilted plane were acquired in a multi-band fashion (factor 3) to 
cover the whole brain with a repetition time of 1100 ms. The first three scans were discarded to 
allow for equilibration effects. All analyses were performed using the Statistical Parametric 
Mapping toolbox (SPM12, version 7219, Wellcome Trust Center for NeuroImaging, London, UK). 
Structural T1-weighted images were coregistered with the mean EPI, segmented, and 
normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) T1 template. During pre-
processing, EPIs were spatially realigned, normalized (using the same transformation as for 
structural images), and smoothed with an 8 mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel. 
 
 
Experimental design 
Experiment1 
After giving their informed consent, participants read detailed written instructions about the 
tasks to be completed. It was explained to them that they were endowed 20€ at the beginning of 
the session, and could win or lose money depending on their motor precision, the choices they 
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would make, and their luck during the experiment. Next, they went through an extensive 
calibration phase during which they gradually learned to perform the required movement and 
received feedback about their motor accuracy. Specifically, the calibration phase comprised the 
following stages: 
1) Measurement of individual maximal voluntary contraction, or ‘fMax’; 3 trials. 
Participants were instructed to squeeze the dynamometer, or ‘handgrip’, with their right 
hand, as hard as possible. They were given online visual feedback about the exerted 
force, in the form of a fluid level moving up and down in a virtual thermometer depicted 
on the computer screen. The maximal force value recorded over their three attempts was 
set as their reference maximal force, or ‘fMax’, for the rest of the session (unless they 
overshot that value later on, in which case that new maximal value was set as the new 
fMax). 
 
2) First stage of motor calibration, or ‘Grip 1’; 15 trials. Participants were instructed to 
briefly squeeze the handgrip so as to produce an impulsion lasting less than 400 ms, the 
peak of which should land within a force range displayed as a green area within the 
thermometer. Although the size of the target could vary, it was always centered on 40% 
of their maximal force. They were given online feedback about their exerted force in the 
form of a fluctuating fluid level, as well as offline feedback as a Force against Time plot 
displayed to the right of the thermometer (similar to Fig. 1b plots), which was 
accompanied with explicit written feedback about their performance (‘Success’, ‘Too 
strong’, ‘Too weak’, or ‘Too slow’). 
 
3) Second stage of motor calibration, or ‘Grip 2’; 15 trials. This stage was similar to the 
previous one, except that this time, no online visual feedback was delivered (a static 
green and red thermometer was displayed during the movement). The offline feedback 
plot was still displayed after their movement was completed. 
 
4) Third stage of motor calibration, or ‘Grip 3’; 15 trials. This stage was similar to the 
previous one, except that no target was displayed during movement execution. Upon 
presentation of a ‘Squeeze!’ cue (the same as in later testing trials), participants would 
squeeze the handgrip and try to be as close as possible to 40% fMax (which was referred 
to them as “the same force level as previously”). They were still given offline feedback. 
 
5) Fourth stage of motor calibration, or ‘Grip 4’; 30 trials. This stage was similar to the 
previous one, except that no offline feedback was given to the participants about their 
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movement. Unbeknownst to them, the aim of this stage was to sample their peak force 
distribution so as to compute the target size corresponding to a 50% success rate. 
 
6) Confidence calibration; 30 trials. This stage was similar to the previous one, except that a 
thermometer with a green target (whose size was fixed and corresponded to a 50% 
probability of success, cf. 5)) was displayed instead of the ‘Squeeze!’ cue, and 
participants were instructed to aim at this target. After completing all trials, they were 
prompted to estimate their success rate, by positioning a cursor along a pseudo-analog 
scale ranging from 0% to 100% (with an additional 50% reference tick). Upon validation 
of their estimate, their actual success rate was disclosed to them, along with a Peak force 
vs Trial number plot, which depicted their motor variability and drift over 30 trials 
without feedback. 
 
Once they were calibrated, participants began the testing trials, which were split into a CHOICE 
phase (100 trials) and a CONFIDENCE phase (200 trials). Before each phase, they received 
additional written instructions and performed 4 training trials identical to the subsequent 
testing trials, in order to familiarize themselves with the series of tasks. Even-numbered subjects 
started with the CHOICE phase whereas odd-numbered subjects did the opposite. 
 
CHOICE phase 
Each trial comprised four steps:  
1) A fixation cross was displayed for 3 s at the center of the screen 
2) The difficulty of the proposed motor challenge was depicted in the form of a 
thermometer with a green target (which represented, as in the calibration phase, the 
range of force around 40% fMax to aim at) varying in size across trials. Unbeknownst to 
the participants, the size of the target was such that the corresponding probability of 
success was one of the following: {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}, and was pseudo-randomly sampled 
such that each Probability x Gain x Loss level combination was presented once over the 
CHOICE phase, and Probability, Gain and Loss factors were varied orthogonally. The 
matching target sizes were re-adjusted every 20 trials so as to be in line with the 
participant’s recent history of motor precision. On either side of the thermometer were 
displayed the pictures of the monetary gain in case of success at the motor challenge (in 
a green frame) and loss in case of failure (in a red frame). Gains and losses were pseudo-
randomly sampled among the following values: {1, 5, 10, 20, 50} €. The side of gain 
versus loss was randomized across trials. This screen was displayed for 4 s. 
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3) Participants accepted or declined the motor challenge (and the associated monetary 
stakes) by selecting ‘YES’ or ‘NO’ with standard keyboard arrows. There was no 
constraint on their response time. 
4) Upon presentation of the ‘Squeeze!’ cue, they were required to squeeze the handgrip. If 
they had accepted the motor challenge, they attempted to execute the movement as 
required and to hit the target. In any case, they did not receive any feedback about their 
motor output. At this stage, regardless of their choice or their motor performance, their 
cumulative payment remained unchanged. 
 
Random draw 
As announced to the participants, after all CHOICE trials were completed, 5 of them were 
randomly drawn by the computer, and the corresponding monetary outcomes (gains or losses if 
they had accepted the motor challenge, 0 if they had declined it) were revealed to the 
participant, then averaged, and that average outcome was added — or subtracted — to their 
cumulative payment.  
 
CONFIDENCE phase 
Two types of trials occurred (in equal proportion but in random order) in this phase: PRIOR 
confidence rating and POSTERIOR confidence rating trials. In either case, each trial comprised 4 
steps. The first 2 steps were identical to CHOICE trials, and the order of steps 3) and 4) differed 
between PRIOR and POSTERIOR trials. For PRIOR trials: 
3) After they were presented with the difficulty of the motor challenge and the magnitude 
of the attached monetary stakes (step 2), they were prompted to estimate their a priori 
chances of success, i.e., their subjective probability of hitting the target in their upcoming 
attempt. This rating was made by positioning a cursor along a pseudo-analog horizontal 
scale ranging from 0% to 100% (with a middle 50% tick). There was no constraint on 
their response time. 
4) Upon appearance of the ‘Squeeze!’ cue, they squeezed the handgrip and attempted to hit 
the target previously shown. They did not receive any feedback about their motor 
output. At this stage, regardless of their motor performance, their cumulative payment 
remained unchanged. 
For POSTERIOR trials, step 4) consisted in rating their a posteriori chances of success, i.e., their 
subjective probability of having just hit the target, in a similar fashion to step 3) of PRIOR trials. 
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Random draw 
As announced to the participants, after all CONFIDENCE trials were completed, 10 of them were 
randomly drawn by the computer, and the corresponding monetary outcomes (gains or losses, 
depending on whether they had hit the target) were revealed, then averaged, and that average 
outcome was added — or subtracted — to their cumulative payment.  
 
Recalibration 
Every 100 trials across CHOICE and CONFIDENCE phases, participants went through a short 
recalibration procedure designed to help them stay in line with the average force peak required 
of them (40% fMax), and to give them feedback on their actual success rate as well as their 
motor variability and drift across trials. This recalibration comprised 10 trials identical to ‘Grip 
3’ trials of the calibration phase, followed by a stage identical to the ‘Confidence’ calibration 
stage (see above). 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was similar in design to Experiment 1. Participants gave their informed consent, 
received similar instructions and went through the same calibration procedure before beginning 
the testing phase. The differing features were:  
- A focus on prior confidence estimates: the testing phase comprised 270 trials, all of 
PRIOR CONFIDENCE type (see nomenclature above). 
- Some of these trials were gain-only (failure at the motor challenge would result in no 
loss) or loss-only (success would result in no gain). All three types of trials were 
randomly interleaved across the testing phase. 
- Gain/Loss magnitudes proposed across trials were: {5c, 50c, 2€, 10€, 50€}. The 
probability levels according to which the size of the target was set were: {0.35, 0.45, 0.55, 
0.65, 0.75, 0.85}. The average probability of success was thus raised to .6 in order to 
ensure a positive expected value of the motor challenge, and to preserve participants’ 
general motivation over the experiment. Each Gain x Loss x Probability combination was 
proposed once over the testing phase (150 ‘gain & loss’ trials), and each Gain x 
Probability or Loss x Probability combination was proposed twice (60 ‘gain-only’ and 60 
‘loss-only’ trials). 
- The total 270 testing trials were split into 3 blocks of 90 trials interleaved with 3-minute 
breaks followed by a recalibration (identical to Experiment 1). Each block comprised 9 
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“games” of 10 trials. After completing each game, the average monetary outcome over its 
10 trials was disclosed to the subject. 
- After all 270 trials were completed, one of the 27 games was randomly drawn by the 
computer, the average monetary outcome over its 10 trials was added (or subtracted) to 
the participant’s initial endowment (20€). 
- The main testing phase was followed by a ‘Lottery’ phase, which aimed to measure 
idiosyncratic loss aversion. This phase consisted of 90 trials in which participants were 
presented with a binary choice between a risky lottery with 50% chances of gain 
(varying in magnitude across trials) and 50% of loss (variable too), and a certain option 
with 100% chances of a smaller gain. The magnitude of gain and loss outcomes attached 
to the lottery was adjusted across trials following a staircase procedure, so as to ensure 
proximity to each subject’s indifference curve and to optimize the subsequent estimation 
of individual loss aversion parameters. To make monetary outcomes more incentivizing, 
10% of trials were covertly selected in advance and the corresponding choice was 
executed immediately after being made, i.e., a “Selected trial” warning appeared on 
screen upon choice validation, then, if the risky lottery had been chosen, a virtual coin 
was flipped and the outcome was kept hidden but was stored by the computer. At the 
end of the Lottery phase, the outcomes of the 9 selected trials were averaged and added 
(or subtracted) to the participant’s final payment. 
 
Experiment 3  
In this experiment, we tested two groups of healthy participants. The Pilot group was tested 
first, and allowed us to confirm the viability of our experimental design for subsequent fMRI 
data acquisition. Both groups went through the same series of task, but the Pilot group remained 
in the behavioural testing room (thus, we only acquired behavioural data), whereas the fMRI 
group performed all testing trials in an fMRI scanner. Overall, the design of Experiment 3 was 
similar to that of Experiment 2, except for the following features: 
- For design efficiency, all testing trials involved two-sided monetary stakes, that is, a non-
zero gain in case of success, and a non-zero loss in case of failure (i.e. all trials were of 
“gain & loss” type). 
- The probability levels according to which the size of the target was set were: {0.36, 0.48, 
0.60, 0.72, 0.84}. Each Gain x Loss x Probability combination was proposed twice over 
the testing phase, in a pseudo-random order. 
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- The duration of the fixation cross preceding the display of the target and monetary 
stakes was randomly sampled from a uniform [0.5; 4.5] s distribution. We additionally 
inserted a waiting screen of variable duration (sampled from a uniform [0; 4] s 
distribution) between the validation of the confidence rating and the onset of the 
‘Squeeze!’ cue. This was 1) to make the trial events’ onset less predictable (and the 
overall session less monotonous), 2) to minimize correlation (as well as auto-
correlation) between the timecourses of our several independent variables of interest 
(e.g.  the onset/offset of monetary stakes, and the onset of the movement) as well as 
inadvertent correlation of these timecourses with periodic signal fluctuations of non-
interest (e.g. due to physiological functions), which would be detrimental in subsequent 
analyses of fMRI data. 
- The design of the ‘Squeeze!’ cue was simplified (reduced to its text component), and its 
onset was preceded (t – 500 ms) with the onset of a grey square, which cued participants 
to get ready for the motor execution.  
- Due to time constraints on fMRI acquisition time, a time limit was set on confidence 
ratings (< 5 s between scale onset and rating confirmation) and on motor execution (< 5 
s between the onset of the ‘Squeeze!’ cue and movement initiation). 
- For half the testing trials in the Pilot group, and all testing trials in the fMRI group, the 
motor target was centered on 25% fMax. Participants in the pilot group were notified of 
this shift at the middle of the session and re-calibrated on the new force level before 
proceeding with the trials. 
- In the fMRI group, participants went through a preliminary recalibration phase in the 
scanner, even before the beginning of testing trials, in order to re-sample their maximal 
force and to help them stay aligned with the desired force level after they had changed 
environment and body position. 
- The 250 testing trials were split into 5 blocks (or ‘runs’ in fMRI terminology) of 5 ‘games’ 
of 10 trials each. At the end of each block, participants were informed of their success 
rate over the 50 trials they had just completed. 
 
 
Behavioural analysis 
For each dataset, we performed a logistic regression of the binary Success variable. The 
inverted model was: 
𝑃(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) =
1
1 + exp (−(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠))
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with 𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) the expected probability of success (computed based on the 
target size and individual motor output in recent trials), 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 the level of prospective gain to be 
obtained in case of success (coded from 1 to 5), and 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 the level of prospective loss to be 
incurred in case of failure. The 𝛽𝑖 parameters are the linear coefficients of each regressor. 
We first obtained an estimate of each 𝛽 parameter for each subject, using Matlab’s glmfit.  
We next performed a group-level random-effects analysis by applying a Student t-test to each 
group vector of 𝛽 parameters. 
Additionally, for each subject, we inverted a simple Generalized Linear Model (GLM) of 
prior confidence ratings: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 
We also inverted a similar model augmented with the corresponding interaction terms, 
which were orthogonalized to the main terms.  We next performed a group-level random-effects 
analysis by applying a Student t-test to each group vector of 𝛽 parameters. 
Finally, in Experiments 2 & 3, we estimated individual loss aversion by inverting, with 
the help of the Variational Bayesian Algorithm (VBA) toolbox(Daunizeau et al., 2014), the 
following model of choices made during the lottery task: 
𝑃(𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦) =
1
1 + exp (− (𝐵0 + 𝐵1 ∗ (𝐸𝑈𝐿𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 − 𝐸𝑈𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)))
 
with 𝐸𝑈𝐿𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 = 𝑃(𝑊𝑖𝑛) ∗ 𝐺𝐿𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 − 𝑃(𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒) ∗ 𝜆 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 
and 𝐸𝑈𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐺𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
where 𝑃(𝑊𝑖𝑛) (resp. 𝑃(𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑒)) is the probability to win (resp. lose) at the lottery (fixed 
at 0.5), 𝐺𝐿𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 (resp. 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦) is the amount of money that can be won (resp. lost) at the lottery, 
𝜆 is the loss aversion parameter, quantifying the relative weight of potential losses compared to 
potential gains in expected utility (EU) computations (as in(Tom et al., 2007)), and 𝐺𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is 
the amount of reward guaranteed by the alternative, safe option. 
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fMRI analysis 
 
Massively univariate approach 
Preprocessed individual time series were regressed for each voxel against the following GLMs. All 
GLMs included three separate categorical regressors for the main events of the task: a 3.5 s boxcar 
regressor for the display of challenge difficulty and stakes, a variable-duration boxcar regressor from 
onset to validation of the confidence rating, and a stick regressor (null duration) for the onset of the 
squeezing movement. In the first GLM, the prospect-display regressor was parametrically modulated 
by the expected probability of success (as computed by our algorithm), the prospective gain level, and 
the prospective loss level. In the second GLM, that same regressor was instead modulated by the 
expected value of the challenge, that is: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 + (1 –  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠, with 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 
and 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 cardinally encoded. In all GLMs, the confidence regressor was parametrically modulated by 
the given confidence rating, and the motor onset regressor was modulated by the peak of the produced 
force curve. 
All regressors were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function of SPM12. To 
correct for motion artefacts, participant-specific realignment parameters were modelled as covariates 
of no interest. Regression coefficients were estimated at the individual level using the restricted 
maximum-likelihood estimation. Linear contrasts of regression coefficients were computed at the 
participant level and then taken to group-level random effect analyses, using one-sample t-tests. 
Statistical maps were family-wise corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level. 
 
 
Multivariate approach 
With the help of The Decoding Toolbox(Hebart et al., 2015), we performed a region-of-interest 
(ROI) multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) with a leave-one-run-out cross-validation approach, to 
decode high versus low confidence ratings (median-split for each participant) and high versus low 
stake value (gain – loss, median-split) based on individual spatially MNI-normalized but non-smoothed 
BOLD activity of voxels included in the ROI, using a linear support vector machine algorithm. The ROI 
was an 8 mm-radius sphere centered on the vmPFC peak coordinates ([0 40 -12]) from a meta-
analysis of value representation(Bartra et al., 2013). For each subject, we thus obtained a vector of 
weights (for each voxel in the ROI) for high versus low confidence decoding, and another vector for 
high versus low stake value decoding. Finally, we computed inter-voxel correlation between these two 
vectors, which provided us with an individual metric of pattern similarity between value and 
confidence encoding. 
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 Abstract 
 
When making a decision about whether or not to accept a challenge, agents must estimate both 
their chance of success and the benefits associated with success. According to prevailing decision 
theories, these confidence and value estimates should be constructed independently. Here, we 
question this independence axiom, based on functional neuroimaging studies reporting that value 
and confidence representations overlap in the same brain system. We predicted that the human 
brain would misattribute value judgments about the context with confidence judgments about the 
behaviour (or vice-versa). In our experiment, healthy volunteers answered more or less difficult 
quiz questions while listening to more or less pleasant musical extracts. In addition to this baseline 
task, they performed either confidence ratings about their answers or likeability ratings about the 
music. As predicted, explicit ratings were reciprocally influenced by incidental factors 
manipulating value and confidence, violating the independence axiom of decision theory.  
However, a follow-up experiment indicated that the confidence-to-value influence was more 
robust than the value-to-confidence influence, denoting as more intrusive the judgment about the 
behaviour being correct, and/or more malleable the judgment about the environment being 
pleasant.  
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A classical formalization of decision-making that has dominated economic studies for 
several decades is expected utility theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Friedman & 
Savage, 1952). At the core of this theory is the principle, originally suggested by Blaise Pascal 
(Pascal, 1670), that the optimal course of action is the one that maximizes the product of value 
and probability, summed over all potential outcomes. Thus, the maximization principle assumes 
that when considering an action, the agent must envisage all potential outcomes, and estimate for 
each outcome its value (how pleasurable) and its probability (how plausible, given the action). A 
key assumption here is that value and probability are estimated independently from each other. 
The maximization principle, along with the independence axiom, are still at the heart of modern 
decision theories, even those which include both stochasticity and systematic distortions in the 
estimation of value and probability (Cane & Luce, 1960; Becker et al., 1963; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979b).  
Here, we question the independence axiom in the case where the outcome depends upon 
the agent’s behaviour. In this case, the (subjective) probability of obtaining the outcome is the 
(subjective) probability that the behaviour is correct, which is a standard definition of confidence 
(Fleming & Lau, 2014).  What we question is therefore the independence of value and confidence 
estimates. The motivation for this question comes from recent neuroimaging studies in decision 
neuroscience. Meta-analyses of functional MRI studies have identified the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) as a central node of the so-called “brain valuation system”, which 
signals values expressed as likeability judgments or as preferences in binary choices (Peters & 
Büchel, 2010; Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014).  More recently, it has been 
demonstrated that the vmPFC also signals confidence in the behavioural response, whether this 
response is a choice or a judgment (De Martino et al., 2012; Lebreton et al., 2015; Morales et al., 
2018). These findings raise the intriguing possibility that a brain system reading out the vmPFC 
output may mistake value for confidence and vice-versa. 
 Other functional properties of value neural signals may shape our expectations about a 
putative interplay between value and confidence. A first property is anticipation, meaning that 
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baseline vmPFC activity has an impact on subsequent value estimates (Abitbol et al., 2015; 
Vinckier et al., 2018). A second property is generality, meaning that the vmPFC represents the 
value of items pertaining to different categories, such as money, food or music (Chib et al., 2009; 
Abitbol et al., 2015), in accordance with the notion of a common neural currency used to arbitrate 
between seemingly incommensurable options (Levy & Glimcher, 2012). A third property is 
automaticity, meaning that the vmPFC signals the value of attended items even when they are 
irrelevant to the task at hand (Lebreton et al., 2009; Levy & Glimcher, 2011). All of these properties 
have been replicated in the case of value representation, but they might also apply to confidence, 
as suggested by recent reports (De Martino et al., 2012; Lebreton et al., 2015; Morales et al., 2018). 
Taken together, these properties make the prediction that a value judgment may distort a 
subsequent confidence judgment (or vice-versa), even when it relates to an incidental item from 
a different category and irrelevant to the ongoing task. In other words, we should expect not only 
some correlation between value and confidence estimates, but also some misattribution, the value 
of a particular contextual feature affecting the confidence in an unrelated behavioural response 
(or vice-versa). 
The present study aims at exploring the possibility of an interplay between value and 
confidence judgments. To our knowledge, this specific type of misattribution has not been 
investigated so far. Nevertheless, several cases of contamination between logically unrelated 
judgments have been well documented in psychology studies. Many cases have been subsumed 
under the term “halo effect”, coined by Edward Thorndike (Thorndike, 1920), to describe the 
correlations between judgments about personality traits of the same valence. The idea is that a 
positive trait seems to confer the person a magical aura that calls for other positive judgments. 
For instance, experiments have shown that attractiveness and trustworthiness judgments 
assigned to series of face pictures are typically correlated (Langlois et al., 2000; Todorov et al., 
2008; Palmer & Peterson, 2016). Yet the notion of trustworthiness, attached to the face stimulus, 
is different from our notion of confidence, which qualifies participants’ perception of their own 
behaviour. Other cases of contamination, closer to an interplay between value and confidence, 
Chapter IV: Article 3 
166 
 
have been subsumed under the term “desirability bias”. This term designates the propensity to 
inflate probability estimates of future events in proportion to their desirability (Krizan & 
Windschitl, 2007; Giardini et al., 2008; Scherer et al., 2012; Lench et al., 2014; Tappin et al., 2017). 
When these future events are behavioural outcomes (success or failure), then the desirability bias 
is evidence for a contamination between value and confidence.  
Yet the effects mentioned above concern value and confidence estimates assigned to a 
same entity: a person for the halo effect, or an event for the desirability bias. However, we intend 
to test whether the misattribution phenomenon generalizes to value and confidence estimates 
attached to different and logically-independent items. In addition, the desirability bias has been 
observed when manipulating the expected benefit of behavioural performance and collecting self-
reports of confidence. This corresponds to an influence of expected value on confidence ratings 
(subjective probability of success). Nothing in our working hypothesis, based on vmPFC 
properties, indicates that causality should only go this way, so we also intend to test the influence 
of confidence on value judgment.  
Another line of research explored the covariations of value and confidence at longer time 
scales, from days to months. At such time scales, likeability or desirability are not attached to any 
event in particular, but rather are assimilated to mood. According to a psychological phenomenon 
sometimes called the “rosy outlook”, good mood can bias economic decisions (e.g., people gamble 
more in periods of nicer weather) (Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003; Kamstra et al., 
2003; Otto et al., 2016). Consistently, sad mood has been associated with lower confidence, and 
joyful mood with overconfidence (Briñol et al., 2007; Moore & Fresco, 2012; Koellinger & Treffers, 
2015; Rouault et al., 2018). These correlations are also observed in clinical conditions, confidence 
being lower during depressive episodes and higher in manic episodes (Johnson, 2005). Here, we 
intend to assess whether the putative contamination between value and confidence estimates can 
occur at a much shorter time scale, compatible with the formation of value and confidence 
representations observed with fMRI in the vmPFC. This corresponds to the duration of a typical 
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trial in fMRI studies (a few seconds), from the onset of a stimulus with variable value to the 
response given with variable confidence.  
We therefore opted for experimental situations that are known to vary value and 
confidence representations in the vmPFC on a trial-by-trial basis. We manipulated value 
representations by playing more or less pleasant background music, and confidence 
representations by presenting more or less difficult multiple-choice questions. The musical 
extracts and quiz questions had been employed in previous fMRI studies and shown to modulate 
vmPFC activity (Abitbol et al., 2015; Vinckier et al., 2018). To assess causal influence in both ways, 
we implemented two conditions:  one in which we recorded value (likeability) judgments about 
the background music, one in which we recorded confidence judgments about the responses given 
to quiz questions. Thus, the value and confidence (independent) factors were varied in both cases, 
but the recorded (dependent) variables differed, allowing us to assess the two causal pathways.  
To recapitulate, we exploited the functional properties of the vmPFC: anticipation, because 
value and confidence factors are expected to affect subsequent value or confidence judgments; 
generality, because background music and quiz questions are related to distinct domains; 
automaticity, because there was no request of explicit value or confidence judgment for the 
incidental factor. Our neuroscience-based perspective on misattribution between value and 
confidence makes the following predictions: 1) it should occur even when value and confidence 
judgments concern unrelated stimulus and response; 2) it should go both ways, from valuation to 
confidence and vice-versa; 3) it should be observed at a short timescale, corresponding to one task 
trial (a few seconds).   
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Results 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we had participants complete a control session, followed by an 
interference session one month later (see Fig. 1 for an overview of the experimental design). In 
the control session, participants completed a likeability rating task (‘Like’) in which they reported 
how much they liked various musical extracts that were played in their headset (see Methods for 
details about task design), and a confidence rating task (‘Conf’) in which they answered various 
general-knowledge quiz questions and reported how sure they were about their answer. This 
control session was meant to verify that group-averaged judgments of likeability and confidence 
were good predictors of individual judgments on the same items. If verified, then individual 
judgments on the incidental factor are unnecessary, so further experiments can skip the control 
session, and test the interference directly. In the interference session, participants completed two 
tasks which both involved answering to quiz questions while hearing musical extracts. In this 
session, since participants were simultaneously exposed to a context of varying pleasantness and 
to questions of varying difficulty, likeability and confidence judgments would be concurrently 
generated and thus susceptible to interfering with each other. In one of these tasks (‘LIKE’), 
participants additionally made likeability ratings about the musical extracts they had heard, while 
in the other task (‘CONF’), they additionally made confidence ratings about their answers to the 
quiz question. 
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Fig. 1: Task design in Experiment 1.  
Experiment 1 comprised two sessions: a control session (tasks a. and b.), followed by an interference session one 
month later (tasks c. and d.). All subjects performed the four tasks. Two different sets of music extracts and quiz 
questions were used in top and bottom tasks (a.c. and b.d.). 
a. ‘Like’ task. On each trial of this control task, subjects listened to a musical extract and reported how much they 
liked it. For each subject, the same set of 128 musical extracts played in this task would be played again in 
task c. 
b. ‘Conf’ task. On each trial of this control task, subjects answered a quiz question by choosing one out of 4 
possible answers, then reported their confidence in the correctness of their answer, and were finally given a 
feedback about this answer. For each subject, the same set of 128 quiz questions asked in this task would be 
asked again in task d. 
c. ‘CONF’ task. On each trial of this interference task, subjects answered a quiz question while a musical extract 
(from task a. set) played in their headset, after which they reported their confidence in the correctness of 
their answer. 
d. ‘LIKE’ task. On each trial of this interference task, subjects answered a quiz question (from task b. set) while a 
musical extract played in their headset, after which they reported how much they liked the musical extract 
and received a feedback about their answer to the quiz question. 
The horizontal dashed-line arrows represent the pairing of musical extracts or quiz questions set between tasks a. 
and c. and between tasks b. and d. 
 
Chapter IV: Article 3 
170 
 
For each task, we fitted individual ratings with a linear model, using sigmoidal 
transformation for a projection to the bounded scale. This model included likely modulators of the 
ratings, as well as potentially confounding factors, all regressors being z-scored. In the ‘Conf’ task 
(Fig. 2a), we observed a positive effect (?̅? = .13, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 06 ; .20], 𝑡(17) = 3.8, 𝑝 = .0015) of the 
initial position of the rating cursor on individual confidence ratings (‘CR(t)’), a close-to-significant 
positive relationship (?̅? = .06, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.05 ; .13],   𝑡(17) =  1.9, 𝑝 = .067) with the rating made 
on the previous trial (‘CR(t-1)’), and no relationship (?̅? = −.02, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.07 ; .03], 𝑡(17) = −.85,
𝑝 = .41) with the feedback given on the previous trial (‘Feedback(t-1)’). As could be expected, we 
also observed a strong positive relationship (?̅? = .28, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 19 ; .37],   𝑡(17) = 6.6, 𝑝 < 10−5) 
between confidence ratings and the correctness of the participant’s answer (‘Success(t)’), and a 
strong negative relationship (?̅? = −.40, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.54 ; −.26], 𝑡(17) = −5.9, 𝑝 = 1.6 ∙ 10−5) with 
the response time (‘RT(t)’). Crucially, we found a strong positive relationship (?̅? =  .31, 𝐶𝐼 =
[. 23 ;  .39],   𝑡(17) = 8.1, 𝑝 < 10−6) with the confidence ratings averaged across all other subjects 
(‘avgCR(t)’), which suggests that average confidence ratings were a good proxy for individual 
confidence judgments.  
In the ‘Like’ task (Fig. 2b) , we found no significant effect (?̅? =. 𝟎𝟒, 𝑪𝑰 = [−. 𝟎𝟒 ;  . 𝟏𝟏],
𝒕(𝟏𝟕) = 𝟏. 𝟏, 𝒑 =. 𝟐𝟗) of the initial position of the rating cursor (‘cursorInit(t)’) on individual 
likeability ratings (‘LR(t)’), and a small but significantly positive relationship (?̅? =. 𝟎𝟕, 𝑪𝑰 =
[. 𝟎𝟏 ;  . 𝟏𝟐], 𝒕(𝟏𝟕) = 𝟐. 𝟓, 𝒑 =. 𝟎𝟐) with the rating made on previous trial (‘LR(t-1)’). More 
importantly, we found a strong positive relationship (?̅? =. 𝟔𝟔, 𝑪𝑰 = [. 𝟓𝟏 ; . 𝟖𝟐], 𝒕(𝟏𝟕) = 𝟗. 𝟏,
𝒑 < 𝟏𝟎−𝟕) between individual likeability ratings and likeability ratings averaged across all other 
subjects (‘avgLR(t)’), which demonstrates that subjects tended to have similar taste for music, and 
that average likeability ratings were a good proxy for individual likeability judgments.   
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Fig. 2: Logistic regression of individual ratings made during Control phase of Experiment 1  
 
a.  Left: box plot illustrates the group distribution of beta coefficients in the logistic regression of 
individual confidence ratings made during ‘Conf’ task. See Methods for details about regressors. 
Right: individual confidence ratings (subjective probability of being correct, between 0 and 1) 
are plotted against confidence ratings averaged across all other subjects (made during ‘Conf’ 
and ‘CONF’ tasks). For each subject, trials were binned according to the average confidence 
rating about the given quiz question. Each dot represents the confidence ratings averaged within 
each bin and across all subjects. The vertical error bars represent the standard error to the 
mean (SEM) of confidence ratings. The horizontal error bars (hidden, smaller than the central 
dots) represent the SEM of average likeability ratings. The continuous curve represents the 
model fit, averaged across participants, and the shaded area corresponds to the SEM of this 
model fit. ?̅? = 0.31, 𝑝 < 10−6. 
b.  Left: box plot illustrates the group distribution of beta coefficients in the logistic regression of 
individual likeability ratings made during ‘Like’ task. Right: individual likeability ratings 
(normalized to an analog scale between -1 and +1) are plotted against likeability ratings 
averaged across all other subjects (made during ‘Like’ and ‘LIKE’ tasks). ?̅? = 0.66, 𝑝 < 10−7. 
Binning and fitting were done using the same procedures as in panel a. 
 
* : p < 0.05;  **  : p < 0.01;  *** : p < 0.001  
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Thus, analysis of the control session indicated that some potential artifacts, such as the 
initial cursor position, should be regressed out. It also showed some remanence of the ratings 
made during previous trials, and some expected effects such as quiz performance (correctness and 
response time) affecting confidence. Finally, it confirmed that average ratings of a given item were 
good proxies for individual ratings. We next proceeded to the analysis of the interference session, 
using the same regression model, augmented with the factors related to the concurrent 
manipulation (quiz difficulty for likeability ratings, and music pleasantness for confidence 
ratings).  
In the ‘CONF’ task (Fig. 3a), we observed no impact of the initial position of the cursor on 
the rating scale on individual confidence ratings (?̅? = .06, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.02 ; .14], 𝑡(17) = 1.6, 𝑝 = .12), 
and no relationship (?̅? = .03, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.04 ; .11], 𝑡(17) = .84, 𝑝 = .41) with the rating made on the 
previous trial.  As expected, we again observed a strong positive relationship (?̅? = .33, 𝐶𝐼 =
[. 23 ; .43], 𝑡(17) = 6.9, 𝑝 < 10−5) with the correctness of the participant’s answer, a strong 
negative relationship (?̅? = −.34, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.45 ; −.23], 𝑡(17) = −6.6, 𝑝 < 10−5) with the response 
time, and a strong positive relationship (?̅? = .32, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 24 ; .41], 𝑡(17) = 8.5, 𝑝 < 10−6) with the 
confidence ratings averaged across all other subjects. Critically, we found a significant positive 
effect (?̅? = .07, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 02 ; .11], 𝑡(17) = 2.8, 𝑝 = .012) of the average likeability of the background 
musical extracts on confidence ratings, with no effect (?̅? = .02, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.04 ; .07], 𝑡(17) = .67, 𝑝 =
.51) of the average likeability of the previous musical extract. Thus, the value of an unrelated 
contextual feature (background music) seemed to affect confidence in the reponse to the ongoing 
forced-choice trial. 
In the ‘LIKE’ task (Fig. 3b), the initial position of the cursor on the rating scale (?̅? =
.10, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 05 ;  .14], 𝑡(17) = 4.5, 𝑝 = 3.0 ∙ 10−4), as well as the likeability rating averaged across 
all other subjects (?̅? = .55, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 40 ;  .69], 𝑡(17) = 8.0, 𝑝 < 10−6), were positively related to the 
individual likeability ratings. In addition, we also observed a positive relationship with the rating 
made (?̅? = .08, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 03 ; .14], 𝑡(17) = 3.5, 𝑝 = .0027) and the feedback received (?̅? = .06, 𝐶𝐼 =
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[. 01 ;  .12], 𝑡(17) = 2.7, 𝑝 = .015) on the previous trial. Critically, we found a significant positive 
effect (?̅? = .05, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 01 ; .09], 𝑡(17) = 2.7, 𝑝 = .017) of the average confidence triggered by 
answering a given quiz question on the contiguous likeability rating, while we found no effect (?̅? =
−.004, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.05 ; .04], 𝑡(17) = −.19, 𝑝 = .85) of the average confidence about the previous quiz 
question. Thus, the confidence in unrelated task performance did seem to affect the value assigned 
to the background context of the ongoing trial.  
Having found evidence for the predicted contamination between value and confidence in 
both directions, we tested for a possible carry-over effect across tasks. We found no influence of 
the order in which subjects had performed the two interference tasks on the size of the 
contamination in any direction: i.e., subjects who first performed the ‘LIKE’ task and then the 
‘CONF’ task did not show a stronger influence of contextual likeability onto confidence ratings 
((𝛽𝐿𝐼𝐾𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) =  −0.076, 𝑡(16) = −1.7, 𝑝 = 0.94, in a one-tailed t-test), nor did 
subjects who performed ‘CONF’ before ‘LIKE’ show a stronger influence of confidence onto 
likeability judgments ((𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝛽𝐿𝐼𝐾𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) = 0.032, 𝑡(16) = 0.81, 𝑝 =0.21, one-tailed t-
test). This precludes the possibility that the misattribution effect observed at group-level would 
be driven by some behavioural perseveration (subjects reporting the first-rated dimension in 
their second task ratings). 
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Fig. 3: Logistic regression of confidence and likeability ratings made during Interference 
session of Experiment 1 
 
a. The top left box plot illustrates the distribution of posterior averages of beta coefficients 
following the inversion of a logistic model of confidence ratings made in the ‘CONF’ task. See 
Methods for details about regressors. Importantly, we observe a significant positive impact (p = 
0.012) of contextual likeability (averaged across ratings made during ‘Like’ and ‘LIKE’ tasks) on 
confidence ratings. The top right graph illustrates this relationship. For each subject, trials were 
binned according to the average likeability of their musical extract, and each dot represents the 
confidence ratings averaged within each bin and across all subjects. The vertical error bars 
represent the standard error to the mean (SEM) of confidence ratings. The horizontal error bars 
(smaller than the central dots) represent the SEM of average likeability ratings. The continuous 
curve represents the model fit, averaged across participants, and the shaded area corresponds to 
the SEM of this model fit. 
 
b. The bottom left box plot illustrates the distribution of posterior averages of beta coefficients 
following the inversion of a logistic model of likeability ratings made in the ‘LIKE’ task. We 
observe a significant positive impact (p = 0.017) of confidence (averaged across ratings made 
during ‘Conf’ and ‘CONF’ tasks) on likeability ratings. The bottom right graph illustrates this 
relationship.  
 
* : p < 0.05;  **  : p < 0.01;  *** : p < 0.001 
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Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, to further discard the possibility of carry-over effects across tasks, we 
had two separate groups of participants perform ‘LIKE’ and ‘CONF’ tasks, similar to those from 
the interference session in Experiment 1 (see Fig. 4 for an overview of the experimental design). 
In both tasks, participants answered quiz questions of varying difficulty while hearing musical 
extracts of varying pleasantness, so we again expected them to generate both judgments 
(likeability and confidence) within the same trial, one being explicit and the other implicit. In one 
of these tasks (‘CONF’), participants made explicit confidence ratings about the accuracy of their 
answers to the quiz questions, while in the other task (‘LIKE’), participants made explicit 
likeability ratings about the musical extracts they had heard.  
A further aim of this new experiment was to assess the robustness of the misattribution 
bias to some motivation for judgment accuracy. Therefore, a critical manipulation was that for 
some participants (half of each group) confidence and likeability ratings were now incentivized: 
confidence ratings determined whether subjects would get a financial bonus, and likeability 
ratings which music they would listen to at the end of the experiment (see Methods for details 
about the procedure). A more minor change was the suppression of feedbacks in the quiz tasks, 
as we realized they could only complicate the isolation of the predicted effect. Indeed, we aimed 
at testing the impact of an internal confidence feeling related to the current quiz question, and not 
the impact of external feedbacks about previous quiz questions.  
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Fig. 4: Block design in Experiment 2.  
 
Experiment 2 comprised two distinct tasks each comprising two variants, performed by four separate groups of 
subjects.  
a. ‘CONF’: Confidence rating task. Top: ‘No incentive’ variant. On each trial, subjects answered a quiz question 
while a musical extract played in their headset, after which they reported their confidence in the correctness 
of their answer. The whole session comprised 4 blocks (only one block is represented here), each 
comprising: 8 mini-blocks (themselves composed of 8 trials at a given music pleasantness level), and a break 
(light grey bar). Bottom: ‘Financial incentive’ variant. Trials were identical to those in the ‘no incentive’ 
variant. After all 64 trials in the block had been completed, the computer randomly drew 2 of those trials, 
then selected that with the highest confidence rating. If the subject had correctly answered the selected quiz 
question, a bonus of 2€ would be added to her cumulative reward (no gain otherwise). 
 
b. ‘LIKE’: Likeability rating task. Top: ‘No incentive’ variant. On each trial, subjects answered a quiz question 
while a musical extract played in their headset, after which they reported how much they liked the musical 
extract. The whole session comprised 4 blocks (only one block is represented here), each comprising 8 mini-
blocks (themselves composed of 8 trials at a given difficulty level) followed by a break (light grey bar). 
Bottom: ‘Hedonic incentive’ variant. Trials were identical to those in the ‘no incentive’ variant. After all 64 
trials in the block had been completed, the computer randomly drew one of these trials, and a 2€ bonus was 
delivered if the participant had correctly answered that quiz question. Next, the computer randomly drew 2 
of those trials, selected that with the highest music likeability rating, and the subject would then have to 
listen to a 2-minute version of the selected musical extract. 
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In the ‘CONF’ task (Fig. 5a), confidence judgments were sensitive to similar influences 
from factors of non-interest as in Experiment 1 (positive relationship with the initial position of 
the cursor: ?̅? = .05, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 01 ; .09], 𝑡(34) = 2.8, 𝑝 = .0088; with the confidence rating made on 
previous trial: ?̅? = .11, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 06 ; .16], 𝑡(34) = 4.7, 𝑝 < 10−4; with the correctness of the 
subject’s answer: ?̅? = .35, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 27 ; .44], 𝑡(34) = 8.5, 𝑝 < 10−9; and with confidence averaged 
across all other subjects regarding the current quiz question: ?̅? = .60, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 52 ;  .68], 𝑡(34) =
15, 𝑝 < 10−15; negative relationship with response time: ?̅? = −.43, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.53 ; −.33], 𝑡(34) =
−8.7, 𝑝 < 10−9; no effect of average likeability of the previous musical extract: ?̅? = .02, 𝐶𝐼 =
[−.02 ; .06], 𝑡(34) = .88, 𝑝 = .39). Remarkably, the positive effect of average contextual 
likeability previously observed in Experiment 1 was no longer present (?̅? = .01, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.03 ; .05],
𝑡(34) = .61, 𝑝 = .55), regardless of the incentivization condition (𝛽𝑁𝑜𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ −
𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = .005, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.07 ; .08], 𝑡(33) = .14, 𝑝 = .89). 
In the ‘LIKE’ task (Fig. 5b), likeability judgments were again positively predicted by 
several factors of non-interest (initial position of the rating cursor: ?̅? = .08, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 06 ; .10],
𝑡(34) = 6.8, 𝑝 < 10−7; previous likeability rating: ?̅? = .08, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 05 ; .10], 𝑡(34) = 6.1, 𝑝 <
10−6; average likeability rating: ?̅? = .64, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 56 ; .72], 𝑡(34) = 16, 𝑝 < 10−15), and again no 
relationship was found with the average confidence about the previous quiz question (?̅? =
−.007, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.03 ; .02], 𝑡(34) = −.59, 𝑝 = .56). Most interestingly, the positive effect of average 
confidence about the quiz question previously observed in Experiment 1 was maintained (?̅? =
.03, 𝐶𝐼 = [. 01 ;  .06], 𝑡(34) = 3.1, 𝑝 = .004), again, regardless of the incentivization condition 
(𝛽𝑁𝑜𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝛽𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = −.02, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.07 ; .02], 𝑡(33) = −.98, 𝑝 = .33). 
This set of findings suggests that the misattribution of contextual value to confidence 
judgments is either non-existent, or weak or elusive, whereas confidence-to-value misattribution 
stands across experimental replications. Furthermore, the incentivization procedure did not 
impact the extent of misattribution in either direction, not did it modulate the weight of predictors 
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of non-interest in the logistic model of neither confidence nor likeability ratings (see tables S1 and 
S2 in supplementary material).  
In all analyses of interference sessions, the level of the incidental factor (pleasantness or 
difficulty) in the previous trial had no significant influence on the current explicit rating 
(confidence or likeability). This suggests that the interplay between value and confidence occurs 
within a trial, as opposed to a progressive buildup of positive or negative feelings across trials. We 
tested more directly for a possible buildup of the misattribution effect (when statistically 
significant: Experiment 1, ‘CONF’ & ‘LIKE’; Experiment 2, ‘LIKE’) within each block of given 
difficulty or pleasantness level. We performed logistic regressions against the same models as 
above, except that the incidental variables in the last two regressors were replaced with the 
following three regressors: 𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑛_𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘, indicating the trial index within its block, 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙_𝑖𝑛_𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘, indicating the pleasantness or difficulty level of the current block (in 
the ‘CONF’ or ‘LIKE’ tasks respectively), and an interaction term 𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙_𝑖𝑛_𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘. We found no evidence for a within-block buildup of the misattribution 
effect, as the interaction regressor was not a significant predictor of confidence or likeability 
ratings (Experiment 1, ‘CONF’: ?̅? = −.02, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.10; .06], 𝑡(17) = −.60, 𝑝 = .56; ‘LIKE’: ?̅? =
.01, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.04; .06], 𝑡(17) = .53, 𝑝 = .60. Experiment 2, ‘LIKE’: ?̅? = .004, 𝐶𝐼 = [−.02; .03],
𝑡(34) = .30, 𝑝 = .76). In other words, the misattribution effects, when present, were not driven 
by the latest trials of particularly easy or difficult blocks for likeability ratings, and respectively 
pleasant or unpleasant blocks for confidence ratings. This suggests that blocking trials by 
difficulty or pleasantness levels brings no advantage to inducing a strong misattribution effect.   
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Fig. 5: Logistic regression of confidence and likeability ratings made during Experiment 2 
 
a. ‘CONF’ task: The top left box plot illustrates the distribution of posterior averages of beta coefficients 
following the inversion of a logistic model of confidence ratings made by the first group. See Methods 
for details about regressors. Importantly, we do not find significant evidence (p = 0.55) for an impact 
of contextual likeability (averaged across ratings made by the second group) on confidence ratings. 
The top right graph illustrates this non-significant relationship. For each subject, trials were binned 
according to the average likeability of their musical extract, and each dot represents the confidence 
ratings averaged within each bin and across all subjects. The vertical error bars represent the standard 
error to the mean (SEM) of confidence ratings. The horizontal error bars (smaller than the central dots) 
represent the SEM of average likeability ratings. The continuous curve represents the model fit, 
averaged across participants, and the shaded area corresponds to the SEM of this model fit. 
b. ‘LIKE’ task: The bottom left box plot illustrates the distribution of posterior averages of beta 
coefficients following the inversion of a logistic model of likeability ratings made by the second group. 
We observe a significant positive impact (p = 0.0041) of confidence (averaged across ratings made by 
the first group) on likeability ratings. The bottom right graph illustrates this relationship.  
 
  * :  p < 0.05;  **  : p < 0.01;  *** : p < 0.001 
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Discussion 
 
Partly in line with a neuroscience-based perspective inspired by the encoding properties 
of the vmPFC, our results provide consistent evidence for a contamination from confidence to 
value representations, even when these representations apply to unrelated stimuli and responses, 
and even when they fluctuate on a short timescale. However, the opposite misattribution, that is 
an influence of contextual pleasantness onto confidence judgments, seemed to be less robust.  
In a first experiment, subjects were instructed to answer trivia questions of varying 
difficulty, while listening to musical extracts of varying pleasantness. Averaged likeability ratings 
from other participants were used as a proxy for music pleasantness, and averaged confidence 
ratings as a proxy for quiz difficulty. We observed a positive influence of average music likeability 
on confidence judgment about the answer to the quiz, as well as a positive influence of average 
quiz confidence on likeability judgments about the music.  
 Since we define confidence as the subjective probability of being correct, it could be 
considered a particular case of probability judgment. The psychology literature already includes 
several reports about the impact of subjective value onto probability judgment, a phenomenon 
that has been coined desirability bias (Kunda, 1990; Giardini et al., 2008; Sharot & Garrett, 2015; 
Lebreton et al., 2018). The opposite influence, that of probability estimate onto desirability 
judgment, has scarcely been explored (Kay et al., 2002). Moreover, the desirability bias refers to 
situations where value and probability judgments relate to the same future events. In short, 
people tend to believe that events they desire more are more likely to happen. Here, likeability 
and confidence judgments were connected to logically independent events, which is the reason 
why we describe the correlation between the two judgments as a misattribution bias.  Since the 
vmPFC encodes desirability but not probability estimates about future events, the desirability bias 
might have different underpinnings than the anatomical overlap observed between value and 
confidence representations (Lebreton et al., 2015). Also, the absence of carry-over across trials 
Chapter IV: Article 3 
181 
 
distinguishes the misattribution bias from mood fluctuations, which could drive correlations 
between value and confidence (Kamstra et al., 2003; Briñol et al., 2007; Moore & Fresco, 2012; 
Koellinger & Treffers, 2015; Otto et al., 2016). Indeed, mood fluctuations, including those observed 
in fMRI studies and reflected in vmPFC activity, are best modeled as an accumulation of positive 
and negative events over several trials (Rutledge et al., 2014; Vinckier et al., 2018). 
Another phenomenon that could explain the correlation between value and confidence 
ratings is the anchoring bias, which can be exerted by incidental numerical stimuli onto any kind 
of judgment (Ungemach et al., 2011). The fact that the (value or confidence) judgment about the 
incidental factor was always kept implicit in our tasks makes such a numerical anchoring effect 
an unlikely explanation for the misattribution bias. Besides, the order in which subjects performed 
the two rating tasks had no influence on the size of the misattribution effect in any direction, ruling 
out the possibility that the bias arose from an internal representation of the incidental dimension 
in a numerical format (elicited by the first rating task). 
 To avoid one judgment priming the other, we had separate groups of participants 
performing likeability and confidence ratings in the second experiment. Additionally, we aimed to 
assess the robustness of the observed misattribution effects, and their suppressibility when 
subjects were financially or hedonically motivated to provide accurate judgments. The influence 
of quiz-related confidence on music likeability ratings was maintained, providing further evidence 
against priming or anchoring explaining the misattribution bias. However, we found no significant 
evidence for the reciprocal misattribution effect, from incidental likeability to explicit confidence 
judgments.  
Although our neuroscience-based perspective does not predict, in general, such an 
asymmetry in value-confidence interferences, we acknowledge that one effect being stronger than 
the other may depend on the specifics of the experimental manipulation. In the present case, 
several features of our paradigm may account for the larger robustness of the confidence-to-value 
misattribution. First, in the context of a quiz task followed by a confidence rating task, music is 
instrumentally irrelevant and thus might be relatively easy to filter out. In contrast, in a task 
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involving both answering to the quiz and rating the musical extracts, since it is likely that 
confidence about the quiz question is the metric used to select the answer (in the sense that people 
pick the answer about which they feel most confident), confidence judgments are relevant to 
performing the task correctly and are therefore used by the participants, rather than ignored. In 
other words, metacognition about task performance would be more intrusive than valuation of 
the context, which could be ignored. If music likeability was indeed filtered out, it must have been 
done in an implicit fashion, since no subject reported using such a strategy in the debriefing 
interview. Moreover, most subjects stated that their confidence on the quiz had not affected their 
appreciation of the music (and vice-versa), so they had little awareness of the misattribution bias, 
and hence no explicit intention to fight against it. A second, complementary explanation is that 
value construction may be more susceptible to incidental influences than confidence estimation. 
Value is an expression of subjective preference, for which there is no obvious notion of accuracy. 
Confidence can be based on more objective information, such as the time taken to select the 
response, or the presence of memories that can help with answering the quiz question. In a 
Bayesian or distributional framework, these additional cues informing the confidence judgment 
might lead to a prior internal estimate which is relatively more precise and thus less liable to being 
shifted with the incorporation of an additional (incidental) cue. Such a view would imply that in 
another context where external, non-affective cues for building a confidence estimate are scarce 
or noisy, confidence judgments would be more vulnerable to incidental affective signals. 
Besides the scarcity of the cues informing the target judgment, another factor that we 
thought could modulate the extent of misattribution, in one direction or the other, is the 
motivation to form accurate judgments. However, we did not observe any impact of our 
incentivization procedure on misattribution effect sizes. This implies that either our manipulation 
of incentives was not successful in affecting participants’ motivation to form accurate judgments, 
or that the change in motivation did not translate into an actual change in their rating behaviour 
(e.g., they were unable to suppress the incidental influence of confidence judgments onto value 
judgments).   
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The interplay between value and confidence judgments was detrimental in our 
experimental context, in the sense that judgments about the relevant dimension were blurred by 
the incidental dimension, which was orthogonally manipulated. However, one can envisage at 
least two reasons why such a contamination would have survived the pressure of natural 
selection. First, value and confidence might be correlated in natural situations, such that mistaking 
one dimension for the other would not be so devastating. The intuition here is that positive 
feedback would bring both valuable reward and information that the behaviour is correct. 
Symmetrically, negative feedbacks would be both punishing and informative about the behaviour 
being incorrect. Second, value and confidence signals might have a similar influence on 
behavioural regulation, since alternative actions should be looked for, in case of either a poor 
(expected) outcome or a poor (expected) performance. This idea is evidently captured by the 
multiplication of probability and value estimates in the calculation of expected utility. Thus, any 
potential gain in adaptive fitness might not have been enough to overcome the burden of 
developing a brain machinery that would properly disambiguate value and confidence judgments. 
An obvious limitation of the present study is the absence of neural recording. As a 
consequence, we cannot conclude that the vmPFC is indeed implicated in the interference 
between value and confidence representations observed here. However, the vmPFC remains the 
most likely candidate for mediating this interference, since we were careful to use stimuli, tasks 
and timing that yielded specific vmPFC activation with both value and confidence in previous 
studies (Lebreton et al., 2015; Abitbol et al., 2015; Vinckier et al., 2018). Moreover, the vmPFC 
possesses the functional properties of being both a generic and automatic valuation device (Chib 
et al., 2009; Lebreton et al., 2009; Levy & Glimcher, 2011; Levy et al., 2011), which are necessary 
properties for an interference from incidental stimuli of a distinct category. Our finding of an 
asymmetry between confidence-to-value and value-to-confidence misattribution suggests, 
however, that value judgments about incidental features may be less automatic than confidence 
judgments, or at least that it is easier for an individual to ignore a feature of her environment than 
the correctness of what she is doing. Overall, the demonstration of a misattribution bias can be 
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considered as complementing the preceding fMRI studies, which alone could not establish that the 
anatomical overlap between value and confidence representations had (detrimental) 
consequences on the behaviour.  Indeed, given the spatial resolution of functional MRI, 
overlapping activations do not necessarily imply that at the neuron level, the brain uses the same 
code for representing value and confidence.  
However, it remains possible that other brain regions contribute to the contamination, 
possibly components of the brain valuation system such as the ventral striatum (Peters & Büchel, 
2010; Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014). Other brain regions, notably in the dorsal and 
lateral prefrontal cortex, have also been implicated in metacognitive accuracy and confidence 
judgment (Vaccaro & Fleming, 2018). The recruitment of these brain regions could explain the 
elimination of the absence of value-to-confidence misattribution. In this scenario, the vmPFC 
would underpin the affective component of confidence, which is susceptible to be confounded 
with the affective valuation of the context. The dorsal metacognition region would be responsible 
for a more explicit estimation of confidence, based on available information. Such a view would 
accord well with the affect-as-information theory (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Schwarz, 2012), 
according to which a generic affect representation (probably supported by the vmPFC) could be 
not only an output of information about context and behaviour, but also an input to value or 
confidence representation, together with other, more specific input. Further studies are needed 
to test this global scenario and to specify the mechanisms of contamination between value and 
confidence representations at the neural level.  
In this study, we were able to isolate for the first time a manifestation of confidence-to-
value misattribution in healthy individuals. This phenomenon may be pervasive yet elusive, as 
relevant judgments were contaminated by incidental, unrelated events that were implicitly 
processed by the brain. While manipulations of state value had previously been found to affect 
probability estimates, the confidence-to-value direction of contamination had never before been 
demonstrated, to our knowledge. While a tendency to misattribution might seem strictly 
prejudicial to its carriers, there is room for optimism. Indeed, we speculate that this very 
Chapter IV: Article 3 
185 
 
misattribution bias could be exploited towards the alleviation of various societal issues. For 
example, in educational contexts, instilling confidence through positive feedback could drive 
pupils to like school better and attend classes on a more regular basis.   
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Methods 
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee for Biomedical Research of the Pitié-
Salpêtrière Hospital, where both experiments were conducted. All research was performed in 
accordance with the French guidelines and regulations.  
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited via the Relais d’Information en Sciences Cognitives (RISC) website 
and screened for exclusion criteria: age below 18 or above 39, regular use of drugs or 
medications and history of psychiatric or neurological disorders.  
All participants gave informed consent prior to partaking in the study.  
In Experiment 1, 20 participants (11F, 9M; mean age = 24) first performed a control session, 
followed by an interference session one month later. Each session included a confidence rating 
task and a likeability rating task. They were paid 20€ for their time (regardless of their 
performance at the tasks). Two participants (1M, 1F) were excluded for guessing the aim of the 
experiment after the control session. The remaining 18 participants were included in the 
analyses.  
In Experiment 2, a group of 35 participants (21F, 14M; mean age = 23) performed a confidence 
rating task, and a separate group of 35 participants (19F, 16M; mean age = 25) performed a 
likeability rating task. Each group was further split into two subgroups, one performing a ‘No 
incentive’ paradigm variant (N = 18x2) and one performing a ‘Financial/Hedonic incentive’ 
variant (N = 17x2). 
‘No incentive’ variant: Participants were paid 30€ for their participation regardless of their quiz 
answers or ratings. 
‘Financial/Hedonic incentive’ variant: Participants received an initial endowment of 18€. As 
explained in the instructions they read prior to the task onset, they could additionally earn up to 
8€ depending both on luck and on their performance at the quiz (for details, see Experiment 2. 
Incentivization paragraph below).  
At the end of the session, participants were required to complete a debriefing questionnaire, 
followed by an oral interview with the experimenter, which confirmed that none of them had 
guessed the aim of the experiment. All 70 participants were thus included in the analyses. 
 
Materials 
We used 256 general-knowledge questions gathered from the French edition of Trivial Pursuit 
Master ©. Questions were chosen from all game categories to cover a large variety of subjects. 
The game’s open questions were transformed into multiple-answer questions by adding three 
false answers to the true answer. Questions and answers were already used in a previous fMRI 
study (Vinckier et al., 2018). In Experiment 1, 10 participants answered the uneven items in task 
c. (see Fig. 1) and the even items in tasks b. and d., and 8 participants did the opposite. Before 
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Experiment 1, the difficulty of the questions was estimated by averaging the accuracy of 
participants in a separate pilot (N = 66). In Experiment 2, every participant answered the full set 
of 256 questions during their single testing session. The difficulty of the questions was estimated 
by averaging the accuracy of participants in Experiment 1. 
We used 256 musical extracts of 17 seconds each, covering a large variety of styles, tonalities 
and instruments (from Gregorian polyphonies to hardcore grind music). 60 of those extracts had 
already been used in a previous fMRI study (Abitbol et al., 2015). All extracts were strictly 
instrumental. We equalized sound volume across all extracts (via root mean square, or RMS, 
normalization). In Experiment 1, 10 participants listened to the uneven items in tasks a. and c. 
and to the even items in task d., while 8 participants did the opposite. Before Experiment 1, the 
pleasantness of each musical extract was estimated by averaging the likeability ratings of 
participants from a previous study (Abitbol et al., 2015) (N = 26), and from a pilot experiment (N 
= 10). In Experiment 2, every participant listened to the full set of 256 musical extracts during 
their single testing session. We estimated each extract’s likeability by averaging the ratings 
made in Experiment 1. 
Tasks were programmed with MATLAB (MathWorks) and the Cogent 2000 toolbox (Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) (Experiment 1) or the Psychophysics 
Toolbox 3.0 (Kleiner et al., 2007) (Experiment 2) for stimuli presentation.  
For all ratings in Experiments 1 and 2, the initial position of the scale cursor was drawn from a 
uniform distribution spanning the central half of the rating scale.  
 
Experiment 1 
Subjects took part in two testing sessions: first a control session, in which they made likeability 
and confidence judgments in separate tasks, and then an interference session about one month 
later, designed such that both likeability and confidence judgments were now likely to be 
generated within the same task and were thus susceptible to interfere together.  
Both sessions comprised a likeability rating task and a confidence rating task. 
The likeability rating task in the control session, hereafter referred to as ‘Like’ task (see Fig. 1) 
was coupled with the confidence rating task in the interference session, ‘CONF’, in the sense that 
the musical extracts rated on Like were subsequently played in the background during CONF. 
This Like--CONF task couple aimed to measure the impact of context pleasantness (measured in 
Like) on confidence judgments (measured in CONF). Similarly, the quiz questions about which 
subjects made confidence ratings in Conf (control session, confidence rating task) were 
subsequently asked during LIKE (interference session, likeability rating task). Thus, Conf--LIKE 
aimed to measure the impact of quiz difficulty on context likeability judgments. 
• Like task (128 trials): On each trial, a musical extract was first played in the headset 
during 15 seconds while a fixation cross was displayed at the centre of the screen, 
then music stopped and subjects rated the likeability of the extract they had just 
heard (“How much do you like this extract?”) by moving a cursor along a discrete scale 
ranging from -10 to 10 (step = 1). The order of the musical extracts was randomized 
across subjects. 
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• Conf task (128 trials): This task was divided into 4 blocks, each comprising 32 quiz 
questions corresponding to a given difficulty range: questions were first ordered 
according to their difficulty and split into 4 blocks of increasing difficulty. The order 
of the questions inside each block and the order of the blocks were then randomized.  
Each trial went as follows: 1) a fixation cross appeared for 1 s; 2) a quiz question was 
presented during 4 s; 3) four possible answers appeared, and subjects then had 5 s to 
select the answer they thought was correct by moving a selection frame (whose 
initial position was randomized) using ‘up’ and ‘down’ arrows on the keyboard. 4) 
Once subjects had confirmed their selection by pressing ‘Space’, they reported their 
confidence in the correctness of their answer (“How sure are you about your 
answer?”) by moving a cursor on an analog scale ranging from “Not sure at all” to 
“Absolutely sure”. 5) Once participants had validated their rating, they were given a 
binary feedback about the correctness of their answer. Unbeknownst to the 
participants, we manipulated feedbacks: errors were given a positive feedback 60% 
of the time in the easy session, 40% of the time in the medium-easy session, 20% of 
the time in the medium-difficult session, and never in the difficult session. The 
purpose of the manipulation was to increase the effect of question difficulty on 
participants’ confidence judgment. 
In the interference session occurring one month later, subjects again performed two tasks.  
In both of them, they answered quiz questions while musical extracts were played in their 
headset (Fig. 1.). In one of the tasks (‘CONF’ task), participants additionally gave a confidence 
rating about the correctness of their answer to each quiz question, whereas in the other task 
(‘LIKE’ task), participants gave a likeability rating about each musical extract. 
• CONF task: This task included 128 trials, divided into 4 blocks of 32 trials of similar 
music pleasantness. The order of the extracts within each block and the order of the 
blocks were randomized. Each block was divided into 4 sub-blocks of 8 trials of 
similar question difficulty. 
Each trial went as follows: 1) a musical extract started playing, while a fixation cross 
was displayed at the centre of the screen for a duration varying from 1 to 10 seconds, 
adjusted so that trials would last 17 s on average (average fixation cross duration = 
5.9 s, average s.d. of duration = 1.4 s); 2) a quiz question was presented during 4 s; 3) 
four possible answers appeared, and subjects then had 5 s to select the answer they 
thought was correct by moving a selection frame (whose initial position was 
randomized) using ‘up’ and ‘down’ arrows on the keyboard. 4) Once subjects had 
confirmed their selection by pressing ‘Space’, music stopped, and they reported their 
confidence (“How sure are you about your answer?”) by moving a cursor on an analog 
scale ranging from “Not sure at all” to “Absolutely sure”. 
 
• LIKE task: This task included 128 trials, divided into 4 blocks of 32 questions of 
similar difficulty (see ‘Conf’ task for details). The order of the questions within each 
block and the order of the blocks were randomized. Each block was divided into 4 
sub-blocks of 8 trials of similar music pleasantness. 
Each trial went as follows: 1) a musical extract started, and a fixation cross was 
displayed at the centre of the screen for a duration varying from 2 to 10 seconds, 
adjusted so that trials would last 15 s on average (average fixation cross duration = 
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6.6 s, average s.d. of duration = 1.6 s); 2) a quiz question was presented during 4 s; 3) 
four possible answers appeared, and subjects then had 5 s to select the answer they 
thought was correct by moving a selection frame (whose initial position was 
randomized) using ‘up’ and ‘down’ arrows on the keyboard. 4) Once subjects had 
confirmed their selection by pressing ‘Space’, music stopped, and they rated the 
likeability of the musical extract they had just heard (“How much do you like this 
extract?”) by moving a cursor on a discrete scale ranging from -10 to 10 (step = 1). 5) 
Once participants had confirmed their rating, they were given a feedback about the 
correctness of their answer (see ‘Conf’ task for details). 
 
Experiment 2 
In order to rule out one potential confound present in Experiment 1, that is the fact that the 
same subjects performed both the likeability rating and the confidence rating tasks on the same 
day, which could have led to confusion as to which dimension they should pay attention to and 
report in their ratings, we had separate groups of subjects perform each of the rating tasks in 
Experiment 2. Therefore, each subject took part in a single testing session, in which they 
answered quiz questions while musical extracts were played in their headsets. Additionally, they 
either performed confidence ratings (Group 1), or music likeability ratings (Group 2). The other 
critical difference in task design with Experiment 1 was that for a subset of each group of 
participants (N = 17/35), answers to the quiz questions, as well as the confidence or likeability 
ratings, were incentivized in order to assess the robustness of misattribution biases to financial 
or hedonic motivation.  
• CONF task: This task included 256 trials, divided into 8 blocks of 32 trials of similar 
music pleasantness. Each trial went as follows: 1) a musical extract started, and a 
fixation cross appeared at the centre of the screen for a fixed duration of 1 s; 2) a 
quiz question was presented during 4 s; 3) four possible answers appeared on 
diagonal positions, which were mapped with horizontally adjacent ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’ 
response buttons. Subjects had 7 s to answer by pressing one of these buttons, upon 
which a selection frame appeared to highlight the selected answer. The four possible 
answers and the selection frame remained on-screen until maximal response time 
(7 s) was elapsed. This was to equalize the time of exposure to the musical extracts 
across trials, and to ensure its independence from quiz response time. 4) Music 
stopped, and subjects reported their confidence in their answer (“How sure are you 
about your answer?”) by moving a cursor along an analog scale ranging from ‘Not at 
all’ to ‘Absolutely sure’. 
 
• LIKE task: This task included 256 trials, divided into 8 blocks of 32 trials of similar 
quiz question difficulty. Each trial went as follows: 1) a musical extract started 
playing, and a fixation cross appeared at the centre of the screen for a fixed duration 
of 1s; 2) a quiz question was presented during 4 s; 3) four possible answers 
appeared on diagonal positions, which were mapped with ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’ response 
buttons. Subjects had 7 s to answer by pressing one of these buttons, upon which a 
selection frame appeared to highlight the selected answer. The four possible 
answers and the selection frame remained on-screen until maximal response time 
Chapter IV: Article 3 
190 
 
(7 s) was elapsed. 5) Music stopped, and subjects rated the likeability of the musical 
extract they had just heard (“How much did you like this extract?”) by moving a 
cursor along a discrete scale ranging from -10 to 10 (step = 1). 
Incentivization 
In Experiment 2, for a subset of each group of participants (N = 17/35), both the accuracy in the 
general-knowledge quiz task and the confidence/likeability ratings were financially or 
hedonically incentivized.  
Specifically, 1) in the confidence rating task: at the end of each block of 64 trials, 2 of these trials 
were randomly drawn, and among these two, that with the highest confidence rating was 
selected and executed. That is, if the participant had chosen the correct answer on this trial, he 
would receive a 2€ bonus. Otherwise, he would not receive any bonus on this block; 2) in the 
likeability rating task: at the end of each block of 64 trials, one of these trials was randomly 
drawn and executed. If the participant had chosen the correct answer on this trial, he would 
receive a 2€ bonus. (Otherwise, he would not receive any bonus on this block.) Then, 2 of the 64 
musical extracts played during the block were randomly drawn, and among these two, that with 
the highest likeability rating was selected. The participant would subsequently have to listen to a 
2-minute extract of this musical piece. 
In the instructions preceding both the confidence and the likeability rating tasks, an example 
random draw was simulated and commented, and it was explicitly stated that due to this 
selection procedure, it was in the interest of the participants to give ratings which reflected as 
closely as possible their subjective probability of being correct (in the confidence rating task) or 
the pleasure derived from listening to the musical extract (in the likeability rating task). 
 
Data analysis 
Statistical analyses were performed with MATLAB, and all models were inverted using a 
variational Bayes approach under the Laplace approximation, implemented in the Variational 
Bayesian Analysis (VBA) toolbox (Daunizeau et al., 2014). The algorithm used in VBA not only 
inverts nonlinear models but also estimates their evidence, which represents a trade-off 
between accuracy (goodness of fit) and complexity (degrees of freedom). The log-evidences, 
estimated for each participant and model, were submitted to a group-level random-effect 
analysis (Rigoux et al., 2014). This analysis was used to generate exceedance probability, which 
measures the likelihood that a given model is more frequently implemented by participants than 
any other model in the comparison set.  
We performed logistic rather than linear regressions of confidence and likeability ratings 
because of the boundedness of the rating scale, which makes sigmoidal transformations 
naturally more suitable to modeling subjects’ ratings, while introducing no additional 
complexity. A random-effects model comparison between this logistic model and its linear 
equivalent confirmed that the logistic variant was much more likely, as it had an exceedance 
probability XP > 0.999 for all model comparisons (task-wise), except for the likeability rating 
task in Experiment 2, where the superiority of the logistic model was less clear-cut (𝑋𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =
0.65; 𝑋𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 = 0.35). It must be noted however that all significant effects of interest remain 
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significant (and all non-significant effects remain non-significant) when linear regressions are 
performed instead of logistic ones. 
All the variables included in our models were z-scored across the whole task, so as to enable 
direct comparison of the amount of explained variance between regressors. All prior probability 
density functions over beta parameters were ‘agnostic’ gaussians centred on 0, with a variance 
of ln²(3), set such that parameter values within one standard deviation from the centre of the 
distribution would entail a [-.25; .25] change in rating (expressed between 0 and 1) around the 
mean (0.5) when the associated regressor would vary within one standard deviation from its 
mean, which corresponds to a reasonably large effect. We subsequently tested for group-level 
random effects of the parameters in our models by performing one-sample two-tailed Student t-
tests on each vector of beta posterior estimates. 
Experiment 1 
a) Like task 
For each subject, we inverted a logistic model of individual likeability ratings: 
𝐿𝑅𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑡) 
 
with 𝐿𝑅𝑡 the subject’s likeability rating on current trial (t), 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚 the sigmoidal function such that 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚(𝑋) =
1
1+𝑒−𝑋
 , 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 the initial (random) position of the cursor on the rating scale, 
𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 the likeability rating made in previous trial, and 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑡 the likeability rating made about 
the current musical extract, averaged across all other subjects. 
 
b) Conf task 
For each subject, we inverted a logistic model of individual confidence ratings: 
𝐶𝑅𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝑅𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅𝑡) 
 
with 𝐶𝑅𝑡 the subject’s confidence rating on current trial (t), 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 the initial position of the 
cursor on the rating scale, 𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 the confidence rating made on previous trial, 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡 a binary 
variable indicating whether the subject’s answer on trial t was correct or not, 𝑅𝑇𝑡 the time 
elapsed between the onset of the four possible answers and the selection of an answer by the 
subject, 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅𝑡  the confidence rating made about the current quiz question, averaged across all 
other subjects. 
 
c) CONF task 
For each subject, we inverted a logistic model of individual confidence ratings: 
𝐶𝑅𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝑅𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑡) 
with 𝐶𝑅𝑡 the subject’s confidence rating on current trial (t), 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 the initial position of the 
cursor on the rating scale, 𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 the confidence rating made on previous trial, 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡 a binary 
variable indicating whether the subject’s answer on trial t was correct or not, 𝑅𝑇𝑡 the time 
elapsed between the onset of the four possible answers and the selection of an answer by the 
subject, 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅𝑡  the confidence rating made about the same quiz question, averaged across all 
other subjects, 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 the likeability rating made about the musical extract played on 
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previous trial, averaged across all other subjects, and 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑡 the likeability rating made about 
the musical extract played on current trial, averaged across all other subjects. 
Only the last two regressors in this model directly address our effect of interest, while 
the other regressors represent factors of non-interest which were nonetheless likely to influence 
ratings, and which may incidentally have covaried with average likeability fluctuations, such that 
we removed their potential influence from the estimation of 𝛽6 and 𝛽7. Specifically, 𝛽1 ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟 accounts for a possible anchoring effect of the initial position of the rating cursor, 
𝛽2 ∙ 𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 accounts for the likely temporal auto-correlation in the ratings, due to the blocking of 
quiz questions by difficulty level, as well as to some perseveration bias from the subjects.  
 
d) LIKE task 
For each subject, we inverted a logistic model of individual likeability ratings: 
𝐿𝑅𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅𝑡) 
with 𝐿𝑅𝑡 the subject’s likeability rating on current trial (t), 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 the initial position of the 
cursor on the rating scale, 𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 the likeability rating made on previous trial, 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑡−1 a 
binary variable indicating whether the subject received a ‘correct’ feedback on previous trial, 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑡 the likeability rating made about the same musical extract, averaged across all other 
subjects, 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 the confidence rating made about the quiz question answered on previous 
trial, averaged across all other subjects, and 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅𝑡 the confidence rating made about the quiz 
question answered on current trial, averaged across all other subjects. 
As in the CONF logistic model, only the last two regressors in this model directly address our 
effect of interest, while the other regressors represent factors of non-interest which were 
nonetheless likely to influence ratings, and which may incidentally have covaried with average 
confidence fluctuations, such that we removed their potential influence from the estimation of 𝛽4 
and 𝛽5. 
Specifically, 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟 accounts for a possible anchoring effect of the initial position of the 
rating cursor, 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 accounts for the likely temporal auto-correlation in the ratings, due to 
the blocking of musical extracts by pleasantness level, as well as to some perseveration bias 
from the subjects, and 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑡−1 accounts for possible effects of feedback on mood and 
thus on likeability ratings. While the feedback received on previous trial is also likely to have 
modulated subjects’ feeling of confidence, our last two regressors are a proxy for confidence 
fluctuations over and above the impact of feedbacks. 
 
Experiment 2 
a) Confidence rating task 
As for CONF task in Experiment 1, we inverted a logistic model of confidence ratings:  
𝐶𝑅𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝑅𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑡) 
The only difference is that, here, 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑡 was obtained by averaging the likeability ratings made 
about the current musical extract by the other group of subjects. 
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b) Likeability rating task 
As for LIKE task in Experiment 1, we inverted a logistic model of likeability ratings:  
𝐿𝑅𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅𝑡) 
The only difference here is that, since no feedback was given to the subjects about the 
correctness of their answer, we did not include any feedback regressor in our model.  
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Supplementary material 
 
Table S1.   𝛽𝑁𝑜 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 − 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 from logistic regression in Experiment 2, ‘CONF’ task. 
 
 ?̅? 𝐶𝐼 𝑡(33) 𝑝 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡(𝑡) − .012 [−.09; .06] − .32  .75 
𝐶𝑅(𝑡 − 1)  .048 [− .05; .1] 1.0  .32 
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠(𝑡) − .10 [− .3; .06] −1.3  .22 
𝑅𝑇(𝑡)  .084 [− .1; .3]  .84  .41 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅(𝑡)  .014 [− .1; .2]  .18  .86 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅(𝑡 − 1)  .015 [− .07; .1]  .36  .72 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅(𝑡)  .0054 [− .07; .08]  .14  .89 
 
 
 
 
Table S2.   𝛽𝑁𝑜 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 − 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 from logistic regression in Experiment 2, ‘LIKE’ task. 
 
 ?̅? 𝐶𝐼 𝑡(33) 𝑝 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡(𝑡)  .0055 [−.04; .05]  .24  .81 
𝐿𝑅(𝑡 − 1)  .012 [− .04; .06]  .49  .63 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑅(𝑡) − .0036 [− .2; .2] − .043  .97 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅(𝑡 − 1)  .026 [− .02; .08] 1.1  .30 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑅(𝑡) − .021 [− .07; .02] − .98  .33 
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1) Overview 
 
In our modern understanding, three major types of judgment are at play 
during action valuation: the subjective value of each action’s possible outcomes, the 
perceived probability of these various outcomes, and the costs (e.g., the energetic 
expense) entailed by each action. In this PhD work, we set out to delineate some 
circumstances under which interferences can occur between these decisional 
variables, and we tried to elucidate their underlying computational and neural 
mechanisms. 
In the first of the three studies presented above, we focused on the 
interaction between the value of a pursued goal and the anticipated effort cost of 
the sequence of actions needed to reach that goal. We had participants 
prospectively estimate the energetic cost of composite running routes, whose 
completion could entail a monetary gain (or prevent a monetary loss) of variable 
magnitude. We found that routes associated to larger stakes (gains to be obtained 
or losses to be avoided) were anticipated as more costly by our participants, 
although the real energetic cost and monetary stakes were orthogonal by design. 
We replicated this finding in a follow-up experiment, in which we additionally 
investigated its computational underpinnings. Of all the cognitive scenarios we had 
considered to account for the positive distortion of anticipated energetic cost by 
goal value, the one whose predictions best aligned with our set of behavioural 
findings involves a contamination of the prospective cost judgment by the output 
of a cost-benefit computation. This computation could either be that of the optimal 
energetic expense to invest in order to maximize a cost-benefit trade-off under the 
assumption that effort investment continuously improves the chances of reaching 
the high-value outcome (either a gain or no loss, depending on the framing), or that 
of the maximal energetic expense above which it is preferable to opt out of the high-
value high-effort course of action. Our model comparison did not reveal any 
difference in frequency between these two scenarios within our sample of subjects, 
either because they are indeed similarly prevalent in the general population, or 
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because we lacked statistical power to detect a difference in prevalence. Besides, 
we did not find consistent evidence for other putative interference mechanisms: 
that of an affect-as-information misattribution, and that of an incorporation of a 
belief in a general correlation between goal value and action cost; their predictions 
were not supported by our results. 
In the second study, we shifted our focus to the influence of performance-
contingent outcome value on perceived probability of success, that is, confidence 
judgments. For this, we first trained participants to perform a specific motor task, 
which consisted in briefly squeezing a handgrip at a given force level, with more or 
less error margin, without any visual feedback on the exerted force. Then, on each 
trial, three pieces of information were disclosed about the upcoming motor 
challenge: its difficulty (adjusted via the size of the force target to hit), the amount 
of money that could be won in case of success, and the (generally different) amount 
of money that could be lost in case of failure. In the following stage of each trial, 
participants were prompted to make an a priori estimate of their chances of success 
at the motor challenge, that is, to give a prospective confidence rating. Finally, they 
squeezed the handgrip and tried to reach the target without receiving any feedback 
about their exerted force, either during or after their motor execution. Our main 
finding is that subjects tend to be more confident in their upcoming performance 
when success is associated with a large monetary gain, and less confident when 
failure is associated with a large loss. Interestingly, this pattern of confidence 
distortions is in contradiction with the predictions of several popular psychological 
constructs, such as the desirability bias, and instead points to a misattribution-of-
affect kind of mechanism. We sought to clarify the neural underpinnings of this 
apparent affect-to-confidence spillover via functional neuroimaging. Based on 
earlier reports that the vmPFC encodes both value and confidence judgments in an 
automatic and generic way (with some carry-over effects also mentioned between 
distinct value judgments), our hypothesis was that the vmPFC might be the main 
site in which value-confidence misattributions occur. However, we failed to identify 
any region whose activity covaried with our variables of interest (the value of 
prospective outcomes and confidence judgments), or to observe an inter-subject 
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correlation between the multi-voxel patterns in vmPFC encoding prospective value 
and prospective confidence, respectively. 
In our third study, we tested the hypothesis — derived from the 
aforementioned findings about the vmPFC encoding properties — that value-
confidence interferences might occur even between unrelated objects or stimuli, 
and bidirectionally, that is, from confidence to value judgments as well as from 
value to confidence. We ran two behavioural experiments in which subjects 
answered more or less difficult general-knowledge quiz questions while hearing 
more or less pleasant musical extracts. After they had answered each quiz question, 
in a subset of trials or participants, they were asked to report their confidence in 
having selected the correct quiz answer; in the complementary subset, they were 
asked to report how much they liked the musical extract they had just heard. We 
found a consistent positive impact of quiz-related confidence (proxied by 
confidence ratings averaged across participants about the presented quiz question) 
on music pleasantness judgments, even when participants were hedonically 
incentivized to provide accurate ratings; however, the opposite effect was more 
elusive. Thus, our neurally-derived predictions were only partly verified. At a more 
cognitive level, our findings suggest that the relative salience, precision, and task-
relevance of value and confidence judgments might determine the direction and 
strength of the misattribution. 
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2) What have we learned?  
 
First, we add to the existing literature about interferences between 
decisional variables, by isolating such effects in well-controlled laboratory settings, 
which notably include loss frames that had scarcely been investigated before. Our 
work thus casts additional doubt on the validity, or viability, of the classical 
assumption of an independence between the various judgments implicated in 
action valuation. 
 In all three studies, we isolated interferences between judgments of value on 
the one hand and judgments of either confidence or effort cost on the other hand. 
Specifically, we extended previous knowledge by showing that 1) larger 
prospective gains entail higher confidence and larger anticipated effort cost, while 
larger prospective losses entail lower confidence as well as larger anticipated effort 
cost, 2) interferences between value and confidence judgments can be observed in 
both directions 3) they can be observed even when these judgments bear on 
unrelated objects, such that in some circumstances, incidental confidence can 
modulate target value judgments, 4) different instances of interference are likely 
underpinned by different cognitive mechanisms: value and confidence judgments 
tend to covary positively, and their mutual influence is evocative of a misattribution 
of affective states, while value and effort cost judgments display a more complex 
relationship, which is best explained by another cognitive mechanism involving 
cost-benefit computations by the agent.  
 
Besides, it can be noted that our behavioural data about the force exerted by 
participants in our second study contributed to the identification of a “reward 
effect” on action vigour, which was primarily investigated by another researcher in 
our team (Oudiette et al., 2019, see complete publication in Appendix).  Across 
several experiments conducted by D. Oudiette and others (including E. Bioud), it 
was found that healthy individuals tend to produce more force in actions 
incentivized with larger rewards, even when this increase in vigour is actually 
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detrimental to the obtention of the reward. Posterior force reports by the 
participants reflected that reward effect, suggesting that they are aware of their 
bias but unable to suppress it. This automatic invigoration of response by potential 
reward (which was observed to a much lesser extent for potential loss) might result 
from a Pavlovian stimulus-response shortcut, which seems to occur independently 
from the specific task context (and thus can deteriorate performance in precision 
tasks, as opposed to force tasks such as weightlifting). Interestingly, this pattern of 
response to potential gain versus loss departs from the pattern of distortion of 
anticipated energetic cost by gain versus loss in our first study, which in both cases 
inflated to a similar extent with stake magnitude. This dissociation could be due to 
the different nature of the running task versus the precision grip or putting tasks in 
which the “reward effect” was observed:  in the former, all the cost laid in the 
energetic expense, while the latter also involved a motor control cost. Besides, 
explicit effort anticipation and actual effort production are probably underpinned 
by non-identical systems, the second one being potentially more sensitive to 
Pavlovian influences (which usually impact action more than cognition).  
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3) Limitations & Perspectives 
 
We will now review the main limitations of this work, a number of which 
actually open perspectives for future research. 
 
First, it can be pointed out that the interference effects isolated here are quite 
small, in the sense that the independent variable of interest does not account for a 
large fraction of the variance of the dependent variable. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that these interferences are always minor in real-life situations, 
and that they could be considered as anecdotal overall. One explanation for the 
relatively modest effect size we observed could be that the fluctuations of the 
independent variable (either a value judgment in studies 1 to 3, or a confidence 
judgment in study 3) were themselves relatively small compared to that of other 
factors informing the dependent judgment (such as the size of the target, or the 
genre of the music). We speculate that massively increasing the range of 
prospective monetary gains or losses, to an extent that may be difficult to 
implement in laboratory settings, would allow to observe more substantial 
distortions of concurrent decisional variables.  Along the same line, and as evoked 
in the Discussion sections of the above articles, if we adopt a Bayesian view of cue 
integration in inferential judgments (Pouget et al., 2016), then it seems likely that, 
had non-interferential evidence for building the dependent judgment been scarcer 
or noisier than it actually was in our experimental paradigms, this judgment would 
have been more liable to interferential influences from concurrent value or 
confidence judgments. More generally, it would be interesting to examine how 
interferences between two decisional variables vary in direction and strength with 
the relative salience, the relative relevance, and the relative uncertainty of these 
two judgments. Finally, another reason for our small effect sizes could be that our 
data were acquired in the lab rather than in the field, such that subjects might have 
been highly motivated to provide unbiased judgments, even in the absence of any 
incentivization procedure. This latter scenario implies that individuals might be 
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able to suppress or at least moderate these interferences when motivated to do so. 
Although we did not find evidence for such a moderation upon incentivization in 
our third study, it might simply be that our hedonic incentivization was not 
effective enough in increasing their motivation for rating accuracy. This point 
would be worth investigating via more extensive, or better-established (Hollard et 
al., 2016), incentivization procedures. 
Another blind spot in our characterization of interferences between 
decisional variables is that, beyond outcome or state value, confidence, and effort 
cost judgments, we ignored other types of decisional variables such as delay, pain, 
or other types of cost or probability judgments. This is mainly due to a lack of time, 
combined with the fact that we prioritized decision variables that could be easily 
manipulated or measured, as well as couples of variables for which interactions had 
been previously reported in the literature, for we eventually aimed to investigate 
their underlying mechanisms; however we believe that such variables also deserve 
investigation in the future.  
 
Perhaps the major limitation of this work is that we failed to elucidate the 
neural mechanisms responsible for these interferences. In our second study, we 
could not identify any ‘non-trivial’ region or set of regions (that is, not the primary 
visual areas, whose apparent implication in encoding confidence or value was very 
likely due to luminance confounds) whose BOLD signal would covary with any of 
our two variables of interest, namely, prospective value and confidence. This 
absence of finding, especially in the vmPFC, contrasts with the hundreds of studies 
that have found this region to be more active when subjects were considering 
valuable stimuli or prospects, or were highly confident in their behaviour. From a 
pragmatic point of view, our null result might be due to a combination of 
insufficient statistical power (in particular, regarding group sample size), 
insufficient intertrial interval (and thus, given slow hemodynamics, too much 
overlap of value and/or confidence signals from one trial to the next), and excessive 
information load during prospects presentation (the first stage of each trial, during 
which we displayed the size of the motor target, as well as potential gains and losses 
simultaneously). From a more theoretical standpoint, over and above the fact that 
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we were unable to isolate clusters of above-threshold correlation with value or 
confidence, we acknowledge that the regional overlap of value- and confidence- 
encoding voxels in the vmPFC does not imply that these variables partly share the 
same neural code in the vmPFC. A network overlap is not even a necessary 
condition to observe value-confidence misattribution; it would be enough, e.g., that 
one downstream output of the network in charge of building a confidence judgment 
be fed in to a node of the network in charge of building a value judgment; in fact, 
this interference could occur in such a distributed way, and/or at such a 
microscopic scale, that fMRI might not be a suitable imaging technique to detect it. 
 
Another important limitation of this work is that we did not assess the impact 
of judgment interferences on actual action selection. Beyond the fact that our small 
effect sizes would lead us to expect a rather minor impact on decision-making, this 
assessment is made difficult by the fact that decisional variables have (by 
definition) a main impact on action valuation, on top of which they might have a 
second congruent or incongruent impact through their distortion of another 
decisional variable. This difficulty may be overcome, for example, by finding a way 
to modulate the extent of judgment interferences (e.g. via incentivization, or by 
manipulating the scarcity of non-interferential cues informing the dependent 
judgment), and measuring the ensuing modulation in action selection. Until this 
investigation is conducted, we can speculate that: 1) the inflation of anticipated 
effort cost by goal value (whether as an obtained gain or an avoided loss) may, all 
other things equal, deter engagement in the considered course of action, but in 
return, if the course of action is still taken on, it may incite more resource 
accumulation prior to action engagement (and thus may compensate the planning 
fallacy that healthy individuals typically exhibit, and eventually entail higher 
chances of reaching the goal); 2) the positive influence of prospective outcome 
value on confidence may accentuate agents’ engagement in courses of actions 
attached to an overall positive balance of outcomes, as well as their avoidance of 
courses of action with an overall negative balance of outcomes. One can speculate 
that several judgment distortions may occur during a given action valuation; for 
instance, prospective outcome value might both distort confidence and effort cost 
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judgments. In such a case, we would expect that highly valuable prospective 
outcomes, by boosting confidence but concurrently increasing the anticipated 
energetic cost of the sequence of action, may not, overall, have a strong effect on 
action selection per se, but may improve resource storage prior to action if it is 
indeed taken on (although it may also, due to an inflation of performance 
confidence,  deteriorate other forms of action preparation).  
 
An additional avenue for future research regards the impact of these 
judgment interferences across time: is a distortion of experienced pleasantness, or 
posterior confidence judgment, just local or could it be fed to a learning process, or 
transferred to episodic memory storage, such that these distortions might actually 
accumulate over time, and/or bias learning processes?   
At a larger scale, following on the findings that overoptimism bias brings 
about higher well-being and better health status (Taylor et al., 2000), and that 
overconfidence is linked to higher risk-taking and perseverance in professional 
ventures (Koellinger et al., 2007), it would be interesting to systematically assess 
the consequences of these interferences at the level of individual traits, e.g. by 
looking for correlations between statistical parameters quantifying the extent of 
interference between two decisional variables (ideally, across different contexts) 
and various psychometric scores.  
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List of abbreviations 
 
BDM Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (Auction bid)  
BOLD Blood-oxygen-level dependent  
BVS Brain valuation system  
dACC Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
EU Expected Utility theory 
fMRI Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
GARP Generalized axiom of revealed preference  
MDP Markov decision process  
mOFC Medial orbitofrontal cortex  
OFC Orbitofrontal cortex  
PCC Posterior cingulate cortex  
PT Prospect theory 
RT Reaction time  
SEU Subjective expected utility 
SPM Statistical parametric mapping  
TMS  Transcranial magnetic stimulation  
VBA Variational Bayesian algorithm 
vmPFC Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
VS Ventral striatum 
WTP Willingness to pay 
WARP Weak axiom of revealed preference 
 
AEC Anticipated energetic cost 
REC Real energetic cost 
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